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Governing Imperial Borders: Insights from the Study of the 
Implementation of Law in Qing Xinjiang 
Huan Tian 
This research examines, through a detailed analysis of the way in which laws 
were implemented, the changing strategies that the Qing Empire employed to govern 
Xinjiang from 1759, when this area was annexed into the empire, to 1911, when the 
Qing dynasty collapsed. Focusing on the changes in the applicability of the two legal 
systems—Qing state law and indigenous Islamic law—in the criminal and the civil 
domains respectively, as well as the dynamic of the Qing legal policies, the 
dissertation studies the Qing‘s state building project in a multi-ethnic context from the 
legal perspective.  
Different from many historians studying European expansion, who argue that 
law was an important tool of forced acculturation, my research on Xinjiang shows that 
the Qing rulers managed to integrated this area without full acculturation. The story 
this dissertation is telling is one of the creation of Xinjiang as a province over time, 
though one that still holds an ambiguous status as an autonomous region even to today. 
It is against this background that the dissertation looks at how the two vast legal 
systems collided in China‘s northwestern frontier, and how the area‘s indigenous 
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Recent scholarship has demonstrated the fundamental role of law in structuring 
Western colonial expansion and governance from the sixteenth century onwards. 
However, little attention has been drawn to its role in the process of state building in 
the East. As many historians have illustrated, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries, China shared the same expansion project as its European counterparts.
1
 
Research on the development of the legal system of Qing Xinjiang will certainly shed 
light on our understanding of how the Qing carried out state building in its newly 
acquired frontier. Mostly due to the lack of materials, little research has been done on 
this topic, especially on the legal arrangement in Xinjiang. In this dissertation, I 
investigate how the Qing authorities established and modified the legal system in 
Xinjiang in order to integrate this northwestern ethnic frontier as well as the influence 
of legal pluralism on the lives of local people, both indigenous inhabitants and 
immigrants.  
                                                 
1 Scholars have long been locating Qing expansion within early modern world history as a form of 
colonialism. As early as 1947, Qing rule over the Mongols was compared with British colonial rule by 
Luo Yingrong. See Luo Yingrong ―Zhong e meng de jiechu yu Qingdai de lifan zhengce‖, Lishi 
zhengzhi xuebao, vol.1, 1947, p. 32. For recent research, see Nicola Di Cosmo, ―Qing Colonial 
Administration in Inner Asia.‖ The International History Review 20.2 (1998), pp. 287-309; Peter 
Perdue, ―Comparing Empires: Manchu colonialism‖, The International History Review, vol. 2, June 
1998, pp. 23-504, and Laura Hostetler, ―Qing Connections to the Early Modern World: Ethnography 





Based on historical, political and topographic differences, during the Qing 
dynasty, the new frontier, Xinjiang,
2
 as a whole could be divided into three parts: 
North Xinjiang (Zungharia), East Xinjiang, and South Xinjiang (the latter two parts 
were also called as Altishahr, Eastern Turkestan, Chinese Turkestan, or Huijiang). 
The entire region totaled some 650,000 square miles. 
After Qing troops defeated the Zunghar Khanate in the late 1760s, almost all the 
Mongolian tribal people, who constituted the majority of the population in North 
Xinjiang, were killed in the purge after the war or were forced to leave their homeland. 
As a result, the dwellers of North Xinjiang were mainly the Qing stationed troops 
(Eight Banner and Green Standard troops) as well as Han or Uyghur agrarian 
immigrants from other Chinese regions and Altishahr. Chinese civilian administrative 
structures were taking shape and three prefecture-level units were established under 
the control of Manchu officials. East Xinjiang had a close relationship with China 
proper due to its geographic proximity and their early submission to the Qing. In East 
Xinjiang, mainly covering Hami and Turfan, local Muslims were organized under the 
banner system. The chieftains were designated as jasaks to rule over their people. In 
South Xinjiang where the indigenous Uyghurs constituted the majority of the 
population, Muslim officials—begs—were appointed to administer the Uyghurs and 
                                                 
2
 The Chinese term ―Xinjiang‖ came into use soon after the conquest as a general appellation for the 
region that is almost coterminous with the present Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, 





other Turkish-speaking natives under the supervision of imperial agents stationed 
there by the Qing.  
Due to the diversity of the population and modes of administrative, legislation, 
judicature, and law enforcement differed in these three parts of Xinjiang. Generally 
speaking, Qing law prevailed in most parts of North Xinjiang. Nonetheless, an 
increase in both Chinese and Uyghur immigrants from within or outside Xinjiang 
made the situation more complex, since the number of disputes occurring between 
different ethnic groups increased accordingly and the implementation of Qing law 
became progressively challenging. The Huijiang area presented an even more 
complex picture. There, both Qing law and Islamic law were enforced to deal with 
criminal and civil cases. After several decades under Qing rule, the conflicts among 
various groups in Xinjiang became intensified due to ethnic conflicts, local 
bureaucratic corruption and legal abuse, foreign intervention, and an increasing 
diminution of the Manchu emperors‘ authority. The Muslim Rebellion, which broke 
out in 1864, can be regarded as an outgrowth of over one hundred years of 
accumulating social dissatisfaction toward Qing rule in the area. Finally, by the end of 
1881, the Qing Empire regained and consolidated its sovereignty over the entire 
Xinjiang area after a thirteen-year loss of control. The designation of Xinjiang as a 
province in 1884 marked a turning point in Qing governance over Xinjiang. 
By then, Xinjiang was administratively incorporated into the imperial prefecture 
system, which can be regarded as the final step of the long process that saw the 





under greater official supervision and renamed xiangyue 鄉約(village compact head). 
As in the inland provinces after the Taiping Rebellion, ethnic Han officials replaced 
Mongol and Manchu officials in many of the high administrative positions of 
Xinjiang. The political thought of these officials was influenced by a group of 1820s 
and 1830s statecraft scholars, such as Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan. Facing increasing 
fiscal and social troubles domestically and growing commercial and military pressure 
along the maritime and land frontiers, this new generation of officials was eager to 
carry out stronger national defense by turning Xinjiang into a fully-fledged Chinese 
―colony‖.  
Broadly speaking, there was a historical shift over the one and half centuries of 
Qing governance in Xinjiang, evolving from flexible, indirect rule which gave ethnic 
chieftains considerable administrative autonomy to an unmediated frontier 
administration which was said to be ―unified‖ with China proper. The development of 
legal policies in Xinjiang followed the political and social changes of the frontier. 
Gradually the realms in which Qing codified law applied were enlarged and the 
realms in which Islamic law applied shrank. But for most of the era, the civil domain 
of indigenous people was largely left untouched by the state. My study examines 
these shifts and trends in detail and discusses their internal logic. 
 
Qing Imperialism  
The past two decades have witnessed a growing body of research focusing on 





much of it stimulated by the opening of the Qing archives in Beijing. The so-called 
―tribute system‖ paradigm raised by John King Fairbank and Teng Tsu-yu3 was 
gradually brought into question, because more and more scholars realized that the 
Sino-centric ideology implied by the tribute system did not fully serve the Manchu 
rulers, and the hua-yi 華夷 (Sino-barbarian/foreign) dichotomy became increasingly 
problematic as the expansion of the empire incorporated many groups of peoples who 
had previously belonged to the yi category in the Middle Kingdom.  
The ―Altaic school‖, represented by David Farquhar, Pamela Crossley, Evelyn 
Rawski, Mark Elliott, and Edward Rhoads, has focused on how the Qing rulers 
ideologically envisioned and governed their multiethnic empire.
4
 According to them, 
the ability to maintain a separate Manchu identity and to adopt a multiethnic cultural 
policy, rather than a sinicization strategy, was the key factor of the Qing‘s success in 
ruling their diverse subjects.  
                                                 
3
 John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, ―On the Ch‘ing Tributary System‖, Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies 6, no. 2 (1941), pp. 135-246. 
4 See, David M. Farquhar, ―The Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch'ing Empire.‖ 
Harvard Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.38, No.1 ( 1978 ): 5-34; Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent 
Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (University of California Press, 1999); Evelyn 
S. Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (University of California 
Press, 1998) and ―Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing; The Significance of the Qing Period 
in Chinese History,‖ Journal of Asian Studies 55 (November 1996): 829–50; Mark Elliot, The Manchu 
Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001); and Edward J. M. Rhoads, Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early 





Following Pamela Crossley‘s idea that the Qing was an Inner Asian empire 
rather than a Chinese dynasty, James Millward‘s book, Beyond the Pass, tries to 
generate a rethinking of China‘s relations with Inner Asia based on the Qing conquest 
and administration of Xinjiang before the eve of the Muslim Rebellion.
5
 In this sense, 
Millward‘s work can be regarded as a case study of the Qing‘s universal emperorship 
advocated by the Altaic school. Focusing on Qing fiscal and ethnic policy in Xinjiang, 
Millward argues that though economic motives could largely explain the European 
expansionism of the same period, the Qing rulers did not treat Xinjiang as a profit 
center. Based on detailed research on Qing economic policies, including the shipment 
of annual silver subsidy (xiexiang 協餉), governmental trade with Kazakhs, official 
commerce, commercial taxation and so on, Millward concludes that at least the 
extraction of natural resources or commercial wealth was not a goal of the Qing in 
occupying this area before the 1830s. The Qing‘s position in Xinjiang seems to have 
had more to do with an imperial ideology, which was represented by the Qianlong 
emperor‘s ideological vision of the empire as ―five nations under Heaven.‖6 
According to Millward, Qing rule over Xinjiang can be divided into two phases. 
Qing imperialism in the first phase (before the 1830s) demonstrates little missionary 
impulse.
7
 The Qing authorities did not greatly interfere with local religion or customs. 
                                                 
5
 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass—Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 
1759-1864, (California: Stanford University Press, 1988).  
6
 Ibid, pp.197-203.  
7





The second Khoja invasion in 1830 marked the beginning of a shift in Qing policy. 
The Qing government began to display an implicit distrust of East Turkestanis and 
voted for intensified Chinese colonization.
8
 In the meantime, some Han statecraft 
thinkers, such as Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, and Xu Song, proposed transforming 
Xinjiang into a fully-fledged Chinese colony. This blueprint was finally realized by 
Han general Zuo Zongtang and his colleagues who re-conquered Xinjiang in the 
1880s and established it as a province. Millward defines their policies as ―Hanization‖ 
instead of sinicization. 
Millward‘s work, however, covers only the period before 1864 and emphasized 
the economic aspect of empire building in Xinjiang; he does not go further to evaluate 
the role of frontier policies in the late Qing period. Therefore his thought-provoking 
research leaves some important questions unanswered. For instances, to what extent 
can we say Qing policies after the 1880s had missionary impulse? Should we regard 
the establishment of Xinjiang province in the 1880s and the more direct state control 
thereafter as a break with the Qianlong strategic mode? Can we divide the Manchu 
ruling elites and Han officials into two distinct camps and treat Xinjiang and even 
Qing history after the mid-nineteenth century as an incomplete process of 
―Hanization‖?  
Peter Perdue is another scholar who specializes in the Qing expansion 
northwestward. His article ―Culture, history, and imperial Chinese strategy: legacies 
                                                 
8





of the Qing conquests‖ argues that the Qing strategy was radically different from the 
Ming, even though both faced a similar situation on the Northwest frontier.
9
 Perdue 
criticizes the cultural realism thesis, represented by Alastair Iain Johnson‘s work10, 
and claims that the Qing strategy by no means can be characterized as merely 
―realism.‖ According to him, the fact that the Qing conquered and protected the 
Central Asian frontiers was mainly the result of the personalities of Kangxi, 
Yongzheng and Qianlong as well as the strong economy at that time. Moreover, 
Perdue suggests that the Qing conquest of Xinjiang was precarious. Their policies 
became more coherent only as time went on and as the international relations and 
domestic situation did not offer them more choices. 
It is very illuminating for Perdue to mention the influence of the emperors‘ 
personalities upon state policies. Many of the Qing emperors, especially the earlier 
ones, had very strong personalities and were usually eager to engage themselves in 
day to day state affairs. On the one hand, different emperors would frequently deal 
                                                 
9
 Peter C. Perdue, ―Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing Conquests,‖ 
in Warfare in Chinese History, ed. Hans van de Ven. E. J. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 252-287. 
10
 Johnson argues that there are two Chinese strategic cultures: (i) symbolic culture (Confucian, 
Mencian paradigm) that generally downplays violence as an instrument of state policy, instead 
stressing the power of moral virtue to bring peace; and (ii) the operational culture (parabellum) which 
means ―if you want peace, prepare for war‖. Johnson demonstrates that the Confucian-Mencian 
strategy was largely symbolic and often had little impact on actual behavior, while the decision-makers‘ 
actual decisions corresponded much more closely to the parabellum paradigm and was realist. Johnson 
mainly based his arguments on the ―Seven Military Classics‖ and the Ming dynasty's grand strategy 
against the Mongols. See Alaistair Ian Johnson, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand 





with similar cases in different ways; on the other hand, the frontier situation was itself 
ever-changing, so the Qing‘s frontier governance was actually a long process of 
constant initiation, testing, and adjustment. Practical policies were formulated in an 
ad hoc manner in line with changing situations.  
Perdue does not totally agree with the postmodernist approach to Chinese 
strategy either.
11
 He argues that both the postmodernists and the ―Altaic school‖ 
totally disregard coercion. They all notice correctly that Qing rulers adopted a 
multiethnic cultural policy to deal with different groups of subjects, but they ignore 
the employment and threat of military force as an important backup when ritual was 
violated.  
Perdue concentrates more on the role played by the interaction of security 
concerns and commercial interests in shaping ―nomadic state building,‖ based on a 
comparative approach dealing with ―state building in Europe and Asia.‖ In China 
Marches West he suggests that we should regard the Qing expansion as a state doing 
state-building—a dramatic challenge to the ―modern‖ concept that Asian 
state-building was merely a response to the West.
12
 Perdue suggests that from the 
                                                 
11
 For instance, James Hevia criticizes Fairbank for endorsing an Orientalist view of China as 
practicing an archaic, traditional style of foreign relations; instead he proposes to view Macartney‘s 
mission to the Qianlong emperor‘s court as an encounter between two imperial formations, each with 
universalistic pretensions and complex metaphysical systems that buttressed them. See James L. Hevia. 
Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the. Macartney Embassy of 1793, (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1995). 
12
 Peter Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, (Cambridge and 





sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries China shared the same expansionist project as the 
European states and imperial China‘s security concerns were also not so much 
different from its European counterparts. Perdue agrees with Eric Hobsbawm, David 
Landes, Andre Gunder Frank, and other scholars who argue that there has long been 
only one global economy in which China played an important role. Perdue rejects the 
notion that China was isolated from the ―European system‖ before the mid-eighteenth 
century and thus finds similar themes in Qing state-building. To him the early Qing 
empire was an ―evolving state structure engaged in mobilization for expansionist 
warfare.‖ When talking about the process of Qing state-building, Perdue borrows 
Charles Tilly‘s model of the formation of the European state system: the constant 
interaction of trade flows and security demands. He does this by arguing that imperial 
China‘s security and commercial concerns were not so much different from those of 
European states. 
According to Perdue, the high Qing
13
 conquests and frontier strategy had a 
dramatic and long lasting influence on Chinese history. The Qing expansion changed 
the definition of the boundaries of state and society. More importantly, in the late 
Qing period, Chinese nationalists inherited this expansive strategic tradition. In his 
words,“imperialists and nationalists were secret sharers, especially in their analysis of 
the future of the Qing frontiers.‖14 It is particularly important that Perdue argues that 
                                                 
13
 By ―High Qing‖, I mean the ―Kang-Qian Golden Age,‖ which is the era when the Kangxi, 
Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors ruled (1662-1795). 
14





Zuo Zongtang‘s determination to re-conquer Xinjiang, the financial support provided 
by the Zongli Yamen for this campaign, and finally the establishment of Xinjiang as a 
province, all were legacies of the earlier Qing expansive strategy. However, Perdue 
does not go further on this topic. Like Millward, his research does not quite extend 
beyond the 1880s.  
In his article ―Qing colonial administration in Inner Asia,‖ Nicola Di Cosmo 
analyzes the administrative system through which the Qing ruled the ―outer provinces‖ 
that included Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia, and argues that efficient administration 
played a more crucial role than military power in control over a colony. Di Cosmo 
notes that with new systems of administration the Manchu elite accomplished much 
more effective governance of frontiers than did previous dynasties when the tributary 
relationship dominated.
15
 Di Cosmo further reminds us that ―while in the beginning 
the military posts were the more important, by the late Qianlong and Jiaqing periods 
the balance had shifted to civil administration.‖ By then, the Qing eventually 
transformed the traditional Chinese system of tributary relations and ―loose rein‖ 
policies into a new system in which the newly incorporated areas were under military 
occupation together with a more direct administrative structure.
16
 In particular Di 
Cosmo notes that the Qing‘s Northwest colonies were ruled via a separate ministry, 
                                                 
15
 Nicola Di Cosmo, ―Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia.‖ The International History Review 
20.2 (1998), pp. 287-309. 
16





the Lifanyuan, and administered differently in different regions. The central 
government effectively established different systems which were largely run by local 
elites.  
Di Cosmo seems to share a similar opinion with Perdue when arguing that the 
Qing expedition in Xinjiang was comparable to the territorial expansion of European 
empires and their establishment of colonial rule over weaker nations and peoples in 
eighteenth-century world history. He makes this argument in order to illustrate that 
the construction of the Qing empire was comparable to Western colonial 
empire-building. 
The research of the aforementioned three scholars all focuses mainly on the 
high Qing expansion and the Qing state building process in the newly incorporated 
Inner Asian frontiers. They all notice that the Qing frontier strategy was dynamic and 
the rulers adjusted their frontier policies constantly as time went on. Particularly, 
Millward mentions that an ideological shift in strategic thinking began to occur after 
the second Khoja invasion in 1830. However, none of them extend their research 
beyond the re-conquest of Xinjiang, when a group of Han ―nationalist‖ officials really 
began to administrate this frontier.  
L. J. Newby‘s book, The Empire and the Khanate, focuses on the political 
history of the Qing administration of Altishahr (South Xinjiang) and its relations with 
Khoqand from 1760 to 1860. Newby links the two angles by reminding us that policy 





domestic administration of Altishahr.
17
 Moreover, the distinctiveness of Newby‘s 
research lies in the fact that she makes a better effort to locate this frontier story in the 
background of the transformation of China from an expansive empire to a proto 
nation state. ―The [Qing] empire‘s interaction with peoples outside its territorial 
jurisdiction contributed towards the move from an open, fluid frontier to a 
non-negotiable, closed concept of border, thus presaging the shift from a Qing empire 
to nation-state.‖18 
The 100-odd years of diplomatic contact between Khoqand and the Qing empire 
from 1760 to 1864, indicates a shift from the old order to a new one. After the 
conquest of this northwest frontier area, the Qing soon found that their adjacent 
neighbor, the Khoqand state, was becoming a more and more powerful regional 
player and was in all likelihood capable of conquering Altishahr. This threat made the 
Qing finally choose to further consolidate their control by transforming Xinjiang into 
a non-negotiable part of the empire. As the Chinese scholar Pan Zhiping has also 
argued, Khoqand‘s relationship with Qing China shifted from that of a dependent 
state (shuguo) between 1759 and 1820 to that of a neighboring state (linguo) and 
therefore one that was equal and independent after 1820.
19
  
                                                 
17
 L. J. Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand. 
1760-1860, (Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2005), p. 10. 
18
 Ibid, p. 11. 
19
 Pan Zhiping, ―Lun haohan hanguo de fuwang‖(Studies on the collapse of Khoqand Empire), 





In the same vein, Qing policy toward Altishahr experienced a general shift as 
well, further demonstrating the transition of a newly incorporated area from a fluid 
frontier for the empire into a closed border of a would-be nation state. As the conflict 
with Khoqand and the Khojas persisted, as early as the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, these frontier frictions, together with internal uprisings in 
Altishahr, enabled the gradual hardening of the concept of border and the 
development of a border consciousness. Both Manchu (Mongol) officials (e.g. 
Nayancheng) and Han officials and statecraft scholars (e.g. Feng Guifen and Wei 
Yuan) came together to argue for Xinjiang as a non-negotiable part of a Chinese 
empire and voiced support for redefining the relationship with Altishahr and Khoqand. 
An inclusive border consciousness finally gave way to an exclusive concept of 
boundary.  
This argument can very well supplement Perdue‘s view on the Qing‘s 
re-conquest of Xinjiang. Thus we can see that out of both a nascent nationalism and 
the legacy of high-Qing expansionism, the late Qing policymakers decided to 
consolidate their rule in Xinjiang. Moreover, Newby and Perdue‘s findings lend alert 
us to the importance of linking the changes of the Qing legal policies with the shift of 







Qing Xinjiang society was legally plural, in the sense that two or more legal 
systems coexisted in this social field.
20
 Among recent English-language scholarship 
on legal pluralism, Lauren Benton‘s work deserves particularly careful reading. Based 
on the profound observation that ―the colonial order was by its very nature a plural 
legal order,‖ Benton traces a historical global movement between 1400 and 1900, 
from those ―truly plural‖ legal regimes of the early modern period to the 
―state-dominated‖ legal regimes of the modern period.21 Benton does not limit her 
research to one or two regions, but tries instead to identify a common dynamic to all 
empires and states.   
Benton‘s work can particularly provide guidance for legal research on Qing 
Xinjiang. Firstly, the shift from truly plural legal orders to state-dominated legal 
orders is very similar to the process by which state-imposed law became more and 
more influential in Xinjiang over time, though the two legal systems never had a 
clear-cut demarcation when applied to Xinjiang legal cases. By ―truly plural legal 
order‖ Benton refers to the relatively fluid legal pluralism in which semi-autonomous 
legal authorities operated alongside state law, which appeared in European expansion. 
The ―state-dominated legal order‖ was described by Benton as hierarchical, in which 
state law subsumed in one way or another all jurisdictions, including ―traditional‖ 
                                                 
20
 John Griffiths defines legal pluralism as ―that state of affairs, for any social field, in which behavior 
pursuant to more than one legal order occurs‖. See John Griffiths, "What is Legal Pluralism?" Journal 
of Legal Pluralism, 24 (1), pp. 1-55. 
21
 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900, (New 





forums given special status by the state.
22
 Benton‘s finding lends us a luminous 
perspective, that is, the extent to which we can define legal pluralism in Xinjiang as 
―fluid‖ or ―hierarchical.‖ The answer to this question is crucial for us to understand 
the development of the relationship between the metropolitan conqueror and the 
conquered frontier.    
Secondly, Benton argues in her book that cultural practice and legal institutions, 
and not just the global economy, shaped colonial rule and the world order. Colonial 
and post-colonial states developed in part as a response to conflicts over legal 
ordering. Similarly, when explaining the development of Qing rule in Xinjiang, 
current scholarship concentrates mainly on economic and military factors. Few 
scholars have ever explored how frontier legal order and metropolitan strategies 
interacted with each other in Xinjiang. My research, however, emphasizes that law 
played a crucial role in shaping the Qing rule over Xinjiang. The jurisdictional 
flexibility that the High Qing emperors willingly offered enabled local officials to 
abuse the law and generated severe social conflicts which finally drove the Qing 
policymakers to consolidate their legal sovereignty there. 
Recently scholars have paid more attention to imperial legislation in relation to 
social change but most of these studies are about the inner provinces.
23
 Joanna 
                                                 
22
 Lauren Benton, ―Colonial Law and Cultural Difference: Jurisdictional Politics and the Formation of 
the Colonial State‖, Comparative Studies in Society and History. 41, 3 (2000), pp.563-588. 
23
 See, Joanna Waley-Cohen, Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang 1758-1820, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); and Matthew H. Sommer, Sex, Law and Society in Late Imperial 





Waley-Cohen‘s book does examine the development and actual implementation of 
banishment in Xinjiang during 1758-1820. However, what most concerns her is the 
lives of exile convicts, most of whom came from China proper, as well as the penalty 
of banishment in Chinese law, rather than the local legal system. 
A few studies about the legislation and legal practice in other frontier regions of 
the Qing empire are particularly helpful for us to discuss the legal situation in Qing 
Xinjiang. Dorothea Heuschert discusses the development of Qing legislation for the 
Mongols in a brief but informative essay that shows some inspiring insights.
24
 Firstly, 
she argues that the gradual blurring of Mongol and Chinese law does not seem to have 
been intentional, but a result of the wish to clarify and formalize Mongolian law. 
Moreover, the validity of the Manchu-made Mongolian statute-book for the whole 
Qing era indicates that Qing emperors had not intended to impose Chinese law on the 
Mongols. Secondly, when studying the coexistence of the Qing code and the 
Mongolian statute-book as well as the applicability of the two laws, Heuschert notices 
the Qing ruler‘s ambivalence in deciding between a principle of territoriality and of 
the ethnicity of the criminal. Thirdly, she reminds us that as the local judicial 
authority, Mongolian noblemen (jasaks) held a recognized position in the official 
hierarchy of Qing administration in Mongolia. They were not like indigenous litigants 
in most Western colonies, such as British Africa, who were answerable to the 
authorities of an alien imperial legal system.  
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It seems to me that all the three phenomena can find parallels in Qing Xinjiang. 
However I argue that some fundamental differences existed between the two regions. 
In Xinjiang, there was nothing corresponding to a Mongolian statute-book, which 
embodies ―customary law‖ in comparison to the Qing state law Qing rulers left much 
room for indigenous Islamic law to settle civil disputes and minor criminal offenses. 
Though Muslim begs held a position in the state official hierarchy analogous to that 
of Mongolian jasaks, Uyghur religious leaders had long been working independently 
of the state in the legal realm.  
Among scholars who are interested in the experience of the Qing empire in its 
Southwestern frontier,
25
 Donald Sutton is the only one who has dedicated research to 
the dual-law system in this area.
26
 Utilizing both historical and anthropological 
methods, Sutton locates legal culture in its bureaucratic context and uncovers the 
process of legislation in the eighteenth-century Miao frontier. According to him, the 
Qing legal policy in this region shifted between a firmly integrative approach, which 
often brought on military conflicts, and a more tolerant, relaxed one. Sutton argues 
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that the reason for the shift lies in bureaucratic splits aligned vertically and 
horizontally. By the former he refers to the conflicts between Manchu or Han 
bannermen who favored a quarantine policy to protect the Miao people in contrast to 
Han Chinese officials advocating the assimilation of the frontier dwellers. More 
importantly, Sutton stresses the horizontal division separating ―ambitious‖ provincial 
level officials from the more pragmatic grassroots officials, who had to deal with the 
frontier reality and often allowed arbitration of Miao cases outside the court.  
Sutton‘s bureaucratic perspective reminds us that the imperial officials who 
were sent to rule the frontier were not a monolithic group. The local-level officials, 
who were implementing the legal policies, often had different agendas from those 
who made the policies. In the Southwest, these grassroots officials were more eager to 
diminish violence than to promote assimilation. In Xinjiang, as my research shows, 
many imperial officials collaborated up with indigenous leaders to abuse the law and 
gain personal profit. 
As for the bureaucratic conflicts Sutton discerns between Manchu and Han 
officials on quarantine or assimilation policies, in Xinjiang the difference of opinions 
also seemed to exist on the surface. We do see that the Qing adopted a largely 
quarantine-based policy in Xinjiang before the Daoguang reign (1821-1850) and after 
the 1880s the Han Chinese provincial officials promoted a series of culturally 
assimilating policies. Nonetheless, I argue that the change took place chronologically 
and not along the line of the policymakers‘ ethnicities. The reason that we see the 





send Chinese officials to rule the Inner Asian frontier before the Taiping Rebellion. It 
seems to me that a better way to explore the fundamental reason for change in state 
legal policy in the frontier is to locate it against the backdrop of the transformation of 
the Qing from an empire to a state.  
According to both Heuschert and Sutton, as well as Millward (in his 1998 
book
27
), the new colonial systems established by the Qing—be they in Mongolian 
territories, the southwestern Miao frontier, or Xinjiang—all more or less favored 
non-Han ethnic people over Han Chinese or aimed to protect non-Han from being 
exploited by Han immigrants or merchants. In Xinjiang, the situation only changed 
after the Qing experienced increasing border conflicts with the neighboring state, 
Khoqand, and internal uprisings by the Uyghurs. During the course of transforming 
itself into a nation-state, the Qing had to redefine its rulers‘ relationship with different 
ethnic groups and adjust frontier policies, including in the legal sphere.  
Sally Engle Merry distinguishes the ―new legal pluralism‖ from ―classic legal 
pluralism.‖ The former was mainly about colonial or postcolonial societies, where 
more than one normative ordering coexisted within the same territory. The latter can 
be found in almost all societies and is about the relationship between the official legal 
system and various kinds of unofficial forms of ordering.
28
 At first sight, the topic of 
legal pluralism in Xinjiang belongs to the ―classic‖ category, as the two actors, the 
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Qing state law and the indigenous Islamic law, were easy to identify. However, as 
Ildiko Beller-Hann reminds us, besides the two codified normative systems there was 
a third player in the game, which was a set of unwritten rules that can be called 




Contemporary Qing officials, however, did not seem to differentiate codified 
Islamic law from unwritten Uyghur customs. The two were treated as one set of rules, 
and called together ―chan su 纏俗 (Uyghur customs)‖ or ―hui su 回俗(Muslim 
customs)‖ in official documents. Different from the Mongolian statute book or miao li 
(Miao statutes), which were both ―historical constructs of the colonial periods,‖30 in 
Xinjiang the Uyghur customs and codified Islamic law had much more continuity 
with the pre-colonial past. More importantly, Chinese officials treated these 
customary rules in a similar way to local Han Chinese customs in the neidi. As Sutton 
also suggests in his article, the frontier grassroots officials were in a situation similar 
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to those who worked in the neidi, where ―the role of custom, personal relations and 
out-of-court negotiation was probably always large in dealing with locals.‖31  
This issue is related to another big discipline about civil practices of early 
modern China to which I try to contribute a very tentative response in this dissertation, 
especially in the second part. In spite of the debate on whether or not custom and civil 
law existed in pre-modern China,
32
 the recent two decades have seen a growing 
literature discussing how ordinary Chinese exchanged and secured their property 
claims in local area, as well as the role played by the state in dealing with civil matters 
in the late Qing and early Republic.
33
 Particularly, some scholars have noticed how 
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contracts created property rights as a fundamental institution in China with or without 
the backing of the state.
34
 
In my dissertation, I observe from a frontier perspective how private economic 
disputes among ordinary people were settled and examine the role played by the state. 
I argue that the flexible approach that the Qing legal system adopted to deal with civil 
matters in the neidi was also applied to frontier dwellers. It was embodied in Xinjiang 
in a non-interventionist policy which tolerated to a great extent the legal power of 
customary law in the civil domain. Moreover, contracts were a fundamental source of 
property rights in this multiethnic region.  
 
Significance of Research 
The one and a half centuries covered in my dissertation were one of the key 
transitional periods in Chinese history. From the high point of territorial expansion 
and state-building carried out by a conquest dynasty at the beginning, the Qing of the 
later period went on to experience the agony that came from its struggle with other 
imperial regimes in order to maintain control over its frontiers. My study shows that 
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the Qing rulers managed to integrate this area into the empire without full 
acculturation. The story this dissertation is telling is one of the creation of Xinjiang as 
a province over time, though one that still holds an ambiguous status as an 
autonomous region. Part I of the dissertation is on on the criminal cases, which focus 
on state policy and its impact on the relationship between state and frontier officials; 
in Part II I use civil cases to examine how people in Xinjiang negotiated legal 
regime(s) in Xinjiang under Qing rule. At both top and bottom levels there appeared 
to be integration but not full acculturation.  
Moreover, my research will respond to and supplement current literature mainly 
in three ways. First of all, while most current research discusses the characteristics of 
the Qing governance of Xinjiang from economic, political, military or administrative 
perspectives, my research provides an answer, based on legal arrangements in 
Xinjiang, to the question of how the Qing engineered state building in a multiethnic 
context, a question few scholars have attempted to address.  
Second, while most current studies discuss Qing rule in Xinjiang before the 
outbreak of the Muslim Rebellion (1864-1877), I extend my study into the period 
stretching a restoration of imperial rule down to the collapse of the dynasty. Research 
on a longer period will enable me to draw a more complete picture of how Qing 
strategy changed in response to various domestic and international crises. 
Third, as some historians suggest that there was a trend of ―Hanization‖ of Qing 
policies toward the end of the dynasty, by locating the change of Qing governance 





proto-nation state, I argue that the changes took place gradually and not along lines of 
ethnicity. It is as difficult as it is meaningless to separate ―Manchu strategy‖ from 
―Han strategy.‖ 
Fourth, studies of Western colonialism show a historical shift over three 
centuries of European overseas expansion: from a relatively fluid legal pluralism in 
which semi-autonomous legal authorities operated alongside state law, to a 
hierarchical model of legal pluralism in which state law subsumed all jurisdictions. 
Inspired by this framework, my dissertation will discuss the extent to which the legal 
pluralism in Xinjiang can be considered ―plural‖ or ―hierarchical.‖ Through an 
analysis of cooperation and competition between local religious courts and those of 
the Qing state, this work leads to a better understanding of the characteristics and 
development of Qing colonialism.  
 
Organization of Dissertation 
Part One of this dissertation, comprising two chapters, focuses on the legislation 
in the newly conquered region and changes in the applicability of the two legal 
systems—Qing state law and indigenous Islamic law—in the criminal domain. The 
general trend was to leave much room for indigenous law to operate in this frontier 
region, while the Qing rulers gradually tightened their control over criminal cases. 
Chapter 1 addresses early legislation for Xinjiang as well as the Qianlong 
emperor‘s opinions on the rule and administration of the ―New Territories.‖ Together 





analyze how and why Qianlong set the pattern for a complex and not always 
consistent application of the law in Xinjiang. Specifically, the emperor‘s intentional 
neglect of institution building in Xinjiang and the ad hoc character of the Qing‘s 
Xinjiang policies will be discussed. In addition, a comparison will be drawn between 
Xinjiang legislation and that of the Mongolian frontier.  
Chapter 2 examines more closely the legacy of the Qianlong emperor‘s 
approach to law and governing Xinjiang. During the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the loosely defined plural legal order led to serious corruption among 
imperial officials and indigenous chieftains, which in turn generated frequent 
uprisings by impoverished Muslims. These uprisings and the Qing‘s constant border 
conflicts with Khoqand made the court finally adopt a more aggressive rule in 
Xinjiang. Accordingly, there was a shift toward a hierarchical model of legal 
pluralism. After the Muslim Rebellion and the re-conquest of Xinjiang, Qing law was 
the only law applied in serious criminal cases, irrespective of the ethnicity of the 
offender, while the arbitrative domain of Islamic law shrank. Moreover, I argue that 
the changes in how the Qing dealt with Xinjiang had a closer connection with the 
Qing‘s transformation from an empire to a state than with the policymakers‘ 
ethnicities.  
Part Two of my dissertation, comprising three chapters, focuses on how the civil 
jurisdictional mechanism operated in Xinjiang, especially after the establishment of 
the province, as well as how indigenous Uyghurs and Chinese immigrants negotiated 





the intervention of Qing state law in the everyday lives of indigenous people was 
always been very limited and hardly helped promote the acculturation of this 
conquered territory into the larger Qing empire. 
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate how the Qing/state and Islamic/local legal 
authorities competed and cooperated in regulating indigenous Uyghurs‘ everyday 
lives, using two dimensions involved in disputes as my windows into this 
subject—the gendered world of family and marriage and the economic transactions 
reflected in contracts and property disputes.  
In Chapter 3 I suggest that Turkic customs and Islamic law in some cases 
provided Uyghur women with more ―rights‖ than both their co-religionists in the 
Middle East and Han Chinese women. After the 1880s the new provincial officials 
tried to impose greater supervision on the gender order and relations among Uyghurs 
but the practical results turned out to be insignificant. Nonetheless, the existence of a 
Han Chinese yamen
35
 in every county did have some real impact on Uyghurs‘ marital 
lives. Furthermore, legal archives in both Chinese and Turkish languages show that 
indigenous litigants were fully aware of the even more patriarchal nature of the Qing 
legal system and soon learned to press individual claims by exploiting jurisdictional 
confusion. 
Chapter 4 explores the operation of the pluralistic legal arrangement in adjusting 
Uyghurs‘ economic relations and protecting their property rights. The most distinct 
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and effective cooperation between the two courts was exemplified in the recognition 
and protection by Chinese legal authorities of maor-sealed Chagatai contracts. 
Generally speaking, only a small minority of Uyghurs‘ economic disputes were 
brought to the magistrates‘ desk. I argue that after the re-conquest, the Qing 
intervention in Uyghurs‘ everyday life was still very limited but this 
non-interventionist policy became more extreme toward the end of the dynasty: Han 
prefects and magistrates left all Uyghur economic disputes to local akhunds to handle 
according to indigenous law. The state simply withdrew from this realm. 
Chapter 5 discusses how Uyghur natives and Chinese immigrants handled their 
economic disputes and protected their property rights in a multiethnic and 
jurisdictionally plural society. It seems to me that an important feature of Chinese law, 
namely the tolerance of local customs, as well as the extensive use of written 
contracts in both Chinese and Islamic legal cultures, enabled ordinary people to 
undertake various types of transactions and protect their economic interests in 
Xinjiang. Moreover, I argue that the lack of any established social mechanisms to 
mediate between different ethnic groups in Xinjiang required the state to play an 
active role in regulating and enforcing property rights and the protection of 
indigenous inhabitants‘ interests. However, the weak dynasty in its last years hardly 






CHAPTER 1  
LEGISLATION IN XINJIANG AND THE QIANLONG 
EMPEROR’S ATTITUDES 
 
This chapter is mainly about frontier legislation, in which I will discuss the 
Qianlong emperor‘s opinions on how to rule and administer the ―new territories,‖ 
opinions that laid the foundation for the Qing policies implemented in Xinjiang. My 
discussion will especially focus on the emperor‘s opinion on the applicability and 
practice of law in this area, as well as how frontier legal policies changed over time. I 
argue that the Qianlong emperor set a pattern for complex and not always consistent 
application of the law in Xinjiang and I will analyze how and why he did this in this 
chapter. 
During the Qing dynasty, the territory of China was greatly expanded and 
several frontiers were added to the map of the Manchu state. As the Qing was a 
conquest dynasty whose own people were outnumbered many times over by the 
indigenous Han Chinese, how the Manchu rulers consolidated their power and 
effectively controlled this vast territory has long intrigued both Western and Chinese 
scholars.  
Among all the Qing Emperors, it was Qianlong who laid down a solid 
foundation for Qing frontier policies, especially those affecting Xinjiang. Calling 
himself the ―old man of the ten completed great campaigns,‖ the Qianlong emperor 





fought against the Zunghar, one of the western Mongol groups in North Xinjiang 
(Zungharia), and the Turkic Muslim Khoja brothers in South Xinjiang (Altishahr), 
dramatically expanding the Empire into central Asia
36
. Before and after the 
anti-Zungharia war, Qianlong also launched eight other wars to suppress Tibet, 
Taiwan and even invaded Vietnam. Under the Qianlong reign, the Qing as a 
multiethnic, multi-linguistic empire gradually took its final shape. Qianlong has been 
regarded as a Chinese state-builder, a Manchu ethnic chief, and also a colonizing ruler 
whose empire-making ambitions largely transcended ethnicity.
37
 
It is now well known that Qianlong projected different images of ethnic identity 
to the different groups of his subjects. To Han Chinese, Qianlong was a Confucianist, 
a Han-style literati, a collector of Chinese painting and calligraphy
38
, and even a 
Taoist believer
39
. To Manchu bannermen, Qianlong was a champion of Manchu 
language and values, who usually expressed his scorn for decadent Han elites and 
worried about the Manchus‘ degeneration.40 To Tibetan and Mongolian subjects, 
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Qianlong designed his most famous self-representation—as a reincarnation of the 
Manjusri bodhisattva.
41
 While there might not be any image of the Qianlong emperor 
designed for Uyghurs as enlightened as that of the bodhisattva, we do know that he 
acquainted himself with the Uyghurs and married the ―fragrant concubine‖ (xiang fei 
香妃) of the Khoja clan.42 These ecumenical claims of the Emperor, as well as the 
establishment of a series of imperial institutions and state rituals to enact them,
43
 
reflected a highly developed ruling, especially colonizing, technique. As Evelyn 
Rawski states, ―the key to Qing achievement lay in its ability to implement flexible 
culturally specific policies aimed at the major non-Han peoples inhabiting the Inner 
Asian peripheries in the Empire.‖44 
The fact that Qing territory was considerably expanded and consolidated during 
his reign, and that the Qianlong emperor was well received by different ethnic groups, 
can be taken as an indication that he had successfully implemented ―culturally 
specific policies‖ to rule his frontiers. Therefore, Xinjiang serves as a good case study 
for research on the Qianlong emperor‘s frontier policies. The central inquiry of this 
chapter can be sub-divided into several questions. What were Qianlong‘s basic ideas 
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about ruling non-Han frontier areas? What were the features of Qianlong‘s Xinjiang 
policies, especially the legal ones? How does one evaluate the success and failure of 
these policies? How did the emperor guide his bureaucracy, especially provincial 
officials, to govern frontiers and non-Han people living there? This chapter tries to 
find some answers to these questions. 
 
The Emperor’s basic consideration on ruling Xinjiang 
The Qing empire comprised five main parts: Manchuria, China proper, 
Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang.
45
 For Qing rulers, the conquest of Xinjiang may have 
been the most controversial, both in terms of the necessity for conquest and the means 
of control to be employed. The controversy was the result of several factors: the 
repeated internecine strife among the Oirat tribes, the threat from Russia, which was 
always waiting to take advantage of instability on its eastern frontier, and the defiance 
of the Khoja brothers who filled the power vacuum in Altishahr left by the Zunghar 
khanate. Facing such challenges, Qianlong was forced to give up his original plan for 
Xinjiang—that is, to establish several power entities there to pin each other down, 
rather than to conquer and control Xinjiang directly. At the time that Qianlong 
ascended the throne, he made an effort at peaceful coexistence with the Zunghars. He 
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allowed the Zunghars to maintain regular trading relations with China and they sent 
periodic tribute missions to Beijing for nearly a decade. Had the western frontier not 
been thrown into disarray after Galdan Tsering‘s death in 1745, this situation might 
have remained unchanged. Therefore it would not be inaccurate to characterize Qing 
policy as one of ―defensive imperialism‖ in Xinjiang.  
The Manchu elites were now presented with a brand new project, figuring out 
how to govern South Xinjiang. In contrast to their relatively rich knowledge about 
Tibetans and Mongols, Manchu elites knew little about the Turkic Muslims (Uyghurs) 
living in South Xinjiang. Furthermore, for Qing rulers the control of millions of 
Muslim subjects was an ideological challenge. They ―could not become proper 
Islamic monarchs on a scale that gave them real leverage without the approval of 
Mecca, which could not be managed the way Lhasa was managed.‖46 At the same 
time, there was little in Tibetan Buddhism or Manchu shamanism that could appeal to 
these Muslims. 
It is worth noting that launching military attacks on Xinjiang, especially South 
Xinjiang, might not have been Qianlong‘s original intention, although it is also 
possible that he expressed such sentiments in order to deflect any accusation that he 
was a warmonger. The Emperor was still trying to justify his Inner Asian wars after 
the court had already begun to celebrate their big success in 1759. In the ninth month 
                                                 
46 Willard J. Peterson ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9, Part one ―The Qing Empire to 
1800‖, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Alexander Woodside, ―The Ch‘ien-Lung 





of that year, in an edict to those officials who insisted on completing the war as soon 
as possible, Qianlong stated,  
You might not know that it was not my original intention to launch a war in the 
Uyghur region (huibu 回部)… Just because the evil (Khoja) brothers were devoid of 
gratitude and even pounced on us, (we) had to suppress them in order to punish their 
crimes…Please think about the Han, Tang, Song and Ming dynasties, respectively. 
They exhausted their financial resources but failed to seize even a small piece of land. 
How do they compare to our glorious Qing dynasty? Since it has been peaceful for a 
long time, the military skills of our bannermen have languished. War (serves to) train 
the troops and polishes their skills…I have thoroughly thought about the whole issue. 
How can you say that I have a fondness for the grandiose?‖47 
One month later, in the ―Pacifying the Muslim tribe‖ edict, Qianlong pointed 
out again, ―…therefore we had no choice but to suppress (the Khojas), since 
originally we did not intend to wantonly engage in military aggression.‖48 
Although nowadays historians still have the impression that Qianlong had a 
taste for political theatrics,
49
 South Xinjiang was very possibly an unplanned 
byproduct of the Manchus overall expansion project. So it might be safe to assume 
that from the very beginning Qianlong did not have a detailed blueprint for the 
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establishment of the new territory. It is highly likely that Manchu rulers were not well 
prepared to directly rule over Xinjiang, especially South Xinjiang. The stance of the 
Qianlong court toward Xinjiang varied over time and should be seen as a process of 
constant experimentation, testing, and adjustment. As we can see in the following 
discussion, this was a possible reason why the emperor‘s opinions were 
self-contradictory or changed quickly on several occasions. However, it seems that 
there was a basic strategy in the emperor‘s mind with regard to the governance of 
Xinjiang, that is, to station large numbers of troops around the Ili region, to exert tight 
control over North Xinjiang, and to rely on local Muslim leaders who pledged 




The Xinjiang administrative system of Xinjiang 
How did Qianlong plan to govern Xinjiang? What kind of administrative system 
did he have in mind for the territory? As Qianlong pointed out in the aforementioned 
edict, one function of the Inner Asia war was to drill banner soldiers. Banner troops 
consisted of the main body of Qianlong‘s westbound army. Following the conquest, 
basically a clique of Manchu military commanders was in charge of Xinjiang affairs. 
High-ranking generals such as Zhaohui and Shuhede were leaders of this conquest 
group. In addition to this military group, there was another administrative group 
shared power over Xinjiang. This group was led by the Governors-General of Shaanxi 
                                                 





and Gansu (shan gan zongdu), who had been in charge of all administrative affairs in 
Shaanxi, Gansu, and the Eastern Xinjiang area before 1759 when Xinjiang became an 
independent administrative unit. Two Han officials took up this position in succession 
from 1755 to 1766: Huang Tinggui (1755-1759) and Yang Yingju (1759-1766). Both 
of them were Han bannermen. As Han Chinese they were a minority in the uppermost 
layer of the ―provincial bureaucracy‖, in which Manchu officials dominated. 51 
Despite their Han lineage, they were seen, in Qianlong‘s eyes, to be different from 
ordinary Han officials because of their bannerman identity. In fact, during the 
Qianlong reign, the share of Han officials in the ―provincial bureaucracy‖ decreased 
by about a half.
52
 
In February 1759 Huang Tinggui died of illness. His successor, Yang Yingju, 
was quite active at the beginning of his appointment. Like the Qianlong emperor, 
Yang was considering issues of ruling the vast ―New Territory‖ as the war 
approached its end. At the end of 1759 he sent a memorial to suggest combining the 
separate governorships of Shaanxi and Sichuan into one position of 
―Governor-General of Sichuan and Shaanxi.‖ His own title, as a consequence, would 
be changed to ―Governor-General of Gansu‖ so that his responsibilities could be 
concentrated on the affairs of Gansu and Xinjiang. Qianlong accepted his suggestion 
at the outset and asked Yang as well as other Manchu generals to discuss how to 
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create an administrative structure for Xinjiang. At that time the Emperor seemed to be 
considering the incorporation of Xinjiang into the regular administrative 
―prefecture-county‖53 system.54 However, several months later Qianlong changed his 
mind. He decided not to station massive forces in South Xinjiang, but thought that the 
Ili area ―still needed top Manchu generals (man zhou da yuan 滿洲大員) to govern‖. 
At that time Yang Yingju had already gone all the way from Suzhou (today‘s Jiuquan 
city, Gansu Province) to Ili, where his yamen was located, in order to familiarize 
himself with the situation in Xinjiang. Yang had begun to prepare himself as governor 
of the New Territory (at least North Xinjiang). However, Qianlong clearly upset 
Yang‘s aspirations by issuing an edict saying ―the newly incorporated land, such as 
the Ili area, was far away from the neidi. Everything is difficult to control from a 
remote distance…So I sent Manchu generals to govern there exclusively. Neither 
were Green Standard troops able to suppress that region, nor was the Governor 
capable of managing it… It is not necessary for Yang Yingju to be there. As (you) are 
already on [your] way, you should return soon to the interior…In sum, the boundary 
                                                 
53 The administrative divisions of China have consisted of several levels since the Qin 
dynasty(221-206BC). A three-tier system based on the levels of dao (circuits), zhou (prefecture) and 
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of your jurisdiction is only up to Urumchi.‖55 Further, in December 1760, one year 
after the establishment of the position of the Governor-General of Gansu, Qianlong 




Thus in 1760 the administrative structure of Xinjiang took shape. The 
headquarters of the military garrison in Ili became the administrative center for all of 
Xinjiang. Below the center, diverse arrangements were made. In northern and part of 
eastern Xinjiang, the Qing established what was basically the civil administrative 
system applied to the interior provinces, with the addition of one or two independent 
counties or prefectures zhilizhou or zhiliting.
57
 The Muslims living in Hami and 
Turfan and other Mongolian tribes in this region were organized as banners with their 
chieftains designated as jasaks who ruled over their people autonomously. In South 
Xinjiang, Muslim officials—begs, whom the Qing appointed to administer the 
Turkic-speaking population—governed Uyghurs and other Turkic-speaking natives, 
under the supervision of military residents. 
It is clear that in Qianlong‘s appointments to the administrative positions in 
Xinjiang, military officials led by high-ranking Manchu generals were given priority. 
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During the wars in Inner Asia, Qianlong always trusted and relied on his Manchu 
generals. With their aid, Qianlong had successfully conquered Xinjiang. Now he 
wanted to continue to rely on these generals to govern this frontier region. It is known 
that, in his territorial administration of China proper, Qianlong appointed Manchus to 
the highest positions (as provincial governors-general) and Han Chinese to the lowest 
(as prefects and county magistrates)
58
. In the Xinjiang administration, the 
appointments were even more biased in favor of Manchu bannermen. Manchu top 
officials (and imperial kinsmen) constituted the main body of the upper ruling strata 
of Xinjiang. Even the ordinary civilian positions in Eastern Xinjiang were largely 
filled by Manchu officials.
59
 A study of the official composition at various levels of 
administration in Xinjiang, including circuit, prefecture, district, and county in the 
Qianlong period, suggests that Manchu appointments outnumbered both Mongol and 
Han bannermen by roughly two to one.
60
 This showed a dramatically different 
pattern from that in China proper.  
This appointment policy, however, was not initiated by Qianlong. It can be 
traced back to policies established with the founding of the Lifanyuan, which was the 
preserve of Manchu and Mongol administrators, and the only body in which ethnic 
                                                 
58 Willard J. Peterson ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9, p. 238.  
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Chinese were excluded from positions above the rank of clerk-translator.
61
 Han 
Chinese non-banner officials were excluded from the administration of Xinjiang. The 
preferential treatment of Manchu officials lasted through the later reigns of the 
dynasty until the suppression of the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), when many Han 
commanders of the new ―regional armies‖ were appointed as provincial rulers. 




Why did the Qing Emperors distrust their Han Chinese officials to deal with 
frontier affairs? The following case might provide a clue to understand Qianlong‘s 
thinking. In January 1760, the Han bannermen
63
 governor-general Yang Yingju 
suggested an official monopoly over saltpeter and sulphur (the ingredients for 
manufacturing gunpowder) mined around Kuche. The Qianlong emperor rejected his 
proposal with the following response:  
This is really a bad characteristic (louxi 陋習 ) of you Han 
bannermen (luqi 綠旗)! You formulate these kinds of regulations in an 
over precise and minute manner. However, didn‘t you know that it was 
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often the case for local people to claim local products or even to make a 
small profit by selling the products to the newly incorporated Muslim 
frontier? How could you completely prohibit them from doing so? If you 
argued that the purpose of prohibiting the private storage of (those 
chemicals) was to minimize troubles, (it would simply be narrow-minded 
and unnecessary) just like to confiscate all of the weapons from those who 
surrendered. In every battle at the Hui frontier, our troops always defeated 
the enemy (even though we never seized their weapons). Do you believe 
that no saltpeter was made there before? Could it be said that we used to 
ban them from extracting (such materials)?‖64  
As Pamela Crossley argues, the Qianlong emperor, in contrast to the 
Yongzheng and Kangxi emperors, rejected the flexible ―transformationalist‖ ideology 
of identity and asserted rigid cultural differences among Manchus, Mongols and 
Chinese. He was eager to define ―who was who‖ in order to consolidate his control of 
the multi-ethnic empire and prevent the assimilation of Manchus.
65
 Thus it is not 
strange for him to make the above generalization of the ―narrow-minded‖ character of 
the Han bannermen. This quote indicates that, in Qianlong‘s mind, Han officials 
tended to pay attention only to minor economic benefits for the state but overlooked 
significant objectives. From his point of view, such intrinsic ―bad characteristics‖ of 
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Han officials constituted a weakness that made them unsuitable to take up important 
positions governing frontier areas. Specifically, he felt that Han officials lacked a 
tolerant mindset, or the capability to harmonize with other ethnic groups. More so, 
they were overly concerned with petty profits, often at the expense of real benefits. 
Generally speaking, to the Qianlong emperor, the seizure of material benefits was not 
the primary purpose of controlling ethnic frontiers. What mattered was to maintain the 
social stability of all occupied territories. Also, it was evident that Qing emperors 
were confident about their military power. Concern with social stability rather than 
economic benefits as well as strong confidence in their military power made Manchu 
emperors take a more tolerant approach toward the governance of Xinjiang. 
Economic benefit, of course, had only been one of Qianlong‘s considerations in 
drawing up Xinjiang policies. While the emperor did not expect economic benefits 
from control of Xinjiang he did expect that Xinjiang at least could be self-sufficient 
without the center having to financially support the troops and bureaucracy there, 
though this goal was never reached.
66
 It is very interesting that, two months after 
rejecting Yang‘s suggestion that the state establish a saltpeter and sulphur monopoly, 
Qianlong sanctioned the Manchu councilor Shuhede‘s proposal requesting that a 
certain number of Aksu Muslim households hand in saltpeter and sulfur they 
extracted. Qianlong also made a detailed plan for the production and transportation of 
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saltpeter and sulphur for the entire southern Xinjiang area. As southern Xinjiang was 
quite rich in these two mineral resources, Qianlong ordered the cessation of 
(unnecessary) transportation of gunpowder from inland.
67
 To the Qianlong emperor, 
economic benefit was surely attractive, but it could not be reaped at the expense of the 
social stability of a new frontier. In Qianlong‘s view, Manchu officials might be more 
capable than Han officials to balance the gain and loss between economic interest and 
social stability. 
In addition to the central officials sent to Xinjiang, local ethnic agents, mainly 
begs and jasaks, were also an important component of administration. What was the 
emperor‘s attitude toward these local ethnic agents? Qianlong advocated a policy of 
tolerance and nonintervention. It is also worth noting that the emperor often behaved 
very cautiously when dealing with these native ethnic officials. At the end of 1761, a 
Manchu official, Kashgar Imperial Agent (banshi dachen 辦事大臣) Yonggui, sent a 
memorial suggesting that, since some Muslim begs often exploited their subjects and 
made trouble, the government should expand its regulations in such a way as to 
reduce the power of local authorities. One way would be to add the confiscation of 
livestock and other goods to the current range of judicial penalties that could be 
applied to local authorities who did not cooperate with the new regime. Qianlong 
refused his suggestion. He was concerned that ―if (the confiscation) is not handled well 
and causes any corruption, it will give Uyghurs excuses (to criticize our rule), which 
                                                 





will be extremely disgraceful.‖ ―In addition,‖ he continued, ―Do you really think 
people living in the neidi never cheat or disguise (ji neidi ren deng, qi jing quanwu 
qishi ye 即內地人等，豈竟全無欺飾耶 )?‖68  Qianlong remained alert to his 
non-Manchu subjects, not only Muslim begs but also Han Chinese. His generosity 
and tolerance can be partly explained as taking precautions against potential troubles. 
At the same time he did not take it for granted that the Han Chinese or officials were 
more trustworthy than Muslims. Again we see that the Qianlong emperor regarded 
Uyghur subjects as equally important as, if not more than, the Han subjects in his 
multi-ethnic empire. This is a view that also appears to be embraced by an increasing 
number of contemporary historians. For example, James Millward suggests that 
within the ideological scope of Qianlong‘s Empire, ―neither Han Chinese nor Chinese 
culture was granted privileged position in the Inner Asian parts of the realm‖.69 
 
The legislation  
Before the advent of Qing governance, Islamic law (mixed with some traces of 
pre-Islamic native customs of this place)
70
 regulated Uyghur behavior in Eastern 
Turkestan. It was recorded in a Chinese document that ―the Uyghurs do have their 
criminal law, but they do not have their codes or statutes. (When they have disputes), 
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they go to akhunds, who will look at the (Islamic) classics to make a decision. Both 
begs and common people will all believe and obey the arbitration.‖71 Generally 
speaking, Islamic law pays more attention to private law.
72
 The judicial regulations of 
civil cases constituted the main body of Islamic law. This is in contrast to the Chinese 
traditional legal system, largely represented by the Great Qing Code, which had a 
strong penal emphasis. In the Great Qing Code, even matters of a civil nature were 
treated based on stipulations of penalties. Moreover, whereas Islamic law operated 
parallel to state authority, Chinese law was public law and ―dealt with all matters 
from the point of view of the ruler‖.73 
After 1759, the Qing rulers allowed the application of Islamic law in dealing 
with the civil disputes and the least serious criminal cases. When dealing with other 
criminal cases, especially severe ones, officials had to make reference to the Qing law 
(an lu ni zui 按律擬罪). It is widely agreed that the adjudication of civil and 
non-severe criminal disputes among Uyghurs during the Qing dynasty was largely 
carried out by akhund.  
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During the Qing dynasty, the central government continuously incorporated 
new sub-statutes and regulations into the Code to meet new exigencies, such as the 
incorporation of new frontier colonies. Legislation for ethnic areas was an important 
project of the Qing government. However, the legislation in Xinjiang, especially in 
terms of the legislation of criminal and civil laws, was different from that in other 
ethnic or frontier areas.  
Qing rulers did not lack experience in the design of a legally pluralistic empire. 
As early as the Kangxi reign, they began to incorporate elements of Chinese law into 
Mongolian law. However, we will find that, when dealing with the legislative issues 
of Xinjiang, the Qianlong emperor did not duplicate the approach that his ancestors 
and he himself followed when dealing with Mongol tribes. Differences in legislation 
between Xinjiang and Mongol regions, as well as the rationale behind them, are worth 
detailed inspection. 
In 1643 the Lifanyuan compiled the Mongol Penal Code (Menggu lüshu 蒙古
律書), which was a collection of all the precedents and rules concerning Mongolian 
affairs during Huang Taiji‘s reign. 74  The collection listed all entries without 
categorizing them. During the Shunzhi and Kangxi reigns it was revised several times 
and the earliest extant edition bears a 1667 date.
75
 The compilation of this collection 
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indicates that the Manchu government had extended their legislative powers over 
Mongols and Mongol areas by this time.  
The next Qing Mongolian legal code compiled after Menggu lüshu was Mongol 
Statutes and Precedents (Menggu Lüli 蒙古律例), which was promulgated for the 
first time in 1741. Generally speaking, the most significant legislative milestone for 
ethnic areas in the Qing Dynasty was the compilation and revision of Menggu Lüli 
during the Qianlong reign (1741-1785).
76
 This set of regulations was compiled based 
on Menggu lüshu but with a large number of amendments. This set of regulations 
contained twelve categories, including ―Official titles‖ (guanxian 官銜), ―Registered 
population and taxes‖ (huikou chaifu 戶口差賦 ), ―Tribute‖ (chaogong 朝貢 ), 
―Alliances and military affairs‖ (huimeng xingjun 會盟行軍), ―Customs and passes‖ 
(bianjing kashao 邊境卡哨), ―Theft‖ (daoze 盜賊), ―Homicide‖ (renming 人命), 
―Litigation‖ (shougao 首告), ―Arrests and escapes‖ (buwang 捕亡), ―Other Offenses‖ 
(za fan 雜犯), ―Lama regulations‖ (lama li 喇嘛例), and ―Judgment and prisoners‖ 
(duanyu 斷獄). About half the regulations in Menggu Lüli focused mainly on 
criminal matters, including both severe crimes, such as homicide and robbery, as well 
as non-severe crimes, such as stealing livestock and cursing a person of higher class. 
The punishments for these crimes were clearly specified in every sub-statute. In 
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addition, Menggu Lüli regulated various civil matters, such as tax collection, marriage 
and divorce. It followed a similar format to that of the Great Qing Code and provided 
regulations for the same kinds of civil matters. In brief, the Qing government 
intentionally formulated a set of laws, particularly applicable to Mongol areas, which 
pertained to administrative, civil and criminal concerns. This code can be seen as 
parallel to the one Qing used to govern inland China.  
In 1789, the Qing government issued Rules and Precedents of Lifanyuan 
(Lifanyuan zeli), which was based largely on the Menggu Lüli.
77
 From that time the 
regulations of the Menggu Lüli formed the main body of law applied over Mongolia, 
Tibet and some other areas. Yet for a long time, the Qing rulers had been trying to 
combine two different legal systems (Chinese-styled Qing law and the autochthonous 
Mongolian law) organically into one legal code. Menggu Lüli (together with Menggu 
lushu and Lifanyuan zeli 理藩院則例) is a good example of such a combination. To 
meet the special situation in ethnic areas, some unique regulations were issued and 
included in Menggu Lüli. For instance, it is apparent that Menggu Lüli widely 
preserved customary law‘s use of livestock fines as a penalty for criminals or civil 
offenses in the legislation of the Mongol area. (It is likely that Yonggui‘s 
aforementioned memorial was inspired by existing customs of livestock fines.) 
Mongolian legal tradition used fines levied in livestock to punish various crimes, 
including homicide, theft, rape, adultery and so forth.  
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Many regulations of the Menggu Lüli combined the typical penalties found in 
Chinese law, such as strangulation and banishment, with livestock fines in a 
comprehensive way. For example, one of the sub-statutes in the statute on ―homicide‖ 
of the Menggu lüli stipulated that ―either an official or an ordinary person, who 
intentionally kills his wife, would be punished by strangulation with delay. If there 
was a quarrel or a scuffle between the couple before the murder, the offender should 
compensate the wife‘s family with ―three nines‖ (one ―nine‖ was a combination of 
nine different domestic animals) as atonement of his crime‖.78 This sub-statute 
indicates that in addition to livestock fines the Qing law makers also incorporated a 
Mongol tradition of compensating the victim of crime.  
Another example relates to criminal motivation. In traditional Mongol criminal 
law, when determining punishment, whether an offender committed a crime on 
purpose or not was not considered. But in the Chinese legal system, the motivation 
was always an important factor in determining the penalty. For example, in The Great 
Qing Code, the penalties for killing a person on purpose and manslaughter are 
different. After the Qing conquest, motivation was taken into consideration when 
Manchu elites drew up Mongol law. In Menggu Lushu, killing a person on purpose 
was mentioned in Statutes no. 70, 75, and 89. The 90
th
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Oaths played an important role in the traditional Mongol legal system. This 
practice was also preserved in the Mongol law drawn up by the Manchus. When there 
was insufficient evidence, the defendant could deny an accusation by swearing an 
oath. In Lifanyuan Zeli, a chapter entitled ―rushi 入誓‖ collected all the detailed 
regulations about oath-taking. According to this code, when the remains of someone 
else‘s missing livestock are found around one‘s home, as long as the defendant swears 
an oath that he did not steal them, he is to be regarded as innocent.
80
 
More importantly, regulations in the Menggu lüli try to clarify the applicability 
of Qing Mongol law and the Qing (general) law when people of different ethnicities 
were involved in one case.
81
 For instance, a regulation specifically stipulates that. 
―Mongols who commit crimes in inland China should be punished according to inland 
laws. Chinese civilians who commit crimes in Mongolia should be punished 
according to the Mongolian codes‖.82 However, it is hard to say to what extent this 
principle was applied. We hardly find any cases that Chinese were judged on the basis 
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of the Mongolian law as Chinese farmers and traders living in the Mongolian areas 
were placed under the jurisdiction of Chinese officials.
83
  
There existed no equivalent counterpart of Menggu lüli enacted in Xinjiang 
from the Qianlong era to the end of the dynasty. The legislation in Xinjiang, 
especially in terms of the legislation of civil and criminal laws, was dramatically 
different from that in Mongol areas. 
The whole Xinjiang area was finally incorporated into the Qing empire during 
the Qianlong reign. However, little systematic effort to establish a legislative 
framework for Xinjiang was carried out in this period. It was during the Jiaqing and 
Daoguang reigns that the Eastern Turkestan bureau (laiyuan si 徠遠司) of the 
Lifanyuan compiled and amended a set of regulations entitled Rules and Precedents 
of South Xinjiang (Huijiang zeli 回疆則例) to deal with Xinjiang affairs.84  
This set of regulations can be regarded as the working regulations of the laiyuan 
si. The Laiyuan si of the Lifanyuan was established in 1761 and was in charge of 
South Xinjiang (including Hami and Turfan) affairs. Huijiang zeli, revised and 
reissued in 1842, contained eight volumes. Each volume records ten to twenty 
regulations. The first five volumes are generally related to administrative matters, 
such as the titles, appointments and dismissals of begs. The last three volumes are 
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mainly about economic and financial regulations. Most of regulations contained in the 
Huijiang zeli concern Uyghur begs, Qing officials and soldiers stationed in the region. 
For example, the begs in Huijiang were prohibited from levying exorbitant taxes on 
Uyghurs. Qing officials were prohibited from selling houses through the Hakim begs. 
The Green Standard soldiers who were on short assignment to the region were 
prohibited from marrying local Uyghur women or accommodating Uyghur women in 
the Manchu garrison cities (man cheng 滿城). Also, there were one to two civil 
regulations to manage Tungan (Chinese Hui) persons and Chinese merchants who 
lived in Xinjiang. In the Huijiang Zeli there is only one regulation directly related to 
criminal offenses. It states that ―Hakim begs themselves can handle those common 
crimes in which the penalty is limited to cangue-wearing, and report the results to 
stationed Qing ministers. When encountering a serious criminal offense, Hakim begs 
can only report the case to the stationed Qing ministers in charge and wait for them to 
deal with the case‖.85 Clearly this was not a criminal statute, but rather established 
judicatory authority in handling criminal cases. No guidance was provided as to what 
criminal statutes would apply in such cases.  
Just as for the Menggu Lüli , the source of the regulations of Huijiang zeli was 
largely decisions made in previous cases relating to Xinjiang and the Qing emperors 
edicts (especially Qianlong‘s) issued concerning Xinjiang affairs. This is no accident. , 
The compilation of Huijiang Zeli was strongly influenced by the ideas that governed 
                                                 





the compilation of the Menggu Lüli. Some regulation makers who were involved in 
writing the Huijiang Zeli were selected from the editorial department of Menggu Lüli. 
Nevertheless, the main contents and formats of Huijiang Zeli and Menggu Lüli were 
far from Identifical. 
The penal nature of Menggu Lüli, in like fashion to the Great Qing Code, was 
evident. It provided specific penalties for legal elites to punish various acts of moral 
or ritual impropriety or of criminal violence. However, Huijiang zeli was merely an 
administrative law, as the category of ―zeli‖ indicated. It followed not the format of 
the luli, but the format of the administrative regulations found in the zeli. This 
eight-volume collection contained regulations about administrative structure, taxes 
and the corvée system, the monetary system, judiciary, foreign commerce and so on, 
with more than half of its provisions devoted to the regulation of the official activities 
of Xinjiang officials, including Manchu and Mongol ruling elites, local begs, as well 
as sojourned troops. 
As a result, when dealing with regular civil and criminal cases, it was 
impossible for an official in charge to make reference to Huijiang zeli, and nor was he 
able to ensure whether the Chinese law or the Islamic law should be applied to a 
specific case. The existence of a legal compendium for this particular territorial 
jurisdiction created ambiguities which do not seem to have been directly resolved. 
Given the existence of the Huijiang zeli, what was the authority of the other codified 





There is some evidence that all the codes issued by the state were considered 
applicable or at least existed as a reference in dealing with official matters in Xinjiang. 
As early as 1764, the Qing court had already issued several sets of statutes to Xinjiang 
yamen, which included the Great Qing Code, Regulations for the Eight Banners (Baqi 
zeli 八旗則例) and Menggu Lüli.86 In 1816, Xuzhuang, a Kuche Imperial Agent, 
presented a request to the throne for the Board of Punishments to draft a proper 
penalty for a specific case. The Jiaqing emperor was irritated by this request, claiming 
that ―the court has already issued the Great Qing Code and some supplementary 
regulations to Kuche. There is no question that this case should be judged according 
to the (Qing) statutes‖.87 Moreover, he demanded a demotion of Xuzhuang as his 
punishment.   
In 1788 (Qianlong 52) a yamen secretary, named Wu Yixian, collected all the 
laws concerning Xinjiang convicts from the Great Qing Code and compiled Statues 
and Sub-statutes Concerning Xinjiang (Xinjiang zeli shuolue 新疆則例說略)88 
However, in this collection, almost all statutes or sub-statutes targeted exiles in 
Xinjiang, not local convicts. In other words, there were no formal laws formulated 
particularly for the regulation of Uyghur people before the 1759 conquest. Moreover, 
this indicates that the state-compiled legal codes did not contain any laws or 
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regulations on Xinjiang Uyghurs. This is in marked contrast to the promulgation of 
specific statutes and sub-statutes directed at civil or criminal acts committed by other 
minorities, such as the Hui or Miao people.
89 
We can get a better sense of the legislative documents that guided officials in 
Xinjiang by looking at a hitherto neglected bibliography of works issued to the 
Kashigaer Councilor‘s yamen. Compiled in 1804 and recorded in the Comprehensive 
Gazetteer of Huijiang (Huijiang Tongzhi 回疆通志)90, this bibliography shows that 
at least the following legal codes and regulations had been issued to the government 
offices in Xinjiang before 1804.  
Chinese works in this bibliography included: the Great Qing Code, the New 
Edition of the Great Qing Code (Xin Zuan Daqing Lu 新纂大清律), Menggu Lüli , 
Table of destinations for exiles (San Liu Dao Li Biao 三流道里表), Regulations 
Concerning the Capture of Escaped Slaves of the Banner Troops (Du Bu Zeli 督補則
例), Regulations of the Board of War (Zhongshu Zheng Kao 中樞政考), Menggu 
Lushu, Regulations for the Eight Banners, A bibliography of Official Banned Books 
(Cha Jiao Weijin Shumu 查繳違禁書目 ), Regulations of the Board of Civil 
Appointments (Libu Zeli 吏部則例), Regulations Concerning Water Transport of 
Military Supplies (Zhuanyun Junliang Tiaoli 轉運軍糧條例 ) ， Regulations 
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Concerning the Purchase of Official Titles (Juan Kuan Tiaoli 捐款條例), New 
Regulations (Xin Li 新例), Collected Cases of Injustice Rectified through Forensic 
Science (Xi Yuan Lu 洗冤錄), Xinjiang Wuliao Jiazhi Zeli  (新疆物料價值則例
unavailable for detailed records, it is presumed to be related to official prices of 
materials in Xinjiang), Regulations Concerning the Purchase of Official Titles in 
Gansu Province (Gansu Juan Kuan Tiaoli 甘肅捐款條例), Supplemental regulations 
of the Great Qing Code (Daqing Lu Xu Zuan Tiaoli 大清律續纂條例 ), and new 
edition of Regulations for the Eight Banners (Xin Zuan Baqi Zeli 新纂八旗則例).  
Law books written in Manchu language included: Regulations of the Board of 
War in Manchu language (Qingzi Zhongshu Zhengkao 清字中樞政考), Regulations 
for the Eight Banners in Manchu language (Qingwen Baqi Zeli 清文八旗則例) and 
Xin Zuan Qing Wen Zeli 新纂清文則例 presumably the Manchu edition of the Great 
Qing Code).  
Among all these regulations and codes, those related to criminal laws included 
the Great Qing Code (all the editions), San Dao Liu Li Biao, Du Bu Zeli, and Menggu 
Zeli. As mentioned above, the Great Qing Code contained no specific regulations that 
applied directly to Uyghurs in Xinjiang, nor did the San Dao Liu Li Biao or Du Bu 
Zeli. It appears that they were largely used in relation to exiled criminals from the 







, it could be only applied to criminal cases that occurred among the 
Mongolian banner tribes (jasak) in Hami and Turfan. 
The government had intentionally left room for Qing law to intervene in 
Xinjiang affairs. Unlike the situation in Mongol areas, the Qing government did not 
stipulate a whole series of independent and comprehensive criminal laws and 
regulations which would represent fixed criteria for the applicability of laws to 
Xinjiang. But this does not necessarily mean that the Qing government never 
formulated new regulations for criminal offenses to meet the requirement of new 
exigencies. Qing legislative policies in Xinjiang appeared more flexible.  
 
The emperor’s basic opinions toward law applicability and 
practice in Xinjiang 
At the beginning of Qing rule in the new frontier, the Qianlong emperor had 
three basic views on the applicability and practice of law there.  
First of all, when the Qing first conquered the ―new frontier‖, the Qianlong 
emperor tried to implement a non-intervention policy. His wanted to legitimize 
Manchu rule in Xinjiang by respecting and tolerating native customs, religion and 
culture. Therefore he was very cautious about imposing Chinese or Manchu or other 
customs on Uyghurs. One example of this approach can be seen in the emperor‘s 
reaction to an attempt to apply a Mongol tradition to Xinjiang in the years directly 
                                                 





following annexation.  In 1761, the third year after the Qing annexation of Altishahr, 
Kashgar Imperial Agent, Yonggui, suggested that the state punish some 
badly-behaved Uyghur begs and commoners by confiscating their livestock and using 
the livestock to honor those hardworking, obedient ones. The Qianlong emperor 
rejected his suggestion by stating ―…If (the confiscation) was not handled well and 
caused any corruption, it will give Uyghurs excuses (to criticize our rule), which will 
be extremely disgraceful. In brief, to deal with Huijiang affairs (we) should take into 
consideration their temperament and customs and guide them to favorable direction 
(yin qi xingqing fengsu er lidao zhi 因其性情風俗而利導之）. Not all inland laws or 
policies can be imposed on them… If a Uyghur could be confirmed guilty, he no 
doubt should be punished precisely based on law, instead of only by confiscation.‖92  
The Qianlong emperor‘s directive to respect Uyghur culture and tradition as 
expressed in this edict had a profound effect on the Qing court‘s Xinjiang policy. 
Even after the establishment of Xinjiang province in 1884, the first provincial 
governor, Liu Jintang reiterated a similar idea. In a memorial sent to the Guangxu 
emperor, Liu suggested that in order to control Xinjiang Uyghurs the Qing rulers 
should ―educate them without changing their customs and polish the administration 
there without abolishing their (previous) effective policies.‖93 Also, Qianlong‘s edict 
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showed that he had been trying to prevent any possible corruption perpetrated by his 
imperial representatives in this newly incorporated frontier, because he was fully 
aware that this would do great harm to the empire‘s rule.  
In brief, in order to control this vast place as long as possible, the emperor 
wanted his Xinjiang policies and officials to be both culturally tolerant and 
economically non-exploitative. This fundamental idea was embraced by most of the 
successive Qing emperors and it became the core of the Qing government‘s Xinjiang 
policies at least until the 1880s.  
Secondly, the Qianlong emperor held that more severe penalties should be 
applied to Xinjiang offenders in order to maintain social stability in this newly 
conquered area. Moreover, these criminals should be punished as soon as possible.  
In June 1760, the Manchu general Shuhede captured a Uyghur horse thief who 
was a recidivist. He requested central government instruction with regard to 
punishment. The emperor ordered that the thief be decapitated and his body hung in 
public according to the traditional regulations of Muslims (huiren jiuli 回人舊例). 
Qianlong emphasized in his edict that because rebellions in this place had been put 




Theft, especially by recidivists，was strictly prohibited in both Islamic and 
Chinese law. According to the Great Qing Code, ―if it is the first offense, tattoo on the 
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right forearm the words, ‗stole stealthily.‘ The second time, tattoo on the left forearm. 
For the third offense, (the thief) will be strangled (with delay).‖95 The penalty of 
strangulation with delay was lighter than decapitation and exposing the body. So the 
emperor ordered the criminal to be punished according to Islamic law.  
Another case, also from 1776, involved a Uyghur slave who killed his master 
with an ax and also injured the victim‘s wife. The local authority sentenced him to 
immediate death in the presence of the public (ji xing zhengfa shizhong 即行正法示
眾). However, in an edict the Qianlong emperor argued that this was a case in which a 
slave or a hired servant planned to kill the household head‖(nupu shasi jia zhu 奴僕
殺死家主). According to Qing statute, the convict should suffer a more severe 
penalty, the lingering death. ―Even in the mainland those who commit this crime 
should be sentenced to lingering death. In Huijiang area, such kinds of crimes should 
be punished particularly severely.‖96 
In 1771, Qianlong sent an edict again stating that in Xinjiang, those who acted 
violently and killed people must be punished severely, expressing that it was improper 
to (treat these cases) with delay, as were similar cases inland.
97
 In 1778, a Uyghur 
brought a false charge against a hakim beg. The Qianlong emperor ordered him to be 
exiled and told his Xinjiang officials that, when dealing with future cases like such, as 
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long as the crime was confirmed, local generals should sentence the guilty person to 
death immediately and request imperial sanction to execute him and expose his body 
in public.
98
   
Thirdly, it seems that in this period the Qianlong emperor took an expedient 
approach to decisions over the application of Chinese or Islamic law. Most important 
was that the case be handled quickly and effectively so that an example could be set to 
warn potential offenders. When responding to the above 1760 horse theft case, after 
confirming that the Uyghur thief should be punished severely, the emperor gave his 
frontier officials an additional instruction. ―Nonetheless, there were also some 
shameless inland soldiers and servants who stole Uyghurs‘ horses. It was unfair if 
they were punished according to the inland laws.‖ Qianlong then ordered that 
hereafter Uyghurs who stole horses from local Uyghurs or inland Chinese, as well as 
inland Chinese who stole Uyghurs' horses, both should be dealt with based on the 
native Muslim law.
99
 This instruction is significant in that in his edict the Qianlong 
emperor specifically stated that criminal acts of cattle-theft should be punished 
according to Islamic law, even when the criminals were inland Chinese.  
The Qianlong emperor‘s emphasis on flexibility extended beyond his choice of 
applicability of law. While he had no problem using Islamic law to punish Chinese 
criminals or Chinese law to punish Uyghurs he was also not averse to making 
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adjustments to the Qing code itself when he felt it was appropriate to do so in order to 
cope with Xinjiang circumstances.  
For example, in 1760 Yongning，a Manchu official, reported that a Hami 
Muslim called Lin Fu—the name indicated that he was a Chinese Muslim—killed a 
person when he was drunk. As a normal procedure, Yongning proposed to punish the 
killer by strangulation (according to the Qing law) and send him to the 
Governor-General‘s yamen to await the result of the annual Autumn Assizes. The 
Qianlong emperor rejected the proposal and thought it was unnecessary. 
―(In this case) Hami is close to Suzhou. If the case takes place in a place as far 
as Yili or Yeerqiang, how can you send him all the way to Suzhou under guard? In 
these recently pacified regions, the legislation should be strict. In the future more and 
more people from inland provinces will live together with local Muslims. Anytime 
there is a homicide following fighting (dou’ou sharen 鬥毆殺人), it should be 
punished by immediate execution right on the spot (benchu zhengfa 本處正法). Only 
in this way can we intimidate ruffians. The inland laws (neidi zhifa 內地之法) need 
not always be consulted.‖ 100 
As we know, Autumn Assizes was an important institution of the Qing judicial 
system. This institution was inherited from the Ming dynasty and became fully 
implemented during the Kangxi reign. According to it, following the initial 
investigation and conviction at the county level all capital cases had to be reviewed at 
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higher levels of government. All relevant documents as well as the accused suspects 
were to be sent in turn to the prefecture, the province, the Board of Punishment, and 
finally the throne (while the suspects were held in provincial prisons). Every year on 
one day of the eighth month (by lunar calendar) hundreds of high officials in the 
central government, including the directors of lifanyuan, would participate in the 
grand ceremony of Fall Assizes at Tiananmen Square to review these capital cases 
and receive the final sanction of the emperor.
101
 As a reviewing system, Fall Assizes 
had two important functions. On the one hand, through this ceremony the emperor 
was able to affirm in front of his subjects his noble virtue of ―respecting lives‖ (hao 
sheng zhi de 好生之德), which was an important Confucian value. On the other hand, 
this institution helped the emperor control the right of adjudication both practically 
and formally.  
Therefore, bypassing the procedures for sending criminals to the provincial 
capital (or Beijing) and waiting Fall Assizes constituted a ―sacrifice‖ of the emperor‘s 
normal prerogative in capital cases. In order to do so the emperor had to bestow more 
judicial power on his imperial provincial officials. In this case the Qianlong emperor 
deliberately changed the capital reviewing procedures and made it a precedent that 
officials should invoke thereafter. To the Qianlong emperor, to punish Xinjiang 
criminals as soon as possible and to warn Xinjiang dwellers who were potentially able 
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to jeopardize the social stability of this frontier must have been important and urgent 
enough for him to make an exception from the regular legal procedures. 
By saying that ―inland laws need not always be consulted‖, the Qianlong 
emperor was in effect creating a new regulation for Xinjiang: homicide after fighting 
should be punished by execution right on the spot. This regulation contains parallels to 
the sentence of ―immediate execution on the spot‖ (jiudi zhengfa 就地正法), which 
was widely meted out through martial law by many field generals during the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850-1864)
102
. A similar policy was implemented in Xinjiang during and 
after the Muslim Rebellion. It is difficult to determine whether implementation of 
jiudi zhengfa at this time was part of the nation-wide martial policy during a period of 
extreme turmoil, or a continuation of Qianlong‘s flexible frontier policy, or both. 
What we do know is, in the late Qing period, this ―effective‖ policy became a 
challenge to the authority of the central government and the emperor‘s judicial right 
over capital punishments which, respectively, would weaken the imperial power and 
symbolize the devolution of central power to local governments, the specifics of which 
I will return to discuss in the next chapter.  
Undoubtedly, Qianlong himself regarded these exceptional precedents as 
effective in Xinjiang. He had no intention to carry out systematic legislation in 
Xinjiang; neither did he care about drawing clear borderlines between Chinese law 
and Islamic law. His preferred method was to give specific instructions whenever a 
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new case came up. By making exceptional and ever-changing regulations, he may 
have felt that he could control this frontier more directly and tightly, although this 
would have deprived him of a good opportunity to engage instead institution building 
on the frontier. Without precise rules, local officials would have to constantly consult 
the emperor about penalties in certain cases.  
Fourthly, since the penalties provided in Uyghur law and in Qing law for certain 
kinds of crimes were often different the emperor was at liberty to punish some 
criminals more severely or more leniently than others. The Qianlong emperor 
pardoned some convicts who themselves, or whose ancestors, made contribution to the 
establishment of the dynasty in the very early period of Qing‘s governance in order to 
show the benevolence and gratitude of the central government.  
For instance, in 1761, a Uyghur, Yisilamu, who was in charge of some 
agricultural colonies, killed another Uyghur, and injured the latter‘s wife and brother 
in the course of several petty disputes. Yonggui presented to the court that this person 
should be punished with strangulation in accordance with the sub-statute on 
―engaging in an affray or intentionally killing another‖ under the Great Qing Code. 
But the Qianlong emperor decided that Yisilamu could be punished in accordance 
with Islamic law for two reasons. First, in the past Yisilamu had helped the Qing 
troops collect information before the conquest. Secondly, Muslim tradition allowed 
monetary redemption of death sentences (chu cai dizui 出財抵罪). The strong 





this case is treated as an exceptional one in favor of Yisilamu. Otherwise he (or any 
other criminal) should be punished in accordance with the Qing codes.‖103  
From 1759 to his death, the Qianlong emperor ruled Xinjiang for 36 years. His 
attitude toward the applicability of law in Xinjiang changed as time went on. 
Gradually, the emperor began to impose the inland law (the Great Qing Code) on 
more kinds of frontier offenses.  
In 1776, a Uyghur slave killed his master with an ax and injured the victim‘s 
wife, too. Maxing‘e, the local Qing official, sentenced him to immediate death in 
public (ji xing zheng fa shi zhong). When the Qianlong emperor was informed of the 
case, he felt that the existing criminal laws in force in Xinjiang were not a sufficient 
deterrent to criminal behavior. In an edict the emperor declared that ―from now on, if 
the crimes would be severe enough to give a banishment sentence (based on Qing 
codes and statutes), officials in Huijiang should handle them in the same way as 
applicable in inland cases, in order to warn the Huijiang Uyghurs.‖ Moreover, the 
Emperor himself drafted a set of regulations with regard to the banishment of 
Xinjiang criminals in the same edict, instructing that the distance of banishments 
should correspond to the severity of the transgression.
104
  
By the end of his reign, Qianlong further emphasized the importance of the 
applicability of the Qing law to Xinjiang cases. In 1792 he issued an edict stating 
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―Xinjiang has been under the central administrative system for years. The officials 
there should have a better understanding of the inland laws. Uyghurs are also my 
servants. There should be no difference between Uyghurs and Chinese. In the future, 
severe cases should be handled in accordance with inland laws.‖105 Later in the same 
year when a local Manchu official listed all the relevant statutes and regulations in 
both Chinese and Uyghur laws in his report of a case to ask for the Qianlong 
emperor‘s final decision, the Emperor seems to have been irritated by the request. He 
criticized the multiple legal inclusions as unnecessary considerations that merely 
complicated the situation, and issued a clearer instruction as well: ―in future all the 
officials stationed in Xinjiang should observe the following rules when dealing with 
criminal cases. A Uyghur who kills his uncle, or brother, or grandfather, or 
grandfather-in-law, should be punished in accordance with the inland codes or statutes. 
The homicide cases related to distant relatives should be dealt with based on Uyghur 
traditions. Such cases need not to be treated based on the inland institutions and 
laws.‖106 
Qianlong‘s ever-changing policy confused his field officials. Without clear 
stipulations they often could not make decisions on how to choose an appropriate law 
to judge cases by themselves. As a result, these officials usually listed all the possible 
precedents that could govern a judgment and let the emperor make a final decision.  
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This appears to have been what the emperor wanted from the beginning. In this way, 
he achieved closer control over his frontier bureaucrats and seized the discretional 
power to choose which laws to apply. However, maintaining this closer control 
required a more patient and diligent sovereign. In his old age, the Qianlong emperor 
does not seem to have been energetic enough to deal with every single case, which 
accounts for the above two contradictory instructions appearing toward the end of the 
Qianlong reign. In the years following Qianlong‘s death, until the Muslim Rebellion, 
the two laws kept working together to deal with criminal offenses, especially severe 
ones, without a clear demarcation.  
 
Qianlong’s Xinjiang policies and bureaucratic monarchy 
Up to this point I have been exploring the features of the Qianlong emperor‘s 
strategies and policies with regard to ruling Xinjiang. Although my analysis is far 
from comprehensive due to archival constraints, some interrelated issues revealed 
here can be raised for further research under the central theme of ruling Xinjiang 
under the Qianlong reign. 
First of all, as mentioned above, the Qing Empire did not intend to conquer 
Xinjiang by military actions at the very beginning. Peter Perdue in his article ―Culture, 
history, and imperial Chinese strategy: legacies of the Qing conquests‖107 criticizes 
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the cultural realism thesis, represented by Alastair Lain Johnson‘s work.108 Perdue 
claims that the Qing strategy by no means can be characterized as merely ―realism.‖ 
Despite the opposition of the Han literati and some Manchu ministers, the fact that the 
Qing conquered and protected the Central Asian frontiers was mainly the result of the 
personalities of Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, as well as the strong economy at 
that time. Moreover, Perdue suggests that the Qing conquest of Xinjiang was 
precarious. Facing such an unprecedented situation, Qing rulers themselves seemed to 
be uncertain about how to govern this newly incorporated area from the very 
beginning. Their policies became gradually coherent only as time went on and as 
international relations and the domestic situation began to limit their choices. When 
reviewing history surrounding the Qing‘s conquest of Xinjiang in 1759, we get the 
impression that Qianlong was not well prepared for ruling a frontier about which he 
and other Manchu elites knew little. When dealing with governance issues, he appears 
to be engaged in a process of trial and error as decisions were made on which policies 
to jettison and which to preserve. Practical policies were formulated in an ad hoc 
manner in line with changing situations. 
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Second, the Qianlong emperor‘s governance in Xinjiang as a whole was 
influenced by his predecessors. He was not the first Qing emperor orchestrating 
empire building in Inner Asia. The three great rulers of the high Qing period 
(1681-1796), the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors, all invested 
considerable political energies and military resources into the expansion of 
boundaries and empire. The prolonged wars against the Zunghars began with the 
Kangxi emperor‘s campaigns of the 1690s; the Yongzheng emperor also launched 
important wars against Galdan; Qianlong concluded the conquest designs carried out 
under his grandfather and father. The administrative apparatus established by these 
earlier Qing rulers during the course of colonization had a great effect on Qianlong‘s 
later administrative arrangement, not only for the ―outer provinces‖ (Xinjiang, Tibet, 
and Mongolia) but also the Chinese heartland. For instance, the Yongzheng emperor 
formed the Grand Council (junjichu 軍機處) to deal with military affairs during 
campaigns against the Zunghars and it later became one of the most important central 
government institutions of the Qing. 
 Another important institution was the court for the administration of outer 
provinces (lifanyuan 理藩院), which was established by Huang Taiji in 1636 (at that 
time it was called as ―Mongol yamen‖) and consolidated by both the Kangxi and 
Yongzheng emperors. Qianlong made further revision of the inner organization of this 
department and had it supervise the affairs of the Northern and Western frontiers. 
Since the Kangxi reign, almost all of the high positions of Lifanyuan were occupied 





central institution as lower-ranked officers, such as Chinese translators (jiaozheng 
hanwen guan 校正漢文官) and scribes (bitieshi 筆帖式). The structure of this ethnic 
composition was continued by Qianlong in setting up the Xinjiang bureaucracy. 
Among the senior positions of the Xinjiang administration, Manchus greatly 
outnumbered Han Chinese. Moreover, the Qianlong emperor did not originate the 
practice of having both the native law and the Qing law operated in the frontier area. 
Early in the Kangxi reign, both Mongol law and the Qing law had been applied to 
punish the crimes committed in Mongol territories.  
Nonetheless, as the designer of Xinjiang policies when the region was finally 
annexed to the empire, the Qianlong emperor had his own thoughts on how to rule 
this non-Han frontier area. It is also very illuminating for Perdue to mention the 
influence of the emperors‘ personalities upon state policies in the aforementioned 
article.
109
 Many of the earlier Qing emperors, especially the Qianlong emperor, had 
very strong personalities and were usually eager to engage in numerous trivial state 
affairs.  
First, the Qianlong emperor articulated a new paradigm of racial identity. His 
perception of cultural differences among Manchus, Mongols, and Han Chinese also 
affected his choices of Xinjiang‘s bureaucracy. He emphasized that, compared with 
Manchus, Han officials were ―narrow-minded‖ and usually paid too much attention to 
                                                 






short-term trivial benefits without a long-range perspective. Therefore, it was better 
not to place them in higher positions to govern the Inner Asian frontier.  
As for the applicability of law, like the situation in other ethnic frontiers, both 
Qing law and Muslim law were simultaneously applied to Xinjiang. But unlike the 
situation in Mongolia, where there existed comprehensive laws made by the central 
government, Xinjiang did not have unambiguous and comprehensive laws formulated 
by the Emperor. Although native Islamic law as a pre-existing legal institution 
continued to be enforced during the Qianlong reign, the emperor made exceptions in 
severe criminal offenses and did not draw a clear line in defining the applicability of 
legal traditions for these cases. Local officials often had no clear guidance to deal 
with this type of cases, resulting in their need to consult the Emperor time and again. 
It appeared that the Qianlong emperor was in favor of flexible, sometimes temporary, 
policies for Xinjiang affairs. The flexible policies reflected a blending of Qianlong‘s 
different concerns on Xinjiang governance. On the one hand, Qianlong did not intend to 
deeply involve and interfere too much in Uyghur affairs. On the other hand, he sought 
to maintain his authoritarian grip on his empire, to which Xinjiang belonged. As a result, 
the laws in Xinjiang were neither comprehensive nor systematic. 
Discussion of the above issues can be related to the question of bureaucratic 
monarchy. Prior studies indicate that over a long period of time arbitrary power 





follow Philip Khun to call this system a ―bureaucratic monarchy‖.110 There always 
existed a tension between the emperor‘s autocratic power and the bureaucracy‘s 
routine power over regulations and rules. Social analysis like that of Max Weber‘s 
tends to support the view that in the long run autocrats will be replaced by bureaucrats. 
But according to Philip Khun, the Qianlong emperor found certain ways to resist the 
encroachment of bureaucracy‘s routine power upon his autocratic power. By creating 
the category of ―political crime,‖ for example, Qianlong was able to mobilize the 
bureaucracy around sedition crises or intimidate the literati by means of literary 
inquisition, and finally exert control over the bureaucratic elite.  
It is helpful, at this point, to review Michel Crozier‘s classic description of 
power relationships in bureaucracies: ―To achieve his aims, the manager has two sets 
of conflicting weapons: rationalization and rule-making on one side; and the power to 
make exceptions and to ignore the rules on the other. His own strategy will be to find 
the best combination of both weapons…Proliferation of the rules curtails his own 
power. Too many exceptions to the rules reduce his ability to check other people‘s 
power‖.111 
Both the soulstealing cases studied by Philip Khun and the Xinjiang cases 
mentioned in this chapter illustrate that the Qianlong emperor relied more on the 
second set of weapons: to make exceptions and to ignore the rules intentionally. In 
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contrast to his father, the Yongzheng emperor, Qianlong did not pay much attention to 
institution building. As I mentioned earlier, in Xinjiang affairs, Qianlong grasped the 
discretionary power to deal with criminal cases by willfully promoting an inconsistent 
application of the regulations. His frontier officials would have to report every 
controversial case to him and wait for his intercession. Also, he gave himself wide 
latitude to punish certain criminals harshly or leniently. Moreover, in the very 
beginning of his reign, Qianlong was impatient with rules that were unworkable. He 
preferred to take a flexible approach to deal with criminal cases rather than to make 
rigid and non-negotiable stipulations which could restrict his discretionary power.  
The Qianlong emperor resisted the encroachment of the bureaucracy‘s routine 
power upon his autocratic power by intentionally not making comprehensive and 
systematic laws. Without a clear legal framework and specific laws, local officials 
often could not decide on how to choose an appropriate law to certain cases. Only the 
Emperor could interpret laws. Local officials were able to do no more than list the 
judgments of cases that could serve as precedents and let the Emperor make a final 
decision. Local officials could not predict the Emperor‘s decision for a given case as 
there were no strict criteria governing the Emperor‘s considerations. By making the 
laws more flexible, Qianlong was able to deprive the local-level bureaucracy of 
decision-making power and then to maintain his autocratic monarchy. However, such 
maintenance of the Emperor‘s autocratic power came at the expense of institution 





Some scholars argue that the flexibility of Qianlong‘s frontier policy was key to 
Qing administrative success.
112
 Certainly that is right. However, on the other hand, 
such flexibility was relied on the absence of strong local institutions and, in the long 
term, had a negative impact on Xinjiang governance. First of all, the absence of a clear 
legal framework provided a window for local officials to abuse their authority for their 
own benefit. Abuse of the law and corrupt practices commonly occurred at the local 
level. Such practices of course further intensified social instability. It was often found 
that by taking advantage of the legal loopholes, Qing officials could gang up with local 
Uyghurs to exploit the common people. They abused the law for their own benefit and 
willfully decapitated those they disliked. This resulted in the death of innocent people 
and resulted in many demonstrations and revolts by local civilians
113
. As more and 
more instances of conflict arose, the deteriorating social situation escalated, 
particularly during the Xianfeng reign, and led up to the Muslim Rebellion of 1864. 
On the other hand, a prerequisite of Qianlong‘s flexible frontier policies was a 
strong-minded, diligent emperor, or in other words, strong imperial power. The 
emperor had to be energetic and active enough to observe every important incident at 
the frontier and provide his opinions immediately. Otherwise, the flexibility would 
very likely lead to local official exploitation. For instance, the policy of immediate 
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execution on the spot, as part of the Flexible Regulations of Xinjiang endorsed by 
Qianlong, was intended to simplify the lengthy procedures of inspection and central 
trial for severe criminal cases. But this policy also made room for local officials to 
deprive the center of its final judicial power. By bypassing the reviewing procedure of 






CHAPTER 2  
LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT 
THE APPLICABILITY OF LAW BEFORE THE MUSLIM 
REBELLION 
 
Historians have noted that the Qing tried to control Xinjiang without 
committing large numbers of troops or officials to the area or spending large sums of 
money there.
114
 Instead of sending imperial representatives to Eastern Turkestan, the 
Qing rulers incorporated the majority of Muslim Turkic native elites into their frontier 
bureaucracy and tolerated local traditions and institutions to a great extent. After the 
Qing conquest, most Xinjiang Uyghurs were still able to maintain their familiar 
religious and cultural traditions and lived under the control of familiar indigenous 
(religious) elites. Only a few imperial officials supervised these indigenous elites. 
This administrative mode was cost-effective for the empire. At the same time, these 
measures allowed the Manchu conquerors legitimized their rule by preserving local 
tradition and recognizing cultural differences.
115
 As an important part of local 
cultural tradition, Uyghur legal institutions continued to operate in Xinjiang. In the 
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following section, I will discuss the applicability of laws to criminal cases in the 
Huijiang area under the Qing before the establishment of Xinjiang province.  
Due to the limitation of available materials, few Western scholars have carried 
out research specifically into the legal history of Xinjiang during the Qing dynasty. 
Several Chinese scholars have written articles on the applicability of laws in criminal 
cases in Huijiang under the Qing. However, their views differ greatly. Based on the 
current literature, limited as it is, four main perceptions can be identified. Here we 
should keep in mind that when elaborating their opinions, some scholars do not 
clearly differentiate the criminal law system from that dealing with civil 
administrative and other legal matters. The ―legal system‖ in Qing Huijiang is used as 
a general term in their studies to refer to all forms of law. 
First of all, since the Huijiang Zeli is the only systematic legal code related to 
Huijiang compiled during the period of Qing rule, some scholars have assumed that 
after it was published, all legal disputes involving Uyghurs were handled according to 
this set of new regulations.
116
 But the majority of the regulations in the Huijiang Zeli 
were intended to treat administrative issues. As I have discussed previously, there 
were only a few regulations related to civil or criminal offences in this collection, 
such as the regulation prohibiting Hakim begs from issuing judgements in cases of 
serious crimes. It was basically an administrative law, the main content of which was 
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about administrative governance. The Huijiang Zeli could therefore not have been 
used widely to handle the majority of criminal matters in Eastern Turkestan. 
Secondly, in The Cambridge History of China, Joseph Fletcher claims that the 
Qing maintained a non-interference policy in Huijiang, where the Qing government 
had set up a bureaucracy of begs and akhunds. From the time of the Qing conquest 
onwards, he argues judicial authority in this region was in the hands of this 
bureaucracy. Moreover, ―foreigners were impressed by the fact that disputes arising 
between Muslims and ‗Chinese‘ (namely Manchus, Green Standard soldiers, and 
other non-native Ch‘ing subjects in Altishahr) were settled according to Muslim 
law‖. 117  However, Fletcher cites as evidence the first Chinese monograph on 
Xinjiang history under the Qing, the Zhongguo jingying xiyu shi, where the historian 
Zeng Wenwu wrote that ―(before the establishment of Xinjiang province), the rights 
of judicature usually belonged to native administrative officials…Uyghurs living in 
the eight main cities of Huijiang were ruled by Hakim begs. Therefore Hakim begs 
also exercised the right to arbitrate disputes. All people abided by religious 
regulations and customs‖.118 Some contemporary Chinese scholars still stick to this 
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 However，Zeng‘s assertion completely ignores the application of Qing law to 
criminal cases in Xinjiang. From the 1759 conquest to the establishment of Xinjiang 
province in 1884, there were a great number of criminal cases either among Uyghurs 
or between Uyghurs and Chinese which were judged and punished according to Qing 
law.  
The third view concerning the applicability of law in criminal cases in Qing 
Huijiang, now held by many scholars, is that whether or not to apply Qing law was 
determined by the nature of the crime. If a crime was regarded as severe, Qing law 
was applied, whereas Muslim law was applied to lesser offences. According to these 
scholars, when handling criminal matters, Qing rulers made different judgments, 
depending on whether the cases were serious enough to endanger Qing governance 
and social stability violating the foundations of the state and Confucian ethics, or 
were regarded as common offences with no such importance. In the former cases, the 
Qing Code would be applied without question and in the latter, begs could judge the 
case based on Islamic law (hui li 回例).120 Most of these scholars argue that these 
policies, which applied a different system of law according to the nature of the 
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offence, had produced a successful balance between the two legal systems.
121
 
However, though this view is supported by many legal cases, it is not confirmed by all 
of them. The relevant historical documents and precedents show that actually there 
was no clear criterion by which one could distinguish severe crimes from 
commonplace ones, and from the cases presented below, one can see that sometimes 
the Qing rulers also punished common criminal offences according to Qing law. 
The last view is that the application of the Qing code was determined by 
ethnicity and social class. If an offender was not a Uyghur, the Qing Code would be 
applied. In addition, local Uyghur nobles and officials who committed criminal 
offences were always punished according to Islamic law. In this way, Manchu rulers 
were able to show leniency to their subjects. Otherwise, the more severe Qing law 
would be applied.
122
 This view is too simple to encompass the principles of criminal 
law and its application in Xinjiang. In Chapter 1, my discussion of the applicability of 
law during the Qianlong reign showed that in Xinjiang it was possible for Chinese 
immigrants to be punished based on native Islamic law. In addition, Uyghurs could 
certainly be punished according to the Great Qing Code. Moreover, the penalty for a 
given crime was not always more severe if adjudicated according to the Qing law than 
if punished according to the requirements of Islamic law. For example, as mentioned 
previously, a habitual thief was punished more severely under the Islamic code.  
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In summary, legal practice and the applicability of laws to criminal cases in 
Qing Xinjiang have been poorly understood. Based on the legal cases recorded in 
Chinese documents, including the veritable records of the reigns of the dynasty and 
court memorials of the Grand Council, I will suggest some tentative conclusions on 
this topic. In general, it seems to me that there were no unequivocal criteria defining 
which of the two systems of law should actually be applied in a specific case. The 
criteria employed by Qing rulers were complex and flexible. Their considerations 
changed frequently in accordance with changes in the social situation in Xinjiang. 
Nonetheless, as time went on the Qing emperors did try to enlarge the field of 
applicable Qing law, but only to a very limited extent.  
 
Punishment of serious criminal offences in Xinjiang 
Study of Xinjiang legal cases suggests that in reality the applicability of laws to 
criminal cases was more complex and flexible than the existing studies have 
concluded. Specifically, I have the following findings.  
1. In Xinjiang, the Great Qing Code could be imposed on Chinese and 
Uyghurs, as well as people of other ethnicities.  
When we review criminal cases that were reported to the central government 
from Xinjiang as well as other relevant materials, it is clear that a significant feature 
of legal practice in this place was that when dealing with severe criminal cases, the 
selection of which laws to apply was not always determined by ethnicity of the 





Xinjiang. But the Great Qing Code could also be imposed on Uyghurs and people of 
other ethnicities. 
As we know, Fairbank has suggested that there were disputes between Uyghurs 
and Chinese which were handled according to Islamic law.
123
 But more often 
Uyghurs who committed certain crimes were sentenced according to Chinese law. 
From the reign of Qianlong onwards, every year there were capital cases that were 
reported to Beijing by Xinjiang officials for imperial sanction. Both Chinese and 
Uyghur criminals in these cases were tried and punished according to the Qing law.  
For example, in 1836 a Han merchant called Lu Zilin, who owned a store in 
Kashgar, was killed. Two Uyghurs were suspected of having committed the crime. 
According to the Administrative Official (zhangjing 章京) of Kashgar, the two 
slipped into Lu‘s store to steal but were caught by Lu and deliberately killed him. 
When the decision in the case was reported to the higher authorities for approval, the 
Yarkand Councilor found that the details of the case s were full of contradictions. He 
summoned all of the seventeen witnesses, who included both Uyghurs and Han, for 
interrogation. The investigation lasted more than two years and finally reached the 
Daoguang emperor. The Emperor announced that the Kashgar zhangjing had made a 
wrong judgment and his official title was to be removed as a punishment. But this 
zhangjing was allowed to remain in office and was ordered to find the real murderer 
within half a year. ―The real murderer should be punished according to the (Qing) 
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law‖, said the emperor.124 In this case, since the real murderer was still at large, no 
one knew his (or her) ethnicity. Still, the emperor emphasized that the Qing law 
should be imposed on him (her).  
Besides Chinese and Uyghurs, criminals of other ethnicities could also be 
punished based on the Chinese law. In 1789, three Turhut
125
 horse thieves were 
captured. When the local official in charge reported to the Qianlong emperor and 
asked for his suggestion about the penalty, the emperor responded: ―Those who stole 
more than ten horses should be put to death by strangulation according to the law. 
Now these criminals stole more than thirty horses from Uyghurs. Surely you should 
sentence them to death and report to me.‖126 
2. Serious crimes that threatened social order and Qing rule were punished 
according to Qing law.  
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First and foremost, those offenders whose actions endangered the rule of the 
empire in the frontier region were to be punished according to the state law. For 
instance, in 1764, the Qing sent an envoy to persuade Khoqand to withdraw from the 
Esi (Osh) area.  Abdulayimu, the ishikagha beg (assistant to the hakim) of Kashgar, 
secretly sent a missive to tell Erdena, the ruler of Khoqand city, that the Qing envoy 
was not bringing troops and that there was no need for Erdena to travel a great 
distance from the city to welcome the delegation. Further, he suggested that there 
would be no harm in agreeing to the Qing‘s request. 127  Under interrogation 
Abudulayimu further admitted that he had appealed to Erdena saying that ―If you lead 
your forces here now, I shall provide support from inside.‖128 
When the secret communication between Abudulayimu and Khoqand was 
confirmed, Nashitong, the councilor of Kashgar, reported this issue to the Qianlong 
emperor. The emperor responded: ―According to the law of our great Qing, the crime 
of those who have told people of other countries about domestic affairs is equal to 
plotting rebellion and high treason (fanpan 反叛).‖129 The Great Qing Code included 
a regulation that ―in the case of plotting rebellion and high treason, when there is joint 
plotting, do not distinguish between the principal and the accessory, all will be put to 
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death by slicing. His paternal grandfather, father, sons, sons‘ sons, brothers, and those 
living in the same household, regardless of whether they are of the same surname, as 
well as his paternal uncles, and sons of his brothers…will all be beheaded. His mother, 
daughter, wife, concubines, (unmarried) sisters, and also the wives and concubines of 
his sons, will all be given into the households of the household of meritorious officials 
as slaves.‖130 In this case, Abudulayimu was finally sentenced to death by slicing. His 
sons were executed and all the other female family members were sent to Beijing as 
servants.
131
 The penalty was precisely in accord with the regulation.  
Uyghur criminals who committed various kinds of homicide were to be 
punished according to Qing law. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, in 1792, the 
Qianlong emperor stated that ―in the future all the officials stationed in Xinjiang 
should observe the following rules when dealing with criminal cases: a Uyghur who 
kills his uncle, or brother, or grandfather, or grandfather-in-law, should be punished in 
accordance with the neidi codes or statutes. The homicide cases relating to distant 
relatives should be dealt with based on Uyghur traditions. No need to treat such cases 
on the basis of neidi institutions and laws.‖132  
According to the Huijiang Tongzhi (Comprehensive gazetteer of South 
Xinjiang), which was compiled in 1804, a Uyghur who has deliberately killed elders 
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or seniors should be punished according to neidi law. The sentence must be reported 
for review. Those intentionally killing someone or injuring someone with an 
instrument to an extent that leads to their death should be strangled in the bazaar. 
Those killing someone by mistake or beating someone to death without using any 
instrument could be dealt with in accordance with Muslim tradition, that is, they 
should ―redeem the crime by giving money or livestock to the relatives of the 
dead.‖133   
Some other crimes that were serious enough to be dealt with by the death 
penalty (based on the Qing law), such as stealing horses, would also be punished 
according to the Qing law.   
Another type of crime that was always treated according to the Qing law was 
rape, including both the heterosexual and homosexual forms. According to Matthew 
Sommer, by the eighteenth century, China‘s status society had been transformed into 
a society in which free peasants (bound only by contractual obligations) comprised 
the overwhelming majority of the population. The Qing government‘s basic principle 
for governing them was to fix them into the institutions of family and marriage in 
order to maintain social stability. A uniform standard of sexual morality and criminal 
liability was extended to the entire population. In traditional China, sexual purity and 
loyalty to husband was the most important female virtue. The law against rape was 
made harsher towards those who ―polluted‖ female purity and threatened family order. 
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Vulnerable adolescents from peasant households were also seen to be in need of 
protection, thus leading to the category of ―illicit sexual intercourse‖ including 
homosexual sodomy.
134
 In the same vein, in order to maintain social stability in the 
new frontier, the Qing court was eager to protect family order among Uyghur peasants 
and so made both heterosexual and homosexual rape serious crimes punishable under 
Qing law.  
In 1799, a Khotan Uyghur raped a ten-year-old Uyghur girl. Enchang, a Manchu 
official, proposed that the offender should be punished by immediate death (ji xing 
zhengfa 即行正法). The Jiaqing emperor approved his proposal by saying that 
according to the Qing law, this crime should be dealt with by decapitation with delay. 
However, ―the criminal was extremely execrable and the situation of Xinjiang was 
different from the neidi area,‖ he ruled, and therefore ―it is right to inflict a heavier 
punishment in order to correct the licentious atmosphere (以惩淫风) there.‖135 
Cultural, marital and gender relationships among Uyghurs differed from those of both 
the Manchus and the Han Chinese, and the Qing completely tolerated Uyghur 
marriage and sexual customs, such as mutah (temporary contractual marriages), a 
high divorce rate, and child marriage. Nevertheless, some of these customs and 
practices, together with the presence of professional Uyghur prostitutes in urban 
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 very likely contributed to the imperial colonizers‘ bias against what they 
saw as the ―licentious‖ sexual behavior of Uyghur Muslims. This attitude certainly 
contradicted the Qing rulers‘ ultimate ideal of an orderly society: every woman a wife, 
every man a husband. Clearly the emperor shared these views when he issued orders 
designed to clear the ―licentious atmosphere‖ by punishing rape criminals in the 
severest way.
137
 According to a sub-statute of the Great Qing Code, if someone rapes 
a girl younger than ten, the punishment is decapitation without delay; if the girl is ten 
or above, the punishment is decapitation with delay,
138
 which supposed to be the 
proper punishment if this case happened in the interior. 
While Uyghur society did not condone rape, the youth of the victim in the 
above case would not have been the deciding factor in popular reactions to the case.  
In Uyghur society to rape a ten year old girl would not be considered as a heinous 
crime because Uyghur girls were considered to be suitable for marriage and sexual 
relations at nine or ten. Most Uyghur people got married at a very young age. 
―According to (Uyghur) custom, women are to be married at around ten. If a woman 
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is still single at thirteen or fourteen, people will paint her home door with filth.‖139 
An investigation conducted in the 1950s suggests that there were still at that time a 
significant number of Uyghur girls who had been married at 9 or 10 years of age.
140
 
But in this case, the ten-year old victim was regarded as a ―child girl‖ (younu 幼女), 
implying that she was sexually immature, according to Chinese standards, and the 
rapist was punished accordingly.  
The Qing also intervened in sodomy cases in Xinjiang. In 1853, a Turfan 
Uyghur sodomized a seven-year old boy, Liu Yinwazi (Liu is a Chinese surname and 
―wazi‖ means boy, so this seems to have been a Chinese name). The Xianfeng 
emperor commented on this case: According to the (Qing) statute, even if a villain (e 
tu 惡徒) has not gathered a gang, whoever lures away a young boy of ten sui or under 
and forcibly sodomizes him shall be immediately beheaded according to the 
subsidiary statute on rootless rascals (guanggun li 光棍例 )‖. In this case, an 
investigation had revealed that the anus of the victim had been ruptured (gudao yi po 
穀道已破) and that the rape had been consummated. Therefore the offender was to be 
sentenced to death according to the subsidiary statute referred to by the emperor.
141
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From the Qing rulers‘ point of view, these rape cases, though not involving any 
act of homicide, still did harm to the social order of the frontier area, since the rapists 
polluted the chastity of adolescents from common peasant families (liangjia 良家) 
and thus jeopardized family order.  
3. The Qing emperors often drew up new regulations to react to specific 
circumstances.  
For a long time imperial edicts had been one of the primary sources of the Qing 
law. The Qianlong emperor had been especially active in drafting specific regulations 
to punish certain kinds of crimes committed in the new frontier, even in the late part 
of his reign. As we have seen, the emperor‘s strong opinions on sentencing made 
frontier law enforcement more flexible and unpredictable for local officials. Officials 
were not always sure which the emperor would think was applicable in a particular 
case.  
For example, from 1785 to 1792, following border conflicts with the Russians, 
the Qing shut down the Kiakhta trade with Russia and placed an embargo on the 
export of rhubarb, which was in great demand by the Russians. Therefore, when more 
and more Eastern Turkestanis as well as Han and Tungan merchants were found 
smuggling rhubarb from the interior to the northwestern frontier, where the Andijani 
merchants traded with Russians so eagerly that the embargo became invalid, Qianlong 
emperor became very concerned and issued a number of edicts to Le Bao, the General 
Governor of Shaanxi and Gansu requesting that these smugglers, whether they were 





punishment within the prescribed limits.
142
 In one of these edicts, the emperor even 
ordered a particular neidi merchant, Li Guisheng, who played a leading role in 
smuggling rhubarb, to be sentenced to death.
143
 When Le Bao reported in 1789 that a 
group of smugglers were to be sentenced to military exile for life or to penal servitude 
according to the regulations on ―smuggling prohibited goods‖, the emperor overruled 
his proposal, saying that it was not proper at all (for Le) to have mistakenly cited the 
substatutes which were supposed to apply to ordinary ignorant neidi people. These 
smugglers, he ordered, should be charged as ―managing to get profit and having illicit 
relations with a foreign country‖, and to be sentenced according to the severest 
penalties.
144
 By doing this, the emperor created a wholly exceptional rule for the 
punishment of a specific crime—too exceptional for the local administrator to draw 
up a ―correct‖ penalty based on the legal code. Qianlong himself was aware of this, as 
in another edict he informed his frontier officials that this severe regulation was made 




Another intriguing situation arose when the Ili General Mingliang proposed to 
punish six Andijani Muslims who had smuggled rhubarb by having them wear the 
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cangue for one month, while seven Kashgarians who had committed the same crime 
were to be made to wear it for two months. For this, he was sternly criticized by the 
emperor. According to Qianlong, Kashgarians had been living under his kindness for 
years and were no different from inland commoners. They were not at all comparable 
to Andijanis, who should be driven out of the locality after wearing the cangue for 
one month. As for the case of Kashgarian merchants, they had to be handled by Le 
Bao according to the special regulation.  
The Qianlong emperor‘s attitude recalls Laura Newby‘s argument that the 
Qing‘s interaction with Koqand contributed to their increasing border 
consciousness.
146
 This case indicates that by the late Qianlong period, the 
northwestern Qing border with Koqand was still blurred and Koqand could still be 
regarded as a dependent state under the Qing, because the Qing officials had a right to 
punish Koqandi merchants who had broken the imperial regulations. However, this 
right had already been circumscribed, since both Qianlong and Mingliang agreed that 
the punishment inflicted on Andiyanis should be much lighter than on the 
Kashgarians.  
From the Qianlong reign on, successive Qing rulers continued to formulate new 
regulations with regard to the assessment of penalties for certain specific criminal 
cases. For example, during the Daoguang reign, there were often cases involving 
people who sent out leaflets appealing for donations in support of the uprising of 
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Jahangir. In 1825 the Daoguang emperor issued a decree of prohibition, stipulating 
that if such a practice were found out, the offenders should be sentenced to immediate 
death. The person who donated the money would be expatriated to the yanzhang area 
(remote and harsh frontiers, at that time meaning Guangdong and Guangxi provinces) 
to carry out military service. Such criminals would not be granted a remission of 
penalty under any circumstances and on any occasion. The beneficiary would be 
expatriated to the inland frontier to carry out military service.
147
 
According to the Chinese legal tradition, the emperor‘s edicts always had 
uncontested legal authority and the Manchu rulers were especially willing to issue 
these when a specific case had to be dealt with in Xinjiang. Legislation there had 
always been incomplete and not systematic, and the Qing rulers had a large degree of 
freedom within which they could amend their policies for Xinjiang from time to time. 
4. As time went on, the Manchu emperors tried to enlarge the applicable 
field of state law and to make a clearer demarcation between the two legal 
systems.  
In Chapter 1, I argued that the Qianlong emperor adopted a flexible and 
dynamic policy to deal with ―severe‖ criminal cases in Xinjiang. During the earlier 
part of the Qianlong reign, the emperor punished Xinjiang crimes according to both 
Chinese and Islamic laws. There is no indication that he had any intention to draw a 
clear line between the fields within which the two laws could be applied. Without 
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clear stipulations Xinjiang officials often could not make decisions on how to choose 
an appropriate law to adjudicate and sentence in a specific case. They usually listed 
the judgments given in cases that were precedents and let the emperor make the final 
decision.  
By the late Qianlong reign, the emperor appears to have shifted his approach to 
the authority of state law in handling serious criminal offences in the frontier area. In 
1792, a Uyghur, Tuohuta, beat his elder brother to death. The Ush Imperial Agent, 
Funishan, listed all the relevant statutes and regulations in both Chinese and Uyghur 
law in his report to the Qianlong emperor and asked if it was proper for Tuohuta to 
―redeem‖ his crime as allowed for in Islamic law. The emperor was furious with his 
memorial and sent an edict stating:   
 Xinjiang Uyghurs have been assimilated (guihua 歸化) for years and they 
should be familiar with neidi law. Now Tuohuta beat his brother to death and so this 
case should be treated according to the neidi statutes and precedents. Funishan has 
already proposed immediate death for this criminal, why cite the Islamic regulation of 
―donating money to redeem the crime‖ as well? It is especially wrong for [Funishan] 
to refer to ―our neidi law‖ and ―the law of those Uyghurs‖ in his memorial. Uyghur 
[and other non-Manchu peoples] are all subjects, why differentiate between them as 
between those and these (or between ours and yours, he fen bici 何分彼此)? 









A careful reading of this edict shows it to be quite revealing. Funishan and the 
Qianlong emperor, though both Manchus, had different attitudes toward not only the 
Uyghurs, but also toward their own identities. By referring to ―our neidi law‖ (wo 
neidi zhi fa 我內地之法) and ―the law of those Uyghurs‖, Funishan‘s memorial 
implies that he regarded himself as belonging to the ―neidi‖ camp, while seeing the 
frontier Uyghurs as others. However, to the Qianlong emperor, ―neidi‖ meant Han 
Chinese; both frontier Uyghurs and neidi Han Chinese were merely subjects of the 
Manchus (and there was therefore no need to differentiate between them). The 
Qianlong emperor, who had been promoting Manchu values for his whole life, was 
far more aware than Funishan of the unique and overarching status of their Manchu 
identity. So he could not stand that his high-ranking Manchu official treated himself 
as a ―neidi‖ person when he referred to ―our neidi law‖. Although the Great Qing 
Code had been compiled largely based on the Great Ming Code
149
, from Qianlong‘s 
point of view, the ―neidi law‖, which was also the state law, was merely to be used by 
him to govern non-Manchu people, especially the Chinese. Even if the law was used 
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to regulate other, non-Manchu ethnic groups, it should not be taken to mean that the 
Han Chinese enjoyed a higher or unique status in the Manchu empire.  
This perhaps is one of the reasons why the emperor left a large space for his 
Inner Asian frontier ethnic subjects to have their legal affairs dealt with according to 
indigenous law. A unified Qing legal system, which was established largely based on 
the Chinese law of the previous Ming dynasty, would foreshadow the risk of 
assimilation of not only non-Manchu ethnic peoples, but also Manchus into the 
Chinese culture, a prospect which significantly worried the Qianlong emperor. 
Nonetheless, a more unified legal system was not only more efficient but also more 
effective in forging a close link between the frontier and the central empire. Therefore, 
after the new frontier had been incorporated for more than thirty years, the emperor 
decided to impose state law on the Xinjiang Uyghurs to a greater, but still limited 
extent. After sending the above edict, the Qianlong emperor soon added another 
decree to declare the new set of frontier legal rules that I have mentioned previously: 
―a Uyghur, who kills his uncle, or brother, or grandfather, or grandfather-in-law, 
should be punished in accordance with the neidi codes or statutes. Homicide cases 
related to distant relatives should be dealt with based on Uyghur traditions. No need 
to treat such cases based on the neidi institutions and laws.‖150 
Serious criminal cases recorded in the Secret Palace Memorials indicate that 
this set of rules was valid to the end of the Muslim Rebellion. No case of killing 
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distant relatives can be found in the archives, which very likely means that this type 
of case was handled according to indigenous law. On the hand, for example, in 1811 
an intoxicated Uyghur injured his wife and killed his own mother with a knife, and 
was sentenced to death by slicing according to the Qing code.
151
 It is also worth 
noting that in this case the Qing government ordered the wife, who was proven to be 
filial to the parents-in law and completely innocent in terms of Chinese law, to be 
dealt with by the hakim beg according to the Muslim statutes (huizi li 回子例); and 
the offender‘s friends, who had been drinking with him that night, were to be 
disciplined by the hakim beg as well. These legal arrangements attested that by this 
time not only minor criminal offenders but also victims were left to be dealt with by 
indigenous law or customs.  
As I have just mentioned, more rules about punishing severe crimes by the Qing 
law were recorded in the Huijiang Tongzhi, including regulations ordering that ―those 
who intentionally kill someone or injure someone to death with a metal instrument 
should be strangled in the bazaar. Those killing someone by mistake or beating 
someone to death without using any metal instrument could be dealt with in 
accordance with Muslim tradition, that is, they were allowed to redeem the crime by 
giving money or livestock to the relatives of the dead‖.152 The Huijiang Tongzhi was 
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compiled in 1804. Some of the regulations recorded at that time seem no longer to 
have been applied by the 1840s. An 1842 case indicated that the regulation mentioned 
above regarding accidental killing was no longer being obeyed by that time. In that 
year, when urinating in a field at night, a Turfan Uyghur, Manlike, threw a stone at 
some dogs which were trying to attack him. Unfortunately the stone hit a neighbor‘s 
head and caused his death the next day. The case was reported by the Turfan 
Commandant to the central government. Finally Manlike was punished with 
strangulation and about 14 taels of silver was to be given to the family of the victim. 
The statute which was invoked stated that anyone who unintentionally kills or injures 
another will be sentenced as if it were an act of killing or injuring in an affray (dou 
sha lu 鬥殺律). Redemption will be carried out according to the law, and the money 
will be given to the family (of the person who was killed or injured). An accident 
means that which the ear or eye does not extend to, or that which was not 
contemplated, as, for example, when for some reason one is tossing bricks or tiles 
(and unexpectedly kills another).
153
 
Although the judgment in this case also involved redemption, this was 
stipulated by the Great Qing Code, instead of by Islamic law. More importantly, 
Manlike was sentenced to death as well according to the Qing statute of ―killing or 
injuring in an affray‖, while in Islamic tradition the crime could have been redeemed 
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by giving money or livestock. Since this case was in the category of ―mistanken 
killing and unintentional killing‖, it indicates that by the 1840s, the offence of killing 
someone by mistake was also punishable according to the Great Qing Code.  
In the meantime, the Manchu emperors repeatedly guided their frontier agents, 
who were hesitant about the applicability of law when adjudicating criminal cases, to 
refer to the Qing law when dealing with serious cases. For instance, in 1816 a Kucha 
yamen runner named Gao Erbing was asked to look for and capture a criminal. 
Fearing that the deadline was approaching, Gao lodged a false charge against a 
Chinese Muslim (Hui) named Ma Xiang and applied severe torture to induce him to 
confess.. In a moment of desperation Ma Xiang injured himself badly. Xuzhuang, the 
Kuche Imperial Agent (banshi dachen 辦事大臣), made presentation to the throne 
requesting that the Board of Punishments draft a proper penalty in Gao‘s case. The 
Jiaqing emperor criticized Xuzhuang harshly, saying ―the court has already issued the 
Great Qing Code and supplementary regulations to Kuche. Undoubtedly this case 
should be judged according to the (Qing) statutes. You (Xuzhuang) said that because 
the case did not fully match with the statutes or the subsidiary statutes, you could not 
decide the penalty. But how can the details of a real case tally with the law book word 
by word?‖154 
Since there were no clear stipulations from the central government with regard 
to the applicability of law to criminal cases in Xinjiang, theoretically the emperor had 
                                                 





discretionary power to make the final decision. It seems that ever since the late 
Qianlong period, there had been a tendency for the Manchu emperors to try to impose 
state law on a greater number of criminal cases. As we shall see, by the reign of 
Tongzhi, the emperor even tried to terminate the applicability of Islamic law on any 
form of criminal case in Xinjiang.  
5. Muslim law continued to play a strong role in the local area and many 
Qing imperial officials dealt with cases according to the Islamic scriptures. Since 
there were no clear guidelines from the central government with regard to the 
applicability of laws, many problems arose at local level.  
Without clear central guidelines, Xinjiang officials were often confused by the 
two law systems that were implemented simultaneously in this frontier area. They 
also could not predict the emperor‘s decision for any given case as there were no strict 
criteria to constrain the emperor‘s considerations. The safest strategy for officials was 
therefore simply to leave the final decision-making to the higher authorities.  
However, not all officials were cautious and correct. Since there existed large 
space for discretion in the selection of a specific law to deal with a given criminal 
case, some officials, both stationed Qing agents and local begs, perverted the practice 
of criminal law in Xinjiang by making decisions that were sometimes very arbitrary. 
The absence of any detailed stipulations with regard to the applicability of laws 
provided opportunities for local officials to abuse the law for their own benefit. This 





In 1857, the Imperial Agent in Kuche, Wuerqinge, asked the local begs to arrest 
some Uyghurs who had refused to pay their taxes in kind. Those Uyghurs were 
charged with having formed a mob to make trouble. With the excuse that both Han 
and Uyghurs resided together in Kuche city and because there was no jail in the city, 
the Agent decided to ―follow Islamic law‖ and ordered immediate decapitation with 
exposure of the head for fifteen Uyghurs who ―had made confessions‖ (qu gong zhi 
fan 取供之犯)  and another fifteen who had not. No effort was made to consult with 
the Ili Governor-General before carrying out these sentences. The Emperor suspected 
that the imperial official pressed local Uyghurs too severely for the tax leading to the 
upheaval. As a result, he required the Ili General to appoint some officials to 
investigate the case.
155
   
The above case is only one of many indicating that Xinjiang officials 
intentionally abused the law and caused popular discontent with Qing rule. A 
notorious case finally made the Tongzhi emperor order that criminal cases among 
Xinjiang Uyghurs could no longer be sentenced according to Muslim law, and in the 
next section of this chapter I discuss this case in detail.  
To summarize, the co-existence of the two laws generated multiple effects. It 
provided both flexibility for the Qing rulers to deal with Xinjiang affairs and 
opportunities for local officials to abuse their powers and oppress ordinary people. 
The abuse of the laws surely caused and intensified social instability in Xinjiang, and 
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this in turn forced the Qing rulers to amend their strategic decisions on the 
applicability of laws to criminal cases. 
 
The Mianxing-Yingyun case 
The primary source of revenue for the Xinjiang government was the silver 
subsidy (xiexiang) shipped from other provinces annually. The subsidy amounted to 
around one million taels by 1830 and rose quickly over the subsequent decades. 
However, because of the Taiping rebellion and foreign indemnities imposed on the 
Qing government in the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing state was no longer able to 
ship the silver subsidy to Xinjiang. This caused a fiscal crisis in Xinjiang as it had a 
very small tax base and its expenditures were highly reliant on the xiexiang shipment. 
Meanwhile, trade between Xinjiang and China proper had been decreasing for a 
decade. Chinese merchants had gradually withdrawn in response to growing political 
instability because they had frequently become the targetof attacks by local Muslim 
rebels and robbers.  
Given the non-availability of the silver subsidy from China proper and the 
declining number and wealth of Chinese merchants, Qing officials in Southern 
Xinjiang were forced to depend increasingly on the local Uyghurs to feed the garrison 





levies on the native people. These changes in fiscal policy undermined the Qing 
policy of light imperial taxation that had been in effect in Xinjiang since 1759.
156
 
It is against this background that we can understand the actions of Manchu 
officials and Uyghur begs in the Mianxing-Yingyu case. Due to the suspension of the 
annual silver subsidy, the Aksu Councilor (banshi dachen 辦事大臣), Mianxing, 
levied a new salt tax without permission from the central government. Beg Akelayidu 
borrowed money from local Han merchants and Andijani merchants and imposed a 
tanpai or irregular levy on Uyghur commoners.
157
 For reasons that are unknown, a 
cashiered beg, Apisi, donated 20,000 taels of silver to the Xinjiang government. What 
we do know is that the Qing authorities resorted to the sale of offices when stipends 
from China proper no longer available. Han and Muslim merchants made 
contributions and received brevet ranks. It was possible that Apisi got his beg title as 
a result of the donation but was soon removed from office. It is against this 
background that a prolonged, complicated case took place, the final result of which 
was the Tongzhi emperor‘s decision to amend the way in which serious offenses were 
handled in Xinjiang. 
In the late Xianfeng reign (1850-1861), the Aksu Imperial Agent (banshi 
dachen) Mianxing, who was also a member of the Qing royal family, reported to the 
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emperor that the Muslim begs in Southern Xinjiang had illegally levied taxes for a 
long time. As the central government did not benefit from such illegal taxation, 
Mianxing suggested that it would be better to legalize the practice and to use the 
money collected to subsidize the expenses that the central government incurred in 
administering Xinjiang.
158
 To assist him in making this decision the emperor sent 
some officials to investigate the feasibility of this taxation reform. Shortly after this, 
the Yarkand Councilor, Yingyun, impeached Mianxing for corruption. The 
investigators found that Mianxing had already illegally levied a salt tax not only on 
the local residents but also on the Andijani aliens living and trading in Southern 
Xinjiang. In fact, Mianxing had openly imposed additional taxes on Uyghurs without 




Several higher-level officials, including the Ili General, Changqing, the Ili 
Councilor (canzan dachen 參贊大臣), Jinglian, and the Ili Commandant (lingdui 
dachen 領隊大臣), Guiwen, were sent to investigate Mianxing‘s case at different 
stages of the investigation process. When Guiwen was in charge of the investigation, 
Mianxing first designated someone to bribe Guiwen and then lodged a false 
accusation to the emperor to accuse Guiwen of having demanded a bribe.  
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In 1862, the new emperor, Tongzhi, urged Changqing and Jinglian to clear up 
the case. During their intensive investigation, Changqing and Jinglian found that 
Yingyun had committed several offences, including levying an illegal exaction on 
Uyghurs, beheading those who were against this illegal exaction without making a 
request for an imperial judgment, and doing something which was not allowed in 
Xinjiang.
160
 Yingyun‘s offences are detailed below.161 
1. Levying an illegal exaction 
In 1857, a Hakim beg called Akelayidu in Yarkand borrowed 20,000 taels of 
silver from Andijani merchants for the defense of the Muslim city during the jihad 
(holy war) led by Katta Khan and Wali Khan, which was recorded as ―the Rebellion 
of the Seven Khojas‖ in Chinese documents. Akelayidu then made a loan from Han 
merchants who were carrying out trade in Yarkand to pay back the Andijani 
merchants. After two years, the cashiered beg, Apisi, donated a similar amount to the 
Xinjiang authorities.  
Yurui, who was the Yarkand Councilor
162
 at that time, ordered the beg 
Akelayidu to lend this donation to local merchants to earn interest.
163
 However, 
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Akelayidu was not satisfied with the low interest rate. He chose to repay all debts to 
his Chinese creditors from this donation, without consulting Yurui. Akelayidu paid an 
additional 6,000 taels of silver as interest. About one year later (in 1860), Yurui 
required Akelayidu to return the amount of silver which he had ordered to be lent to 
merchants for interest (fa shang sheng xi 發商生息) in order to pay soldiers‘ stipends. 
At that time Akelayidu could only borrow 7,000 taels at most from merchants, the 
amount that was equivalent to the interest earned if that money had been lent to 
merchants, but had no way to pay back the principle of 20,000 taels.  
Therefore, Akelayidu discussed the matter with other begs and decided to levy a 
special exaction (tanpai) on local Uyghurs in order to collect 20,000 taels of silver. 
They asked the new Yarkand Councilor, Yingyun, for his permission. Yingyun 
replied: ―This is an official debt (ci shi gongzhang 此是公帳). It is assumed that you 
should try to repay the debt in an official way. Do not trouble the Uyghur 
(commoners).‖164 Nevertheless, it appears that Yingyun did not strictly prohibit the 
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practice of exactions and these begs apportioned the burden of 20,000 taels of silver 
to all the Uyghur villagers and finally collected the total amount of 447 silver ingots 
(equivalent to 22354.1 taels of silver) between the 10th month of Xianfeng 10 (1860) 
and the 9th month of Xianfeng 11 (1861).  
2. Beheading those who resisted this illegal exaction without authorization 
When Akelayidu implemented the tax apportionment, local Uyghur imams 
(akhunds) filed a petition requesting that they be exempted from the exaction, as 
Muslim clerics were habitually exempt from the alban tax. With Yingyun‘s 
permission, Akelayidu ordered the eight akhunds to be placed in the cangue. The 
general public also resisted the exaction, but in a different way from the akhunds. In 
one case, it was reported, the heavy burden of the new tax forced a Uyghur named 
Tailai to attempt to commit suicide. According to Tailai, a beg called Nudun levied a 
share of 12 taels of silver on him, and as he could not afford to pay it, Nudun took 
away most of his property, including a piece of white felt, a piece of wood and a 
donkey. Out of despair, Tailai injured himself severely in his suicide attempt. Scared 
by the potential consequences of Tailai‘s behavior, Nudun eventually returned his 
goods and promised that he would be exempt from the apportionment.  
The most severe resistance against this exaction occurred in the 10th month of 
1860. Local begs in a village called Yinma refused to present Uyghur commoners 





not pay the tax in the form of Muslim cotton (hui bu 回布).165 As a consequence, 
more than one hundred Muslims, holding knives and wooden sticks, went to protest at 
the front gate of the yamen. Only after the begs fired blanks did the crowd finally 
disperse. The new Yarkand Councilor Yingyun apprehended the mob leaders and 
strangled or beheaded more than ten of them according to the Islam classics, without 
first submitting a request for imperial approval. 
3. Doing something which was prohibited in Xinjiang 
During the course of investigation, Jinglian also found that Yingyun had 
celebrated his mother‘s birthday with an opera performance (yan xi 演戲). According 
to the emperor‘s edicts and Jinglian‘s memorials, drama performances were banned in 
Xinjiang. Yingyun defended himself with the justification that he had only asked 
some travelling artists to perform on that day. However, the Secondary Captain 
(shoubei) of the Councilor yamen, Tian Feng, confessed that he had painted costumes 
for the theatrical troupe and had them embroidered by Uyghurs. Moreover, later the 
investigators found the actor, who confessed that he had gone onto the stage on that 
day to play ―peaceful songs‖ (taiping ge太平歌). According to Jinglian, drama (xi戲) 
was referred to as ―peaceful song‖ in the region beyond the pass (kou wai 口外).  
So far I cannot find any sources precisely recording a regulation banning drama 
performances, either in the law codes or in other Qing materials such as the Qing 
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Huidian. Why did the Qing government prohibit the playing of dramas in Xinjiang? I 
can only try to guess some of the reasons. First, although Uyghurs have always loved 
song and dance, Islam is hostile to music and performance in principle. We have no 
record indicating that all kinds of secular music were banned in Qing Xinjiang, but 
according to some historians, the Islamic imams and mullahs monopolized secular 
culture among Uyghurs, and did what they could to prevent its spread among the 
people.
166
 The second and probably the most important reason is that Chinese operas 
often used images of idols such as Buddha, the Monkey King, which would be 
offensive to Muslims. So it is highly likely that the ordinance indicated a way in 
which the Qing leaders showed their respect to the religious customs of Uyghurs, 
especially the upper class. 
In 1861 the Ili General Changqing was appointed to investigate and handle 
Yingyun‘s case. In the investigation edict Changqing reported that what Yingyun had 
done was based on the consideration that ―previously all cases in Yarkand were 
handled according to the Islamic codes‖,167 from which it is clear that the Imperial 
Agents often applied the Islamic codes to cases in Xinjiang. In 1862, the Tongzhi 
Emperor circulated a decree about the Yingyun‘s case. The decree pointed out that in 
addition to Yingyun, other councilors such as Yurui, Deling and Changqing all took 
the same action against those who objected to the apportionment. It was ordered that 
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all of them should be punished, and the emperor decided that ―from now on cases 
should be sentenced according to the Qing codes. All penalties based on Islamic 
codes were no longer allowed.‖168 
This edict, however, tells us little about which kinds of cases should be dealt 
with only by the Qing codes. In the Collected Institutes and Precedents of the Qing 
(Qing huidian shili), we can find only the instruction issued by Tongzhi
169
 without 
any further explanation about which are the relevant cases to be sentenced under the 
Qing system. Shortly after the issuance of this edict, the Muslim Rebellion broke out 
in Southern Xinjiang. In no time the entire Xinjiang region was engulfed in enormous 
upheaval. During these chaotic times, the emperor‘s priorities inevitably shifting to 
measures for suppressing the rebellion, and no explanations or clarifications by way 
of follow-up on the matter of law applicability have been found. No other evidence 
has been found so far with regard to the central decision on the applicability of laws 
to criminal cases in Qing Huijiang. The crisis lasted until the establishment of 
Xinjiang province and to date no other evidence has been revealed to clarify the 
central decision on the applicability of laws to criminal cases for the yeas 1862—1877, 
the period before Zuo Zongtang proposed the designation of Xinjiang as a province. 
Sizable archives about the Mianxing-Yingyun case help us to understand more 
clearly Southern Xinjiang society on the eve of the Muslim Rebellion. Mianxing‘s 
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original proposal of formalizing the extra tax illegally levied by indigenous officials 
(biantong si zheng zhuanwei gongyong 變通私徵轉為公用) indicates that Chinese 
officials were trying to seize illicit profits extracted from Uyghur commoners by 
indigenous begs. In his memorial, Mianxing was able to justify undertaking this 
policy by saying that he was planning to reduce this ―private tax‖ by half and to 
formalize it and that therefore ―local Muslims will suffer less and the (Chinese) 
government will get more funds.‖ The Xianfeng emperor, though fully aware of the 
illegality of this tax, could not resist any policy that could relieve the financial burden 
of the central government. According to him, Mianxing‘s suggestion would probably 
―increase (Uyghur‘s tax burden) on the surface but reduce it in reality‖.170 This 
proposed policy reminds us of Yongzheng reforms, which legalized the collection of 
meltage fee (huohao 火耗 or haoxian 耗羨) in order to increase the legal income of 
localgovernment without increasing the tax burden on the people, although neither the 
officials nor the emperor mentioned that there were precedents.
171
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Actually Xinjiang residents had long been suffering from exploitation by both 
imperial and local officials.
172
 These officials managed to extract revenues by various 
means, including levying extra taxes, investing government funds for interest, selling 
official titles, and so forth. These practices, as we know, were also common in the 
neidi. With stipends from China proper no longer available the situation became even 
worse. Imperial and local officials were both partners and rivals in the search for 
funds. Usually Qing officials demanded more revenue from indigenous begs, who in 
turn made up for their own loss of revenue by levying more taxes from Uyghur 
commoners. In this case, people like Tailai were at the bottom of the pyramid. They 
had no way to meet these demands but to commit suicide or rebel.  
It was hard to say how much of the revenue went to the government treasury 
and how much to the officials‘ own pockets. In this case, without resources from the 
state, the need to repress the rebellion of the Seven Khojas gave Qing officials an 
excuse to demand more local revenue and Uyghur begs to extract more from the 
populace. By so doing, popular discontent with Qing rule was further heightened 
contributing to increased popular unrest. This seems to be a vicious circle that 
foreshadowed the bankruptcy of Qing governance in Xinjiang.  
This case also suggests that Islamic law was widely referred to in the 
punishment of Uyghur criminals by Chinese officials. Although, as I have discussed, 
the Qing emperors from Qianlong to Xianfeng had all reiterated that severe criminal 
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cases were to be handled according to state law, in practice, many cases in Yarkand 
were handled based on the Islamic scriptures, which is why so many high-ranking 
Qing officials were condemned by the Xianfeng emperor.   
Why did the Qing officials prefer to consult indigenous Islamic law, instead of 
the state law? This case proved particularly instructive for answering this question. It 
seems to me that what mattered here was not the system of law itself, but the 
jurisdictional procedures each one set in motion. When a capital sentence was issued 
according to the Qing law, it had to be reported and approved by the emperor. 
However, punishments based on Islamic law, including the death penalty, could be 
implemented quietly at the local level without the knowledge or acquiescence of 
higher-level authorities. In this case, if Yingyun was going to execute the Uyghur 
mob leaders based on Chinese law, the whole case had to be reported to Beijing and 
the emperor would have found out that he was carrying out illegal tax extractions in 
Yarkand. With the native law available to him, Yingyun was able to suppress the 
rebels crudely and secretly. In brief, the dual-law system, especially the validity of 
Islamic law in Xinjiang, helped to cover up the corruption of both imperial and 
indigenous officials.  
In the previous chapter I have argued that the Qianlong emperor was able to 
deprive the local level of the bureaucracy of decision-making power and then 
maintain tighter control on the frontier by not drawing clear distinctions between 
Chinese law and Islamic law. Nonetheless, the Mianxing-Yingyun case during the 





double-edged sword. Whenever the central authority loosened its control, frontier 
officials manipulated the system to benefit themselves.  
 
Rebellion and the state of Kashgaria: a chaotic period 
Beginning in the 1820s the new frontier saw increasing popular discontent, 
more and more domestic rebellions and frequent Khoja jihad, as well as severe 
external pressures mainly from Russia and Khoqand. Shortly after the 
Mianxing-Yingyun case, the (Chinese) Muslim rebellion broke out in South Xinjiang. 
Soon all of Xinjiang was engulfed in upheaval. It has not been found that the emperor 
presented any follow-up explanations or clarification for policy to end any further 
reliance on Islamic law. The social crisis lasted until the establishment of Xinjiang 
province.  
Encouraged by the Tungan (Chinese Muslim) rebellions in Yunnan (1855-1873) 
and Shaanxi (1855-1873), Kucha Uyghurs and Tungans, who shared the same religion 
but spoke different languages, rose up in June 1864 and overthrew the local 
government. This revolt soon expanded to almost the entire area of South Xinjiang. 
Qing rule there was on the brink of collapse: the rebellion wiped out the last vestiges 
of Qing rule in Xinjiang. The power vacuum left in South Xinjiang was soon 
occupied by a Kokandi army led by Yaqub Beg, who set up the independent Islamic 
state of Kashgaria. Yaqub tried to maintain good relations with both Great Britain and 
Russia, in the hope that these two countries would protect him against military attack 





proceeded to annex the Ili Valley in 1870, in the name of maintaining stability in this 
area and in the territory in Russian Turkestan that they had recently conquered. 
Depicting himself as a defender of religious values, Yaqub pursued a strict 
Islamic policy. Sources concerning the implementation of law in the state of 
Kashgharia are limited in number, what we do know is that East Turkestanis were 
required to adhere to Islamic law at that time. Of the two documents that are known to 
have survived, one was written by Kuropatkin, an officer of the Russian General Staff, 
who was dispatched to Kashghar in 1876; the other was written by Liu Jintang, the 
first governor of Xinjiang province. 
Kuropatkin wrote the following in his report: 
Severe punishments, often which by death, overtake those disobedient to the 
will of Yakoob Bek. Of late years, however, having succeeded in making his name 
terrible, this potentate has, in spite of the generally-received opinion to the contrary, 
very seldom resorted to capital punishment. Being in need of money, he has more 
frequently punished offenders and those in disgrace by declaring their possessions 




Liu Jingtang in his memorial to the Guangxu emperor told basically the same 
story as Kuropatkin: 
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Yaqub had occupied Xinjiang for more than ten years. That was a really chaotic 
period. A Uyghur who killed others need only to pay some money to the relatives of 
the dead, which was called ―buy-life money‖, but never pay a life for a life (chang 
ming 償命), since to amass money is the only purpose of Yaqub‘s regime. Therefore, 
the rich men there regarded murder as a children‘s game.174 
Surely both the Russians and the Chinese had reasons to want to criticize Yaqub. 
But the above two observations, especially the latter one, obviously have their own 
biases. As ―a life for a life‖ (sharen changming 殺人償命), which means the person 
guity of murder should be executed seemed to be one of fundamental principles of 
Qing criminal law, it would be hard for the Chinese to accept the Islamic laws which 
allow a murderer to be punished financially instead of by death and money given to 
the family of the victim as compensation.  
 It is well-known that in 1875 a heated debate took place at the Qing court over 
the relative importance of ―Coastal Defense (haifang 海防) of the Southeast‖ and 
―Overland Defense (saifang 塞防) of the Northwest‖. The Qing government finally 
decided to back the Han general, Zuo Zongtang, in his suggestion that it reconquer the 
northwest frontier. In 1877, the Qing army under the command of Zuo Zongtang and 
Liu Jintang defeated the Kashgarian troops. Yaqub Beg died in April of that year 
when the Qing army was approaching his state. The Qing military expedition was 
formally completed with the occupation of Khotan on the second day of January 1878. 
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However, "the Ili Crisis" continued until the signing of the St. Petersburg Treaty in 
1881, which affirmed the return of most of the annexed areas of Ili to China. Thanks 
to the financial difficulties of Russia at that time as well as the great diplomatic skills 
of Chinese ambassador, Zeng Jize, a war was avoided and Russians finally gave back 
the territory to the Qing. Under the terms of this treaty, Russia kept part of the 
territory, China had to pay an indemnity, and had to allow Russia to open more 
consulates in this area.
175
 By the end of 1881 the Qing Empire regained and 
consolidated its sovereignty over the entire Xinjiang area after a thirteen-year loss of 
control. 
 
Cultural policies for the new province 
The officials who led the reconquest and establishment of the province, namely 
Zuo Zongtang and his subordinates among the Hunan troops, showed more ambition 
for cultural expansion than the Qianlong emperor, who had always been extremely 
cautious about enlarging the influence of Han culture across his multi-ethnic empire. 
It was not the first time that China had implemented direct control over this area, but 
the control mechanisms in previous periods had been primarily military-style 
governance. From the 1880s on, Xinjiang was integrated into the regular civil 
administrative system of China. Civil bureaucracy, manned largely by Han Chinese 
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officials governed these areas directly in place of members of the Manchu and 
Mongolian military elites. The tax system was restructured to be consistent with that 
of neidi provinces. Muslim begs were placed under greater imperial supervision and 
were renamed xiangyue (―village compact lecturers‖). Meanwhile, immigration from 
the interior to Xinjiang continued to be encouraged.  
Unlike the conquest of 1759, when the Qianlong emperor had designed most of 
the policies for the new frontier, this time it was a group of Han Chinese provincial 
officials who planned the new administrative model for Xinjiang. Among them, it was 
General Zuo Zongtang who had the greatest influence on this period of Xinjiang‘s 
history. The successful repression of the Taiping Rebellion paved the way for a group 
of Han officials and the troops they led, most of whom were from Hunan province, to 
step to the center of the political stage during the last decades of the dynasty. These 
Han officials, such as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, and Hu Linyi, were all faithful 
adherents of Confucianism and were deeply influenced by the statecraft school. Zuo 
Zongtang had been memorializing the Qing court in favor of the idea of province 
designation for Xinjiang long before he took over official responsibilities in the area. 
By the time Xinjiang was designated a province in 1884, Zuo had already taken up a 
position as Governor-General of Liangjiang.  However, the first four Xinjiang 





According to James Millward, during the high Qing period, the Qianlong mode 
of frontier governance barely had any missionary ambition.
176
 As we too have 
demonstrated, within this scheme, native customs, law, and religion were highly 
respected and able to operate as before. The policies implemented after the 
establishment of Xinjiang province, however, reflected the cultural concerns of the 
new generation of Xinjiang rulers. From 1876 on, Zuo Zongtang, in four memorials 
he had submitted to Beijing, set out his blueprint for Xinjiang province. Among his 
suggestions were the abolition of rotation of the garrison troops, the construction of 
irrigation projects, the expansion of land reclamation, a survey of arable land, 




In one of the memorials, called ―Report on handling rehabilitation works in 
Xinjiang‖, Zuo mentioned that Zhang Yao, who had participated in the Xinjiang 
reconquest campaign and had served as his adjutant, had edited Sixteen Sacred Edicts 
with Simple Explanations of the Code (shengyu shiliu tiao fu lv li jie 圣喻十六條附
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律例解).178 The book was written in both Chinese and Uyghur and had been 
distributed among Uyghur begs for them to teach orally to Uyghur commoners. The 
Sixteen Sacred Edicts had first been produced by the Kangxi emperor in 1670. It 
announced sixteen fundamental principles about how to be a ―good‖ imperial subject, 
one of which was ―obeying the law‖. Most of these principles were drawn up on the 
basis of Confucian values.
179
 Moreover, some of the maxims were simply directed at 
reducing challenges to the state. Ever since its publication the Sacred Edicts was 
intended to be taught to common people by xiangyue or school teachers in every 
village across the empire. This was, however, the first time it was suggested that it be 
promoted in Xinjiang. This can be seen as a sign that the new policy-makers intended 
to extend imperial cultural influence into this frontier region.  
A memorial submitted by Liu Jintang, the first governor of Xinjiang province, 
also mentioned the distribution of the Sixteen Sacred Edicts with Simple Explanations 
of the Code. Early on, during the time when the Qing troops were fighting with Yaqub, 
the book had been distributed and taught in the newly established Confucian 
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Before the territory had been completely reconquered, the Qing officials had 
begun to establish Confucian yishu in every place immediately when it had been 
recovered. The establishment of Confucian schools throughout Xinjiang later aimed 
to teach non-Han children Chinese language and Confucian classics.
181
 The 
government would pay for the students‘ tuition and various living expenses. At the 
same time, the Qing rulers used this channel to disseminate Chinese legal thought. 
The minorities from a young age were inculcated with Chinese legal principles, as 
part of an education in Chinese social norms. During the process of preparing the 
designation of Xinjiang as a province, careful attention was paid to the insertion of 
Chinese legal culture into the area.
182
 
Though the new policy makers did attempted to modify local customs and 
moral principles, in general, they paid more attention to economic and financial 
construction than cultural affairs, since the expense of governing this frontier had 
haunted the court ever since Qianlong‘s 1759 conquest. In terms of cultural policies, 
these provincial officials still largely inherited Qianlong‘s idea of non-intervention, 
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which was reflected in Liu Jintang‘s famous memorial declaring the aim of the new 
policies as being to ―educate [the Uyghurs] without changing their customs and polish 
the administration without abolishing its [previous] effective policies.‖ 183  The 
Xinjiang Tuzhi further elaborated this idea: ―[we] should raise up and teach [Uyghurs] 
as people do with their newborn infants, through the establishment of the province, 
the nomination of officials and the installation of administrative units. However, as 
for religion, customs, and moral principles, there is no need to impose uniformity，and 
neither for food, clothing, language, or writing.‖184 Since newborns actually have no 
culture, this expression indicates anambivalence of Qing officials‘ opinion toward 
Uyghur native culture and custom: on the one hand, they felt it was necessary to adopt 
a tolerant cultural policy; on the other hand, they thought Uyghurs were without 
civilization. 
 
Dealing with criminal cases after the 1880s  
Few studies exist on the administration of laws in Xinjiang province after the 
1880s. Based on materials such as the Secret Palace Memorials and the Veritable 
Records, I will try to analyze the applicability of laws and how criminal cases were 
handled from the 1880s to the fall of the dynasty. Since the central archives only 
documented serious cases punishable by execution reported by provincial governors 
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to the emperor for his approval, my study of this period will still focus on these 
serious criminal cases. First, however, I look briefly at jurisdiction in cases of minor 
criminal offences in Xinjiang based on local archives, which are also limited in 
quantity. 
1. Only Qing law was applied to serious criminal cases, irrespective of the 
ethnicity of the offender. Islamic law was no longer valid for dealing with cases 
of this type. 
Before the Muslim Rebellion, more than one Qing emperor had emphasized that 
the imperial agents were prohibited from judging serious criminal cases according to 
the Islamic classics. The notorious Mianxing-Yingyun case indicated that this 
prohibition had never taken full effect in Xinjiang. But after the 1880s, all serious 
criminal sentences documented in the Secret Palace Memorials were strictly dealt 
with according to the Great Qing code, regardless of the ethnic identity of the 
offenders or the victims. No more discussion about ―handling cases according to the 
Islamic classics (cha jing ban an)‖ has been found at the central level, which means 
that, at least among cases that were severe enough to be reported to the emperor, these 
were all dealt with according to Qing law.  
On the other hand, there had been waves of in-migration by Han and Hui 
Chinese from the 1830s onwards. After Jahangir‘s jihad and the invasion of Khoqand, 
the Qing had begun to encourage the migration and settlement of Han people in 
Xinjiang. In addition, more Chinese agricultural colonies had been established in the 





and Tianjin followed the Qing troops to Xinjiang. They opened businesses and 
gradually settled down. By the early years of the Guangxu reign, the trend of Chinese 
migration to Xinjiang was more prominent.
185
 After the defeat of the Rebellion, a 
large number of Tungans moved into Xinjiang from Gansu and Shaanxi to escape 
persecution by the government.
186
  
With a huge number of Chinese migrants flooding into this frontier region, 
conflicts among various ethnic or religious groups inevitably increased. The situation 
pushed the imperial rulers to work out an appropriate policy to deal with these 
inter-ethnic tensions. More so, the Qing government had to determine whether or not 
to go on punishing perpetrators according to different laws, even when they 
committed the same crime and in the same place.  
Archives dating after the 1880s indicated that the Qing government exclusively 
imposed Chinese law on severe criminal offences committed in Xinjiang, irrespective 
of the perpetrators‘ ethnicities. In 1886, for example, a Kucha Uyghur called Tudi 
beat his cousin‘s wife to death when she vigorously resisted his efforts to rape her. 
The case was reported to the xiangyue and investigated and reviewed in turn by the 
county magistrate, the prefectural magistrate, and finally reported by the provincial 
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governor, Liu Jintang, to the emperor. The criminal was punished by decapitation and 
his head was exposed to the public, according to the substatute on attempting to rape 
the wife of a relative of morning degrees above sima (緦麻)187 and killing her. The 
victim was honored as a chaste woman for having given up her life to resist pollution 
according to the Qing policy.  
In the same year, a Kotan Uyghur boy, Wushou, at the instigation of his mother, 
Lidipi, stole 250 cash coins from a female neighbor and was found out immediately. 
When the neighbor reported this to Lidipi‘s husband, Lidipi was shamed, agitated and 
worried that she might reveal this to other villagers. So she induced the woman to 
enter her house and there killed her with the help of her son. Eventually Lidipi was 
sentenced to decapitation with delay according to the substatute on intentional murder. 
According to the Great Qing Code, those who stole money of less than one tael of 
silver should be beaten by 60 blows of a heavy stick and the penalty for the 
subordinate criminal should be reduced by one degree or level. So Wushou was to be 
punished by 50 blows with a light sticks. However, there was another substatute in the 
Code providing that if a child younger than ten years old steals or injures others, his 
crime should be redeemed (by money) and no other penalty should be imposed on 
him. Therefore, Wushou‘s father was asked to pay a ransom as well as to return the 
money that Wushou had stolen. The father himself was punished by eighty blows 
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with the heavy stick- according to the penalties of minor offences(bu ying zhong lu 
不應重律) because he had failed to discipline his wife.188 
The above two cases indicate that by the 1880s the assessment of punishment in 
severe criminal cases was strictly based on the Great Qing Code. In the first case, 
although the criminals were Uyghurs, Chinese mourning degrees were used to weigh 
the relation between the criminal and the victim and then to assess the degree of 
seriousness of their crimes. In addition, the murdered woman received the honor of a 
chaste woman, a gesture that was never found in Xinjiang before the 1860s.  
The second case is even more instructive, since the boy, as the accessory to the 
crime, was also strictly punished according to the Great Qing Code. But as I have 
discussed previously in this chapter, at the latest by the early nineteenth century, the 
accessories to serious crimes were left to be punished or ―disciplined‖ according to 
Islamic law. Thus we can say with certainty that the Chinese legal system did expand 
in Xinjiang, although largely with regard to the most serious crimes.  
2. The Flexible Regulations of Xinjiang 
When Zuo Zongtang was called back to Beijing in 1880, he recommended his 
fellow countryman, Liu Jintang, a 30-year old Hunan Chinese, to be the Imperial 
Agent in charge of Xinjiang affairs. It was Liu who finalized the grand project of 
province designation and took the position of the first Xinjiang Provincial Governor.  
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In 1881, Liu Jintang drafted the Flexible Regulations of Xinjiang (Xinjiang 
biantong zhangcheng) and submitted them to the Qing court. The Regulations were 
the first and most important set of principles in the shaping of the rule of law in 
Xinjiang province. Although the word ―biantong‖ in Chinese means not only flexible, 
but also temporary and subject to change, this legal framework actually defined the 
implementation of criminal law in Xinjiang for the next twenty odd years. In this 
document the Qing laws, especially Qing legal procedures, were amended for 
implementation in Xinjiang.  
When submitting the Regulations to the court for the final amendment, Liu 
explained the purposes and necessity of drawing up these regulations in his memorial, 
which he called ―Proposing to handle ming [homicide] and dao [general disorder and 
theft, including rebellion, robbery, and theft] cases flexibly‖.189  
According to Liu Jintang, Xinjiang inhabitants of various ethnicities had been 
away from orthodoxical (Confucian) education (jiu wei sheng jiao 久違聲教) for a 
long time. They were like pastured horses, whose wild nature could not be tamed 
although they were temporarily under restriction. In previous dynasties, systems of 
law operating in the frontier areas had been designed to be simple and easy to apply. 
Ferocious crimes had been punished severely to warn others while minor faults had 
usually been forgiven. The Qing government, he wrote, should follow this tradition. 
Particularly, Liu Jintang cited the Qianlong emperor‘s legal policies in the Miao 
                                                 
189





frontier as a good example. After the Miao frontier was annexed to the regular civil 
administrative system of the empire in the early Qianlong reign, Miao people were 
allowed to resolve their disputes according to the native law. This policy could now 
be extended to Xinjiang, he proposed, because it would not be easy to achieve perfect 
governance immediately by imposing Chinese policies on frontier barbarians (yong 
xia manyi, ju zhen shangzhi, shi wei yi yan 用夏蛮夷，遽臻上治，实未易言).   
The legal flexibility proposed by Liu Jintang mainly consisted of two elements. 
One was the toleration of minor offences (kuan xiaoguo 宽小过), which meant 
leaving those cases to be handled by native laws and customs. The other was to hold 
to great principles (zong dagang 总大纲), which meant harshly and quickly punishing 
serious crimes. According to Liu, trials for these cases should be carried out 
immediately and the sentence should be imposed as soon as possible. If the offender 
was punished long after the crime was committed, the warning and intimidatory effect 
of the punishment would be weakened. On the other hand, since Xinjiang was large 
and logistics inconvenient, the cost of sending criminals to the upper level court to 
wait for their cases to be reviewed and the cost of exiling criminals would be 
unaffordable. Therefore, for the time being the criminal cases of ming and dao should 
be tried and punished immediately on the spot and a list of summaries of these cases 
would be submitted to the emperor every three months.  
The Flexible Regulations of Xinjiang contains a number of detailed provisions 
to ―simplify legal procedures‖. These can be summarized into two aspects: those who 





all be executed immediately on the spot; those who should be sentenced to death with 
delay or to personal military exile, should all be punished by imprisonment (gujin 锢
禁) of various lengths. In other words, the complex assessment of penalties was now 
―simplified‖ into two extremes: either the most severe penalty or more or less the 
lightest one. In this way, it was argued, provincial officials would be able to 
implement the criminal law in a very easy, prompt and perhaps more effective way. 
They need not wait for Beijing‘s sanction to punish serious criminal offenders, and 
instead they merely had to submit a report to the emperor every three months, briefly 
summarizing all the cases that had been handled according to the Flexible 
Regulations.  
The earliest report that I have found written by Liu Jiantang is about the cases 
―flexibly‖ handled in the autumn and the winter of 1882. There were seven criminals, 
shown here with the punishment each received.  
A Turfan Tungan who intentionally killed his brother (who were a young child) 
and tried to impute the crime to others (tu lai taren 圖賴他人): execute on the spot 
(jiu di zheng fa 就地正法). The standard sentence for a superior or elder relative to 
plots to kill someone who is an inferior or younger relative was strangulation (with 
delay) according to the Great Qing Law.
190
 However, usually in the Fall Assizes if a 
person willfully killed his younger brother or neiphew and tried to impute the crime to 
others, he would be classified into the category of ―confirmed (qingshi 情實) and 
                                                 
190







 A Koqandi Uyghur who injured another Uyghur to death in a 
fight: wearing cangue for three months. If he was an inland Chinese, the standard 
sentence was strangulation (with delay) according to the Great Qing Law.
192
 
An Aksu Uyghur who killed a person because the latter beat his mother: 
imprisonment (gu jin 錮禁) of two years. The standard sentence was strangulation 
with delay according to the Great Qing Law.
193
  
A Shayar Uyghur who murdered a Chinese merchant and his wife for their 
money: death on the spot (jiu di zheng fa), head being cut off and hanged up as a 
warning to all. The standard sentence was decapitation (without delay) according to 
the Great Qing Law.
194
 
An Aksu Chinese with mental disease (fengbing 瘋病) who injured a Uyghur 
and caused his death: sending back to his native place to be locked up (suo gu 鎖錮) 
for at least two years by the local magistrate. The standard sentence was to be locked 
up forever or to be punished according to the Regulations of Affrays and Blows (if the 
offender had recovered from the mental disease).
195
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A Uyghur living in Qitai county who murdered another two Uyghurs (father and 
son): jiu di zheng fa, head being cut off and hanged up as a warning to all. If the 




A Yarkand Uyghur who beat his sister in-law‘s adulterer to death when catching 
them in the act of having sex: imprisonment for half a year. The standard sentence 
was strangulation (with delay) according to the Great Qing Code.
197
  
Basically these cases attest the above mentioned principles of flexible 
regulations. Those who might be punished by death without delay were all executed 
on the spot and those who might be punished by death with delay or lighter all receive 
sentence of imprisonment. In the light of the policy being put forth at this time the 
punishment of Criminal 2 is astoundingly light. We can only assume that this was 
politically motivated by the Qing desire to maintain peaceful relations with the 
leadership of the man‘s homeplace, Koqand.  
The Flexible Regulations were imposed not only on primary criminals but also 
on accessories. For instance, there were twelve cases in total which were handled 
flexibly according to the Regulations in the spring (from the first to the third month of 
the lunar calendar) of 1885. Among the twelve cases, primary criminals in seven 
cases and accessories in two received sentences of imprisonment ranging from two to 
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five years. Imprisonment is not a punishment in China. Here in Xinjiang it seems to 
be a substitute for exile, since it was too difficult to transport exiled criminals in 
Xinjiang, especially South Xinjiang.
198
  
3. Immediate execution on the spot  
After the establishment of Xinjiang province, at the level of legislation, the most 
controversial issue was whether or not to continue ―jiu di zheng fa‖, which was 
supposed to be a temporary legal practice. However, Xinjiang was not the only 
province that generated this debate between the central and the provincial officials – 
the debate was nation-wide and prolonged. 
The institution of death penalty review became problematic during the Taiping 
Rebellion, when many more local bandits, who had taken advantage of the social 
instability at that time and carried out various crimes, were to be sentenced to death 
than during any preceding peaceful period. To wait for final approval of a death 
penalty was not always feasible for local officials during this time of war or rebellion. 
To minimize the delay in carrying out a capital sentence, Chinese military officials 
who were fighting on the front, represented by Zeng Guofan, proposed that jiu di 
zheng fa should be institutionalized in times of chaos. In 1853, the Qing court 
approved this proposal and issued the Regulation concerning jiu di zheng fa (jiu di 
zheng fa zhangcheng).
199
 According to this ordinance, whenever a group of bandits 
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gathered and pillaged commoners, the local officials were allowed to execute them 
immediately after investigation, but all other regular crimes of the dao and ming 
categories were to be punished according to the normal procedures.
200
  
The Regulation concerning jiu di zheng fa remained valid after the Taiping 
Rebellion was put down. Beginning in the 1870s, central officials of the Board of 
Punishment had begun to challenge the normalization of jiu di zheng fa. In 1874, an 
imperial censor, Deng Qinglin had proposed to abolish jiu di zheng fa in provinces 
that had recovered from warfare, but this had been rejected. In 1882, Chen Qitai and 
Xie Qianheng, both of whom were censors of Board of Punishment, submitted 
memorials to the court to suggest the cancellation and amendment of jiu di zheng fa 
respectively. This time, the emperor asked for more opinions from both sides— the 
legal elite on the Board of Punishment and the provincial officials as legal executors. 
According to the former, jiu di zheng fa was a simplified, ad hoc policy that was only 
suitable during wartime. The dynasty had been at peace now for twenty years, and jiu 
di zheng fa had been abused by local officials. It was often difficult to catch a criminal 
offender immediately. When the tenure of a county or prefecture magistrate was up, 
in order to clear his caseload, he often wrongfully procesuted those who committed 
minor crimes as serious offenders and sentenced them to death peremptorily 
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according to the jiu di zheng fa regulation. Therefore, lack of the review mechanism 
severely damaged the fundamental principle of ―cautious punishment (shen xing 慎




According to the provincial officials, however, chaos had not completely ended 
and it was also a tradition to impose serious punishments during periods of chaos 
(luanshi xu yong zhongdian 乱世需用重典). Liu Jintang‘s explanation of the situation 
in Xinjiang was a typical of the opinion coming from the provincial level. According 
to him, the delay in implementing criminal sentences would produce challenges for 
the detainment of offenders. Xinjiang had a large territory with low population 
density, and it would be hard to prevent criminals in jail from escape if they were 
detained for a long time, he argued. Moreover, the cost of imprisoning them and 
sending them to the upper-level court could be huge. On the other hand, if a capital 
criminal were not executed because of a long string of judicial procedures, capital 
sentence would hardly produce enough effect in terms of warning others.
 202
  
In the fourth month of 1882, an emended regulation concerning the 
implementation of jiu di zheng fa, drafted by the Board of Punishment, was supposed 
to end the debate. It provided that from then on, within one year the ―old institution‖ 
should be restored to deal with all regular cases in the dao category, with exceptions 
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including cases arising in Gansu and Guangxi, where there were still wars and 
uprisings, as well as cases of bandits, horse thieves, secret society bandits (huifei 会
匪), escaping soldiers (游勇) and rebels. Provincial governors were prohibited from 
executing other criminals before receiving sanction from the capital.
203
  
But the story of Xinjiang indicates that this amendment to the regulations by no 
means terminated the local officials‘ arbitrary rights to execute criminals on the spot. 
The ―old institution‖ had not been restored in Xinjiang by 1885. Officials of the 
Board of Punishments suggested that the emperor reconsider how to deal with cases 
of general disorder and cases of homicide occurring in Xinjiang. According to them, 
all Xinjiang criminals in ming and dao cases should be charged according to the Great 
Qing Code and their penalties should only be implemented after receiving the 
approval of the Board. All offenders subject to ―death penalties without delay‖ should 
be executed only after receiving approval and other criminals sentenced to death 
should wait for the Autumn Assizes.
204
 In the memorial that contained his immediate 
response, Liu argued that the legislation of criminal cases of ming and dao in Xinjiang 
had been different from the neidi areas as early as the period before the Muslim 
Rebellion, and in any case jiu di zheng fa was still valid in many interior provinces. 
Therefore, he wrote, it was really difficult to apply strictly the regular legal 
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institutions in Xinjiang at the present time.
205
 Finally, a compromise was reached 
between the two sides: the offenders sentenced to (military) personal exile, or to 
strangulation or decapitation with delay, or assigned to the category of ―capital 
sentences with delay‖ in the Autumn Assizes (qiushen ru huan 秋审入缓) should not 
be handled in any exceptional way, but according to the regular legal procedures. 
Those offenders sentenced to strangulation or decapitation without delay, or assigned 
to the category of capital sentences without delay in the Autumn Assizes (qiushen ru 
jue 秋审入决 ) according to the regular legal procedures, should be executed 
immediately on the spot according to the Flexible Regulations.
206
 
A year later, the imperial court tried again to restore the normal reviewing 
system for capital sentences with another edict. Liu reiterated the special situation in 
Xinjiang. At the end of his memorial, Liu requested that the Flexible Regulations of 
Xinjiang continue in effect for at least another three years. The memorial was finally 
endorsed by the emperor.
207
  
Nothing significantly changed three years later when Liu Jintang retired in 1888. 
Another Hunanese who had served in the Hunan troop, Wei Guangtao, succeeded Liu 
as the acting governor of Xinjiang province. In around 1899, the Amendment to the 
Flexible Regulations of Xinjiang (Xinjiang zouding biantong zhangcheng 新疆奏定
                                                 
205
 Ibid.  
206
 Guangxu chao zhu pi zouzhe, v106, p.505.  
207





變通章程) was issued, according to which severe cases in the dao category were still 
subject to jiu di zheng fa, but the final judicial right to issue capital sentences of the 
ming type went back to the Board of Punishment and the emperor.
208
 This change 
helps to explain why two of Wei Guangtao‘s reports to the emperor about flexibly 
handled cases, one dating from the fourth month of 1889, the other from the second 
month of 1890, differed dramatically when describing the content of the Flexible 
Regulations. In the first report, Wei wrote: ―According to the (Flexible) Regulations, 
severe cases of the ming and dao should be punished by jiu di zheng fa.‖209 After the 
statement, Wei listed six cases under the ming and dao categories, for example, the 
case of a son killing his father and the case of a wife killing her husband. Both were 
no doubt homicide (ming) cases. Regarding the second one, Wei wrote: ―According to 
the [Amendment to the Flexible) Regulations, severe cases of ―theft‖ (dao) should be 
punished by jiu di zheng fa.‖210 The two statements, though they looked alike, had 
significantly different implications for the kinds of cases that would be subjected to 
jiu di zheng fa. Ten cases of jiu di zheng fa listed in the second summary were all 
about dao, such as killing people willfully during a robbery, or killing people while 
plundering a house, or raping women during a robbery.  
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 Much as with the practice of jiu di zheng fa in the neidi China, the Amendment 
to the Flexible Regulations remained valid in Xinjiang until very late, when the Qing 
rulers tried to modernize the Chinese legal system during the reforms of the New 
Policies movement in the 1900s.  
It is worth noting that the practice of jiu di zheng fa did not start at the time of 
the Taiping Rebellion, as some Chinese historians suggest.
211
 Instead, from the early 
Qianlong reign emperors had, from time to time allowed capital offenders to be 
executed immediately.
212
 As I have discussed in the previous chapter, as soon as 
Xinjiang was conquered, Qianlong had issued an edict bestowing on sojourning 
officials the right to punish criminals guilty of homicide by immediate execution on 
the spot in order to intimidate local ruffians. Post-Rebellion Xinjiang officials were 
fully aware of the legal history of this place. So when the legal elites of the Censorate 
and the Board of Punishment tried to abolish the policy of jiu di zheng fa by defining 
it as merely a temporary military law implemented during the Taiping Rebellion, Liu 
Jintang meaningfully pointed out that this policy had been in place in Xinjiang during 
the ―peaceful period.‖   
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Though applied in both the early and later parts of Qing‘s rule in Xinjiang, the 
policy of jiu di zheng fa implied a different status for the imperial power. The debate 
over jiu di zheng fa in the late Qing period has long been interpreted as a competition 
for arbitrary power between the emperor and the provincial officials, and the result of 
this debate has been seen as the downward transfer of power from the center to the 
province. 
It seems to me, the contention on jiu di zheng fa indicates more acutely the 
aloofness of the late Qing rulers from local affairs, especially from legal enforcement 
in the localities. In Qianlong‘s reign, this policy was drawn up by the emperor himself 
and could actually be regarded as a direct collaboration between the emperor and his 
Xinjiang imperial agents, bypassing the officials of the central legal and censorate 
institutions. Local officials had to report their decisions on immediate execution to the 
emperor, but did not need to receive sanction from the central judicial institutions. 
The Qianlong emperor strengthened his rule by making this kind of exception.
 213
 
However, during the late Qing period, the Guangxu emperor (and the Empress 
Dowager) no longer played the role of policy maker for Xinjiang. They had 
withdrawn from day to day governance, or at least from consultation about the 
governance, of frontier administrative affairs some time earlier. As we have noted, it 
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was not even the imperial court, but the central legal institutions, that had been 
eagerly promoting the abolition of jiu di zheng fa and the restoration of the regular 
reviewing procedures for capital cases. The court became much more passive than 
during the high Qing period, when the emperors‘ opinions were quite unpredictable 
regarding each capital case. The late Qing rulers‘ lack of commitment and ability to 
become involved in frontier governance made it easy for the frontier officials to 
ignore imperial opinions and acquire more power.  
It does not seem to me, however, that the motive of these local Han Chinese 
officials to try so hard to maintain the policy of jiu di zheng fa was simply to grasp 
more power and to contend with the center. The purpose of implementing a simplified 
legal policy could also be to warn the potential perpetrators and to maintain stability, 
as the provincial officials claimed themselves. In traditional China, judicial and 
administrative were always intertwined. From the emperor to the county magistrate, 
all were judges as well as administrators. Therefore, both the Qianlong emperor and 
the Xinjiang provincial governors, such as Liu Jintang and Wei Guangtao, tended to 
put social stability above the authority and stability of law. After all, in the short run, 
to quickly and cruelly punish criminals could be effective as a means to end turmoil. 
As an exception to normative legal institutions, jiu di zheng fa was advocated by legal 
executors but opposed by imperial censors. Therefore, when the late Qing monarchs 
were too weak to become involved in detailed local governance, it is not surprising 





to execute criminals than to go through all the procedures necessary to make sure that 
justice is carried out.  
 
Flexibility and the culturally tolerant policy  
It was not just a coincidence that both the Qianlong and the Guangxu emperors 
had approved a set of Flexible Regulations for Xinjiang. Rather, flexibility (biantong 
變通) was a constant theme of the Qing‘s Xinjiang policies, not only in the realm of 
legal practice. The Qianlong emperor employed a flexible approach to frontiers in 
general. The Han officials in the post-Muslim Rebellion period failed to transform it 
into a regular administrative unit, although they intended to do so through the 
establishment of Xinjiang as a province. When Liu Jintang tried to persuade the 
emperor to stick to the special legal policies in Xinjiang, he described eagerly how the 
situation there differed from the neidi provinces. Although according to the new 
generation of Xinjiang policy makers, the setting up of the province of Xinjiang 
implied carrying out comprehensive, neidi-style governance there, in practice, to 
incorporate the administration of justice of Xinjiang into the neidi legal system was 
not within their repertoire.  
Therefore, in this sense, it is not correct to conclude that the Qing way of 
dealing with Xinjiang criminal cases became increasingly unified with the neidi. 
What we have seen is a rather contradictory picture: on the one hand, after the 
province was established, criminal cases subject to verification by the Board of 





hand, the Flexible Regulations of Xinjiang was used to handle other criminal cases in 
an astoundingly ―simplified‖ or arbitrary way.  
However, materials dating from after the establishment of the province indicate 
a clearer trend: Islamic law was no longer valid to adjudicate severe criminal cases. 
This practice, which was so common before the 1860s that even the imperial officials 
often judged a case based on the Islamic classics, disappeared completely from the 
legal documents beyond the provincial level. This trend can easily to be understood as 
one of the results of the ―Hanization‖ policies promoted by the Han officials after the 
1880s. However, this change had actually started much earlier than that. As I have 
argued, early in the reign of Qianlong, the emperor had stated that the Xinjiang 
Uyghurs had been assimilated to Qing culture for years and that the state law should 
therefore be imposed on them in a more intensive way. Since the reign of Xianfeng, 
the Qing emperors had issued several edicts to prohibit reference to Islamic law in the 
handling of serious criminal cases. In non-Han frontier areas, Manchu ruling elites 
always faced two main missions: one was to maintain the significant ruling status of 
the Manchus in the ―great unity‖ of the five peoples that composed the Qing empire; 
the other was to strengthen a close connection between the frontier and the central 
empire. In the first mission, the Han Chinese were regarded by the Manchu elites as 
their competitors, while in the second one, the Koqand gradually became a potential 
enemy.  
The 1759 conquest by the Qing of Xinjiang represented a great success for the 





rule in Xinjiang, the Qianlong emperor devoted most of his attention to promoting 
Manchu values and to limiting interaction between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. This 
also explains why the Huijiang zeli devoted much space to prohibiting exploitative 
conduct of Xinjiang military personnel and Chinese merchants, as well as why 
Islamic law had been valid up until the mid-nineteenth century to punish Muslims and 
even Chinese criminals in some extreme cases. 
However, as the conflict with Khoqand and the Khojas persisted, as early as the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these frontier frictions together with 
internal uprisings in Altishahr made it necessary for the Qing rulers to redefine their 
relationship with Khoqand and Altishahr. As the Chinese scholar, Pan Zhiping has 
argued, Khoqand‘s relationship with Qing China shifted from that of a dependent 
state (shuguo 屬國) between 1759 and 1820 to that of a neighboring state (linguo 鄰
國) and therefore one that was equal and independent after 1820. A parallel process 
was the transformation of Eastern Turkestan from an open, fluid frontier to a 
non-negotiable, closed border.
214
 This transformation in turn enabled Qing rulers to 
carry out a series of state-oriented policies beginning in the 1830s, including 
encouraging immigration and settlement of Han Chinese, as well as a frontier legal 
system that no longer targeted the Han Chinese, but the local Uyghurs. Finally, the 
indirect rule of the Qing in Xinjiang during the High Qing period was replaced by the 
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idea of establishing a province under the more direct control from Han officials, 
advocated first by the statecraft scholars.  
But can we divide the Manchu ruling elites and Han officials into two distinct 
camps and treat Xinjiang and even Qing history after the mid-nineteenth century as an 
incomplete process of ―Hanization‖? Shall we regard the establishment of Xinjiang 
province in the 1880s and the more direct state control thereafter as a sharp break with 
the previous Manchu strategy?  
It seems to me there was no clear-cut dividing line between Han and Manchu 
views concerning the frontier issue; neither was there an specific point in time that 
marked a sharp change in Xinjiang policies. The Qing frontier policies were largely 
the product of international and domestic conflicts. Although Qianlong‘s indirect 
Xinjiang policy was finally replaced by a more direct form of control, his northwest 
expansion and his Xinjiang administrative policies were to a great extent inherited by 
successive Xinjiang policy-makers, no matter whether they were Manchu, or Han.  
In this sense, I fully agree with Peter Perdue‘s argument that ―imperialists and 
nationalists were secret sharers, especially in their analysis of the future of the Qing 
frontiers.‖215 Although statecraft thinkers criticized Qing policies for having failed to 
achieve enough assimilation of Xinjiang, their statement about ―fighting war is 
superior to worshipping at ancestral temples (zhan shengyu miaotang 戰勝於廟堂)‖ 
expressed an approach to the frontier  similar to the expansionist ideology of 
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Qianlong. Moreover, in his Shengwuji the nineteenth century foreign expert Wei 
Yuan took Qianlong‘s military conquests as a model for securing the imperial borders. 
It is therefore impossible to divide ―Manchu strategy‖ from ―Han strategy‖: the 
changes took place gradually, and not along the line of ethnicity.  
When statecraft scholars were promoting their ideas about the establishment of 
the province and the demographic remaking of the Western Region in the 1830s and 
1840s, the Daoguang emperor had already begun to encourage Chinese colonization 
in Xinjiang. After the Koqand invasion, Zuo Zongtang, a loyal student and friend of 
Wei Yuan, reconquered Xinjiang based on Qianlong‘s map as well as realizing the 
blueprint of a Xinjiang province, which had been passionately advocated by the 
statecraft thinkers. His administrative policies had a missionary character, since he 
was eager to promote the Sacred Edicts and the establishment of Chinese elementary 
schooling. However, this was more likely a reflection of his own zeal for Confucian 
teaching than a characteristic shared by all his Chinese colleagues in the Xinjiang 
project.  
Liu Jintang, who was recommended by Zuo as the first governor of Xinjiang 
province, had a more tolerant attitude toward Muslim culture. Liu‘s statement - ―to 
educate them without changing their customs and to polish the administration there 
without abolishing their [previous] effective policies‖ - echoed Qianlong‘s cultural 
policy of ―taking into consideration their personalities and norms and instructing them 





In practice, Qianlong‘s culturally tolerant policy in Xinjiang was largely 
followed by Han nationalist officials. In terms of legislation and law enforcement, the 
late nineteenth century saw only limited changes. Uyghurs were still allowed to 
resolve their civil and non-severe criminal disputes within the sphere of Shari‘a. 
When dealing with severe criminal cases, Islamic law had long been prohibited. 
However, the provincial officials showed little intention to uphold in Xinjiang the 
authority and stability of the Great Qing Code and especially the complex Chinese 
legal procedures. Instead, they were more interested in the flexible style of dealing 






CHAPTER 3  
UYGHURS’ CIVIL MATTERS (I): THE GENDERED WORLD 
OF FAMILY AND MARRIAGE 
 
After the Manchu conquest in Eastern Turkestan, there existed both religious 
courts (Shari‘a) and secular legal authority (the begs) to deal with Uyghurs‘ civil 
disputes. After the establishment of Xinjiang province in the 1880s, Uyghurs were 
allowed to bring their civil lawsuits to Chinese magistrates‘ yamen. How did the 
jurisdictional mechanism operate in this area？How did the new situation after the 
1880s affect the resolution of day-to-day conflicts within the province of Xinjiang? I 
examine these questions by looking at two important realms of human activity: the 
gendered world of family and marriage, and the local-level economic transactions 
reflected in contracts and in property disputes. I focus in particular in this chapter on 
the gender issue. A large proportion of criminal and civil cases among Uyghurs that I 
collected are related to gender, such as adultery, rape, divorce, marriage and so on. 
This chapter will show how indigenous ethnic dwellers reacted to the new change of 
jurisdictional system after the establishment of Xinjiang province, as well as what 
legal cases, especially those recorded in Chinese materials, tell us about Uyghur 
society.  
 






Before the Muslim rebellion, a relatively clear demarcation along ethnic lines 
existed in the civil judicature in Xinjiang. The civil disputes of Han, Manchu and 
Tungan commoners who were foreign to this region were taken to the Chinese yamen, 
while local Xinjiang Muslims continued to comply with normative Islamic law as 
well as with their local customs.  
It is conventional wisdom that Islamic law retained its salience in local society 
after the Qing conquest. However, a question that remains disputed is to what extent 
the local secular officials, the begs, retained the monopoly of power, including 




The Altishahr nobility who held secular authority were engaged in a power 
struggle with local religious leaders (akhunds) long before the Qing conquest. This is 
demonstrated in one instance in which the akhunds were given the authority to decide 
if a Hakim beg should continue to hold their positions or to be executed after an 
incident in which he was seen as having behaved incorrectly on the Roza (fast) 
festival.
217
 After 1759, however, as Laura Newby has shown, the Qing ―dealt a 
significant blow to religious powers and enhanced the status of the begs‖ by 
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subordinating the religious functionaries to the high-ranking begs.
218
 According to 
official Chinese gazetteers such as the Qinding Huangyu Xiyu tuzhi, the 
administrative system under the charge of the Hakim beg and his subordinates 
included several legal functionaries: the qadi beg (responsible for interpreting Shari‘a 
law); the sipah qadi beg (in charge of lawsuits brought by Uyghur chieftains); the 
ra’ya qadi beg (in charge of lawsuits brought by Uyghur commoners); the padishab 
beg (in charge of hunting down criminals, carrying out arrests, night patrols, and 
prison security), and so on.
219
 The fact that it was secular officials who carried out 
these legal functions is the main reason that some scholars suggest no religious court 
existed in Qing Xinjiang before the Muslim Rebellion. In other words, the yamen of 
the begs appeared to cover all the functions of a religious court.
220
  
However, there are more sources that seem to suggest the opposite. Nayancheng, 
one of the most famous Manchu ambans sent to Xinjiang, reported in one of his 
memorials that ―according to Muslim customs, akhunds are in charge of religion. 
Uyghurs‘ domestic disputes or small lawsuits are all judged by them, and no one 
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disobeys.‖221 Xinjiang tuzhi also mentioned that ―the one [who is in charge of] a 
mosque is called an imam. It is he who teaches classics and deals with disputes.‖222  
When the Russian military official Kuropatkin traveled to Kashgar in 1876, he 
came away with a similar impression on this issue:  
On the question of religious tolerance the Chinese proved 
themselves to be very humane. In the towns which they occupied 
mosques might be seen to exist side by side with Buddhist pagodas…. In 
like manner the Chinese abstained from interfering with the manner and 
customs of the people. They left to the Kashgarians their Mahommedan 
tribunals and took no part in the choice of Kazis [qadis] and Mooftis.
223
 
Since both religious and secular systems for administering legal authority 
existed in Xinjiang, what was the relationship between the two? The Qur‘an and other 
religious written traditions such as hadith and ijma, were the exclusive source of law 
in mosques, but they were just one kind of the sources used for the dispensing of law 
in the beg yamen. As discussed in Chapter 2, both Chinese and Islamic juridical 
works were stored in beg‘s yamen, and the begs judged the cases according to either 
Islamic classics or the Great Qing Code. There seemed to be a rough division of labor 
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between the two legal institutions, the details of which require further study. Based on 
currently available materials from the 1760s to the 1860s, local Uyghurs usually went 
to akhunds to resolve civil disputes over issues such as marriage, inheritance, the 
endowment of waqf properties, transactions involving land or other commodities, 
while the beg officials handled most local criminal cases, especially those severe 
criminal cases that had to be reported to the provincial and state authorities. 
Did some of the functions of the two legal institutions overlap? Can we detect a 
hierarchy of jurisdiction in some cases? My tentative answer to both questions is yes. 
Some statements by Uyghurs accepting the judgments given in property disputes are 
addressed to ―Master beg‖ even though they were actually judged or mediated by the 
Shari‘a religious court.224 We do not know whether these documents, dating from the 
Daoguang reign (1821-1850), indicate that the Uyghurs appealed to the beg court 
when they were dissatisfied with akhund‘s decision or show that the begs asked the 
religious courts to resolve some of the civil lawsuits that they had received, not all 
that different from the practice among Han officials in the neidi who sent certain civil 
cases back to local lineages or other social groupings for mediation. But we do know 
that it is hard to completely separate the secular and religious systems administrations 
in Xinjiang, especially during the earlier period of Qing domination. In 1760 many 
who had served as religious and legal authorities (such as the qadi akhund) under the 
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Khwajas and the Zunghars were now given the title of beg, and we know that 
hakim-begs were eager to appoint their personal favorites as akhunds.
225
 Therefore, 
people might well go to the same person to deal with their civil issues after the Qing 
conquest because they were aware that although he was now the ―qadi beg‖, he had 
previously been the qadi akhund.
226 It is thus important not to confuse the position of 
the qadi akhund in a mosque, the judge in the Islamic religious courts, with the qadi 
beg, a secular position in the beg bureaucracy.  
Information about the administrative structure of the local religious courts in the 
Uyghur communities in Xinjiang at this time is limited. Basically, the clergy of a 
local religious court included the ailanmu akhund, who was the highest judge, 
referred to by the Chinese as the da-a-hong or ―the first akhund‖; the qazi kalan, who 
worked as a legal scholar and consultant and was referred to as the second akhund; 
the qazi rais, who was the third akhund and worked as a religious judge to deal with 
day-to-day civil disputes; and the mufti akhund (the fourth akhund), whose function 
was said to be equivalent to that of a modern lawyer.
227
 Every Shari‘a akhund held a 
seal called a maor (or mo in Chinese documents) which was used to authenticate or 
certify a legal document such as a judgment, contract, or will. The title of qadi was 
engraved on it. All of the Chagatai contractual documents signed by Uyghurs during 
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the Qing dynasty bore the maor seals, and without these a document would be 
regarded as fake or illegal.
228
 The maor can therefore be regarded as a symbol of the 
authority of both Shari‘a and the akhunds.  
After the 1880s, when Xinjiang was established as a province, every beg yamen, 
as the lowest level of local government, was replaced by a county yamen in the charge 
of a Chinese magistrate. The begs‘ judicial function was now taken over by these 
magistrates as well, under whom all disputes were dealt with according to Qing law. 
From then on, as we have seen, native Muslims in Xinjiang had to deal with two 
normative legal systems between which the boundaries were much clearer than in the 
previous system: the Shari‘a court based on Islamic religious law and the Chinese 
court based on secular Chinese law. The two legal systems existed side by side and 
were often in competition with each other. Besides these, a set of local customs 
continued to regulate social relations through informal mechanisms, such as 
communal mediation and public reconciliation.
229
  
How did Eastern Turkestanis deal with their civil disputes and affairs within a 
legal framework constituted by Islamic law, Chinese law, and local customs, 
especially after the 1880s? The lack of sources has meant that until now little research 
has been undertaken on this topic. For the same reason it has been unclear until now 
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how ordinary Xinjiang Turkestanis
230
 during the last decades of the Qing negotiated 
their personal and property rights, as well as marriage and family relations. But now, 
thanks to the Chinese legal archives of the Qing dynasty preserved in the local 
Archives in Xinjiang, private documents written in Chagatai
231
 collected by both 
Chinese and Japanese scholars, and Chinese records of Xinjiang homicide cases kept 
in Qing central archives, I can offer a preliminary assessment of the operation of the 
civil legal system of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and of its place in the everyday life of 
native dwellers after the Qing conquest, particularly after the 1880s. Several dozen 
cases provide abundant information about how Xinjiang Uyghurs practiced marriage, 
divorce, family division, inheritance, and economic transactions.  
Generally speaking, after the 1880s the yamen of the Chinese magistrates and 
the Islamic religious courts operated in parallel as they dealt with civil matters among 
non-native commoners and native Muslims respectively. Uyghurs were still allowed 
to settle their civil disputes within the realm of Shari‘a. Nevertheless, they did face 
some inconspicuous but crucial institutional and substantial changes in civil practices. 
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For example, the secular Chinese yamen was now open to them too, and if they chose 
to go there they would be judged based on a group of new laws and regulations which 
were different from the standards applied by the akhunds and begs in the past. 
Moreover, from as early as the late 1820s, more and more Han and Muslim (Tungan) 
farmers from China proper had come to Xinjiang and were living side by side with the 
Uyghurs. After the 1880s, when disputes between local Uyghurs and these civilian 
immigrants arose, they had to go to the Chinese yamen to ask for resolution. More 
importantly, although the religious judges, the akhunds, preserved their legal authority 
among Uyghur commoners, they were subject to greater control by Chinese secular 
officials sent by Beijing. The Xinjiang archives show that during the late Qing period 
although the akhunds who held maor seals in each community were recommended 
(公舉 gong ju) by local eminent Uyghurs, the recommendations and the request of 





Marriage and divorce in Eastern Turkestan 
Marriage and family stood at the very center of Uyghur society and culture. 




 centuries that focus on the 
role of women and gender relations are scattered and very limited in number, they do 
provide some crucial information on this topic and several historians have already 
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managed to carry out pathbreaking research based on this material. Linda Benson, in a 
1993 article, examined Western, Chinese, and even local Uyghur literature about the 
image of Chinese Turkestani women in the period 1850-1950. Unfortunately she had 
access only to a limited number of Chinese sources—a 1930s record and two history 
books published after the 1980s—and had to rely mainly on folk tales to get a sense 
of local perceptions.
233
 But still she was able to show that Chinese and English 
sources concur very closely in their accounts of the relatively high status of women in 
Xinjiang. Divorce and remarriage were prevalent and in terms of status did not 
represent an obstacle for women within the local society. Indeed, some women even 
gained a considerable degree of control over their sexual behavior and over 
possession of property through divorce and remarriage.
234
 Local Uyghur sources, 
which offer an image of strong and independent women and of equal welcome being 
given to baby girls, also support the perception of women‘s high social status in 
Xinjiang. Based on these findings, Benson suggested that Turkestani culture seemed 
to be less orthodox than some other Islamic societies in its observance of Islamic law 
in terms of marriage and family issues, and called for further study of the role of 
Islam within Xinjiang society in the recent past.
235
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Ildiko Beller-Hann‘s paper, ―Law and Custom among the Uyghur in Xinjiang‖, 
suggests an answer to Benson‘s question about why local marriage and divorce 
practices in Xinjiang Uyghur society deviated considerably from those in other 
Islamic societies. Beller-Hann regards the standard binary description of Xinjiang‘s 
jurisdiction system as insufficient because, she argues, it does not take account of the 
set of unwritten rules (basically Uyghur customary or local law) that operated in 
addition to state law (imperial Qing law and, later, Republican law) and Islamic law 
in the local community, managing everyday social relations both in the Qing dynasty 
and even today. Family disputes were one of the main areas in which both Islamic law 
and customary law had regulatory power, and some aspects of gender relations were 
in practical terms under the exclusive authority of customary law.
236
 Beller-Han‘s  
main purpose is not to compare the social status of Uyghur women with those living 
in other Muslim communities, but we do find that, to a certain extent, Uyghur 
customs (most of which were Turkic customs from pre-Islamic times) bestowed some 
unique conjugal rights on women as well as the right to possession of family 
property.
237
 The existence and effectiveness of customary law thus might be a 
significant factor in the relatively high social status of Uyghur women. 
Both of these studies, although heavily reliant on sources in Western languages, 
offer us valuable insights into gender relations in Xinjiang, and the questions they 
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raise about the conjugal rights and social status of Uyghur women shed great light on 
the topic that I am researching here. To these we can now add the materials available 
in the Chinese archives, especially the local Xinjiang legal archives, which provide 
important pieces of the larger picture of Uyghur gender relations. Although Uyghurs 
were not forced to go to a Chinese court when no Chinese or any other non-Uyghur 
ethnicity was involved in a case, the existence of a new legal system, that of Qing 
state law, after the establishment of Xinjiang province in the 1880s also had a 
significant impact on the lives of local Uyghurs and has to be added to the picture 
created in the earlier studies, which paid more attention to the role of Islamic civil law 
and Uyghur customary norms on everyday life among Uyghurs. Therefore, this part 
of my dissertation is an attempt to examine gender relations and women‘s social 
status in Xinjiang as depicted by Chinese records of criminal and civil cases, and to 
discuss how the situation was influenced by the emergence of the third realm--the 
Qing state law.  
In general, it seems that the presence of this third realm of law provided 
additional ground for some Uyghurs to negotiate their personal interests at the same 
time as introducing new threats to some of their existing rights. It seems to me local 
Uyghur custom gave women considerable rights even though they did not exist in 
Sharia courts and that the possibility of going to a Qing court gave Uyghur husbands a 
way to exert greater control over their wives. Most prominent was the introduction by 
the Qing local courts of patriarchal Chinese social norms that enabled Uyghur 





possessed. But in addition, I want to ask how people made their legal choices when 
confronted by more than one court system and how the power-holders in the Qing 
court dealt with local customs which were distinct from their own cultural beliefs.  
Most of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School, 
who practiced nikah marriage according to Shari‘a. According to both Chinese and 
Western records, a valid marriage in this tradition had to involve the attendance of 
one or several Islamic akhunds, who would read the classic text known as the nikah 
(he hao jing 和好經) for the new couple in the wedding ceremony in order to legalize 
the marriage.
238
 In 1873, when the area was under the rule of Yaqub beg, the price of 
this service was ―one to two or more tanga according to the rank and means of the 
parties‖.239 T. D. Forsyth noted in 1873 that when the marriage terms were agreed to, 
the girls' parents would receive a letter of permission from the governor of the city, 
whose fee was one tanga. But no record of this certificate letter has been found in 
Chinese materials, and this policy might have been peculiar to Yaqub‘s rule.  
Besides the comparatively stable system of marriage by nikah, there existed 
another kind of marriage—the temporary marriage (mutah). Both the Russian scholar 
Valikhanov and the Russian military official Kuropatkin, who went to Xinjiang in 
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1858 and 1878 respectively, claimed to have witnessed the practice of temporary 
marriage in Southwest Xinjiang, especially in cities to the west of Kucha.
240
 This 
type of marriage had to last at least one week, provided that the man had agreed to 
support the woman and buy new clothing for her. According to both these observers, 
this marriage system was only popular among the foreign merchants sojourning in 
Kashgar and other southern cities. Since mutah was not permitted among Sunni 
Muslims, Valikhanov regards it as a remnant of pantheist traditions.
241
 Two Chinese 
scholars, Chen Guoguang and Wang Dongping, suggest that this practice indicated 
the impact at Xinjiang of the Shi‘a Islam tradition from Central Asia, which 
considered mutah as legal, since the Central Asian Islamic merchants played a very 
active role in Southwest Xinjiang during that period.
242
 Forsyth believed that the 
mutah (mata’), which had been ―of universal prevalence‖ under Chinese rule, was 
entirely suppressed by the Yaqub regime when it reestablished pure Islamic rule in 
South Xinjiang in 1870s.  
Compared to the steps associated with marriage, divorce procedures were much 
easier in Xinjiang. According to the Hanafi School, if a husband wished to divorce his 
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wife, all he needed to do was to pronounce the word talaq (divorce) once (for 
reversible divorce) or three times (for irreversible divorce). The wife could also 
propose a divorce, which was known as khul. The prevalence of divorce in Xinjiang 
impressed both Chinese and Western observers. The Xinjiang tuzhi suggests that 
among Uyghurs ―couples divorce at any time when they do not get along well with 
each other.‖243 Qishiyi, a Manchu scholar, records in his travel notes, the Xiyu 
wenjian lu (Xiyu zongzhi), that  
A couple can divorce whenever they do not get along well; this is called 
yandur in the Uyghur language. If a husband divorces his wife, she can 
take anything of the home away with her; if a wife divorces her husband, 
she is allowed to take away nothing. The custody rights of their children 
are split between them, and sons go to the husband, while daughters 
belong to the wife. Within one year after their divorce, if the woman bares 
any child the man would need to acknowledge him (her) as his child. After 
one year, (the child) would not be his responsibility. In some cases, after 
several years during which the woman has married several husbands, her 
ex-husband is still willing to remarry her. Some people continue with their 
relationship secretly (si xiang wang lai 私相往來) after divorce.244  
                                                 
243
 Yuan Dahua and Wang Shunan ed., (Xuantong) Xinjiang Tuzhi, 48: 6b. 
244





According to an investigation by PRC researchers in 1953, few Uyghur women 
had not divorced at least once in their lives.
245
 These Chinese depictions of the 
prevalence of divorce and of the ease with which divorce could be arranged in the 
19th and 20
th
 centuries concur with European sources. Forsyth suggests that divorce 
was ―extremely prevalent‖ among Uyghur women and ―systematically worked as a 
means of securing independence and provision for old age‖.246 He gave examples that 
were intended to show that local women were capable of gaining both independence 
and property from men by means of multiple marriages and divorces.
247
 Kuropatkin, 
noted that ―[in the time of the Chinese dominion], the people were left free to follow 
their own faith… Marriage, which can, by the law of Mahomet, be so easily dissolved 
in Kashigaria, was set aside with even fewer formalities.‖248 C. P. Skrine observed 
that in Xinjiang a woman above average in looks or wit could ―exchange an 
uncongenial husband for a better one with very little difficulty‖, and usually older 
women or those who have been married and divorced more than once were worth 
more on the marriage market.
249
 In brief, divorce was observed as very much 
tolerated among Xinjiang Uyghurs and no particular reasons were required to justify 
                                                 
245
 Nanjiang nongcun shehui (Agricultural Society of South Xinjiang), Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu 
bianjizu, ed., (Wulumuqi: Xinjiang renmin, 1980), p. 332.  
246
 T. D. Forsyth, Report of a mission to Yarkund in 1873, pp. 84-85.  
247
 Ibid, pp. 84-85.   
248
 A. H. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria: Historical and Geographical Sketch of the Country, p. 38.  
249





such a common and unremarkable practice. It was said that divorce even tended to 
heighten a woman‘s value on the marriage market rather than to diminish it.250  
Modern Chinese scholars also noticed the high divorce rate among Xinjiang 
Uyghurs during the socialist period. According to them, the causes of this 
phenomenan include the simplicity of the divorce procedure, the tolerance of divorce 
by Uyghur culture, which is regarded as a remnant of matriarchal period, and Uyghur 
families‘ close relationship with and support of their daughter (which I will discuss 
later in this chapter).
251
 Particularly, Uyghur daughters had inheritance rights and 
many Uyghur parents allocated at least a house to their daughters. By doing this, they 
could better shelter their daughter in circumstances such as when she argued with her 
husband and came back home, or divorced. This also contributes to the ease with 
which one couldget divorce.
252
 
Moreover, Uyghur women were often awarded the custody of their children 
after divorce. Fieldwork done by a Chinese scholar in a South Xinjiang town, Aksu, 
in the 1990s concurs with the observations noted above. After a Uyghur couple 
divorced, usually the daughter(s) lived with their mother and son(s) father. If the 
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children were younger than one year, they stayed with mother regardless of gender. 
So Uyghur women were allowed to bring children with her after her husband had died, 
whether she decided to go back to live with her natal family or to get remarried.
253
 
This is different from Han Chinese women, who were actually married more to the 
husband‘s family than the husband himself and whose son(s) had to stay at their 
father‘s home even when the father had died.  
In the high Qing period, the Qing officials who sojourned there generally 
maintained a laissez-faire attitude toward marriage and divorce issues among Uyghurs, 
although from time to time they discussed the sexual order among Uyghurs and what 
they saw as their exotic tastes in their memoir or travel notes.
254
 After the Muslim 
Rebellion, the Qing officials seem to have succeeded in imposing stricter limits on 
marriage and divorce among Xinjiang Uyghurs. Just after the Qing rulers regained 
sovereignty over Xinjiang, they began to install village compact head (xiangyue 鄉約) 
in every county of the Islamic area to handle the civil affairs of Uyghurs commoners. 
In Shengjin county, Turfan prefecture, a Uyghur was appointed to be the ―haidipu‖ 
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xiangyue, with responsibility for marriage of Uyghurs there. He received an edict 
from the prefecture which read as follows: 
The marriage traditions of the Uyghurs are outside [the realm of] 
proper moral relations (chu yu lunchang zhiwai 出於倫常之外). They get 
married hastily and privately, and they frequently divorce and remarry, 
which is degenerate and loathsome… The xiangyue are in charge of 
marriage issues. From now on, when proposing a marriage, people must 
make sure that both parties know each other‘s age and are willing. They 
must engage and marry each other openly and officially, [the marriage 
ceremony] should be ceremonious enough [to make it known to others]. 
They must not marry secretly or divorce for trivial reasons.
255  
This regulation was first announced in the Turfan area, perhaps because this 
region was subjected to Qing rule very early during the war of conquest in the 18th 
century, and because the Uyghur Jasaks there had always been loyal to the Manchu 
emperors.
256 
However, the newly posted officials after the re-conquest were not 
pleased with putting only part of the Uyghur population under the sovereignty of 
Confucian social norms. Two years later, in 1882, Liu Jintang, the first governor of 
Xinjiang province, sent two edicts requiring that not only the Uyghurs in Turfan 
prefecture but also those living in the eight cities of South Xinjiang (nan ba cheng 南
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八城) should eliminate their ―bad norms and habits‖ (qu exi)祛惡習: ―Once married, 
a couple is not allowed to divorce except for the seven reasons (qichu 七出)257,‖ he 
ordered.
258
 In these edicts Liu Jintang implied that this regulating policy had already 
taken effect in some places in Turfan and Yangi Hisar.  
These regulations and edicts are very interesting particular because the state did 
not certify marriages among Han Chinese and did not interfere in marriages unless 
there was a lawsuit. Were Liu‘s edicts treated as law and obeyed by the Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang, at least in principle? According to the materials and legal cases collected so 
far, it seems that the answer is no to both questions. Liu‘s edicts appear to have 
represented only an ambitious and idealistic blueprint for legal consolidation in the 
minds of those Qing generals who first re-conquered this area. At that time, they 
expected to establish a new province that was economically low-maintenance or even 
profitable, as well as institutionally and culturally in line with the inland provinces.
259
 
However, in due course, as the Qing encountered problems elsewhere, most of their 
time and energy were spent on practical and routine issues and the missionary impulse 
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was gradually forgotten. In the case of marriage reform, no follow-up edict has been 
found to indicate any Qing efforts to consolidate Liu‘s initial demands. 
Western travelers and scholars paid much attention to the social status of 
Eastern Turkestan women. According to Forsyth, before the 1860s, ethnic custom 
prevailed because the Qing was initially inclined to allow self government in areas of 
family and civil law. Even during the strict enforcement of Shari'a during the rule of 
Yaqub, ―ethnic custom‖ still played an important role in the everyday life of Xinjiang 
Uyghurs.
260
 Valikhanov expressed a similar opinion regarding the social status of 
Xinjiang women before the 1860s. In his expedition to Kashgaria from 1858 to 1859 
he observes that:  
Women in Kashgaria have superior status in social and domestic 
life…Women support their husbands‘ careers, and whenever there is a 
meeting, women have to be present. Polygamy is not common in Xinjiang. 
This is because wives are able to abandon their husbands as they wish… 
their faces were always bare (and without a veil).
261
  
When Linda Benson suggests that Turkestani women generally enjoyed higher 
status than ―either their Han Chinese neighbors or their co-religionists of the Middle 
East‖,262 she refers mainly to the freedom Uyghur women enjoyed to divorce and 
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remarry, as well as to the image of women as strong and independent individuals that 
is found in Uyghur love stories. Regrettably, the Chinese legal archives in which I 
conducted research included hardly any cases of divorce or remarriage, perhaps 
simply because a Uyghur person would never choose a Chinese court to propose a 
divorce (I discuss below the types of domestic cases that were brought before a 
Chinese judge). Nonetheless, the records of criminal cases found in the legal archives 
of the central government in Beijing and the records of various civil disputes in the 
local archives do give us some clues about gender relations and the family lives of 
ordinary women in Xinjiang. All of this information can help us to reflect further on 
the social and domestic status of Uyghur women at this time. 
 
Social status of Uyghur women: showed by legal 
cases  
In Xinjiang, ―adultery‖ was frequently cited as a motive or factor in homicide 
cases. Cases of this type from Xinjiang involving female criminals or victims in the 
legal archives of the central government have storylines that look very similar to those 
from China proper. There are a number of scenarios or plots that were relatively 
common in the Xinjiang caseload. The first scenario, the the most violent and tragic, 
describes a woman caught in bed with her lover and killed immediately on the spot 





found from 1886-1898 in Xinjiang.
263
 Since by then all Xinjiang homicide cases 
were under the penalty of the Qing law, these husbands were exempted from any legal 
punishment – this was a privilege bestowed by the patriarchal Great Qing Code on all 
married males: if a husband caught his wife and her paramour in the act of adultery, 
he could kill both on the spot with impunity.
264
 In a second type of case, the husband 
killed either his wife or the jianfu (or in one case was killed by him in the ensuing 
fight) after coming to know of their misconduct, or after just becoming suspicious of 
their behavior. In these cases the murderers were sentenced to death. Four cases of 




 A third and quite frequent scenario 
consisted of a husband who, upon discovery of his wife‘s infidelity, beat her severely 
and prohibited her from associating with her lover; the wife, unable to bear this any 
longer, then murdered her husband by herself or with the aid of her partner, the 
adulterer. Three cases of this type occurred in 1887, 1889 and 1892. In these cases, 
the female criminals, although also abused by their husbands, were all described as 
―really lascivious and villainous‖ (shi shu yin e 實屬淫惡) by Chinese magistrates and 
sentenced to the most cruel punishment—death by slicing, according to the Great 
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 There are also cases where a woman killed her husband simply 
because his existence hindered her association with her paramour
268
 and cases caused 
by the jealousy between the two adulterous lovers of a married woman.
269
  
Similar accounts to these can easily be found in legal records in inland courts, 
even for the last and rarest scenario. Nonetheless, the social systems of the two places 
differed so much that this resulted in different players in legal cases. In Han Chinese 
cases, when marital transgressions were found, the unfaithful wives usually suffered 
pressure or abuse not only from their husbands but also from his parents or other 




In cases from Xinjiang involving Uyghurs, on the other hand, almost no 
relatives of the husband appear in the records. There is only one case in which we do 
see mention of a mother-in-law of the female murderer: In 1892 a woman living in 
Kalasha‘er ting (sub-prefecture) suspected that her husband was having an affair with 
their neighbor, which was denied by him. They argued and fought with each other, 
leading to the wife unintentionally fatally wounding her husband. Probably because 
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the wife was pregnant, her mother-in-law did not report her son‘s death (and the 
woman‘s crime) to the authorities and instead helped to bury him secretly. The death 
was not discovered until 16 months later—―the ting magistrate carried out a visit 
round and about and came to know about it (fang wen 訪聞)‖.271 In Uyghur cases 
involving a dispute between a couple, we seldom find that the family of the husband 
played an important role. Even in the Kalasha‘er case, the mother-in-law is very 
different from in-laws in Chinese cases, who often made the situation for wives more 
difficult.  By contrast in the Uyghur cases a wife‘s relatives, whether by blood or 
marriage, appeared far more frequently and always took her side when there was a 
dispute between a Uyghur couple. In brief, Chinese archives about criminal cases 
indicate that in Eastern Turkestan, a man‘s family members rarely intervened in his 
conjugal life or put a lot of pressure on the wife.  
Besides enjoying marriage without abuse or intervention from her husband‘s 
family, a Uyghur woman also seemed to suffer less scrutiny from the community.  
Whether a woman was married or divorced could never be a secret in a Han 
Chinese community, but in Uyghur community women seem to have been able to 
invent or fabricate their marital status, at least for some time, when they wanted to 
move in with their new lovers. In 1887, for example, a Yutian villager named Shawei 
planned to relocate along with his wife, Hailijie, to an area near a gold mine, leading 
Hailijie to ask her lover, Yueyinmuxia, to beat him to death so that the two of them 
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could be a ―lasting couple‖ (changjiu fuqi 長久夫妻). Later, when asked by her 
husband‘s friend, Hailijie told him that Shawei had divorced her and had gone to the 
gold mine by himself three months earlier, so that she had married Yueyinmuxia. The 
man accepted the story as true (xin yi wei shi 信以為實). This case too was finally 
revealed and became known (fang wen) to the county authorities.
272
 Clearly the local 
people (including family) did not treat marriage and divorce the same way that Han 
did.  
Another case of status deception took place in Ningyuanin in 1892, when a 
Uyghur woman named Aizihan had an affair with her husband‘s friend, Zelepu, while 
her husband was away on business outside the county. Afterwards she became 
sexually involved with another man called Tuolai. She decided to escape with him to 
Shamar after she heard that her husband was about to return. With fatal naïveté, she 
hired her ex-adulterer, Zelepu, as the coachman to take the two of them and her little 
daughter to Shamar. She told him that her husband had abandoned her and she had to 
make a living with Tuolai in another place. Feeling extremely jealous and humiliated, 
Zelepu killed her and her daughter on the way.
273
 
Both cases were about women who boldly changed their marital or sexual 
partners in an illicit way, making their decisions before their husbands became aware 
of the affair. The reasons why they were able to dissemble their marital status perhaps 
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lie in the prevalence of divorce in Uyghur society or in the simple procedure which it 
required. Moreover, the relatively mobile life-style of Uyghur men (many were 
engaged in trade or mining work) and the widely dispersed residential practices of 
Xinjiang Uyghurs, based as they were on a single household,
274
 also seem to have 
provided women with more opportunities to evade public attention and develop an 
extramarital relationship.  
While a husband‘s relatives did not play an important role in his conjugal life, a 
Uyghur wife usually maintained very close relationship with her natal family. 
According to Forsyth, in the wedding ceremony the groom had to make several 
promises to the bride or her family in addition to promising to obtain their permission 
before taking a concubine. These included a pledge not to take his wife to another 
place without her consent as well as to allow his wife free contact with her parents 
and near relations.
275
 To be sure, the latter was crucial for Uyghur women, who 
usually remained very close with their natal family after they got married. A Uyghur 
custom was that a woman would usually go back to her parents‘ home to give birth to 
her first and second children, and her husband was not allowed to take her and the 
baby back to their own home until after 40 days.
276
 In the socialist period, a Uyghur 
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wife still has the customary right to visit her natal home ―once every eight days‖, 
provided it is located reasonably close to her husband‘s residence.277  
In nineteenth and early twentieth century Xinjiang, Uyghur women usually 
made frequent use of this customary right. They seem even sometimes to have taken 
advantage of it in terms of relations with their spouse – whenever wives were 
disatisfied with their husbands for economic or other reasons, they frequently went 
home and stayed for a long time, until the husbands came to take them back. When 
this right was jeopardized, many women would immediately fight with their husbands 
and take various measures to protect their freedom. They either went back to their 
natal home in spite of the husband‘s objections, or sought help from family members, 
or threatened the husband with divorce. In Xinjiang quite a few domestic conflicts, 
ranging from severe homicide cases to minor civil disputes, arose from cases where 
wives ―returned to the natal home‖.  
For example, two homicide cases of this kind were reported in 1889. The wives 
in both cases returned to their natal home frequently because of the ―poverty of the 
home of the young couple‖. The first case involved a Yangi Hisar husband who 
suspected that his wife was committing adultery at her parents‘ home with a man who 
was often called to help weave cloth there. Finally the husband stabbed the latter to 
death.
278
 In this case the son-in-law obviously did not believe that his parents-in-law 
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were on his side in helping to protect his wife‘s fidelity. In the second case, in Turfan, 
a husband who had been rejected and threatened with divorce by his wife killed her in 
a rage while trying to persuade her to come back from her natal home.
279
 The man 
was sentenced to strangulation according to the Great Qing Code for ―willfully killing 
one‘s wife‖. The magistrate commented on the actions of the wife, noting that  
She went back to her natal home frequently and when her husband 
went to bring her home, she rejected him and claimed that she was going 
to [divorce him] and get remarried, and although she was being dragged on 
the ground [by her husband when she said this], the words, though shouted 
out with anger, were still inappropriate (sui shu fuqi zhiyan, jiu shu buhe 
雖屬負氣之言，究屬不合). However, since she has been killed, there is no 
need to punish her.  
This comment, which was to be reviewed by the emperor, clearly indicates that 
the right of Uyghur women to propose divorce bestowed by Shari‘a was considered 
―inappropriate‖ within the framework of the Chinese sexual orthodoxy.  
As we have seen, unlike many Chinese parents, Uyghur parents almost always 
stood on their daughter‘s side and showed no disapproval of her return to their home. 
Not only parents, but also the girl‘s other close kin were eager to protect her right to 
return home. In 1895 when a husband living in Karashahr went to his mother-in-law‘s 
house to bring his wife back home to help collecting the harvest, both her 
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father-in-law and brother-in-law would not let her go. They soon began to fight and 
the father-in-law was fatally wounded.
280
  
In some cases, the natal home even became a refuge for Uyghur women in 
which they could develop a sexual relationship with other men. In Wensu prefecture a 
married woman named Gusongbibi had an affair with their neighbor, Aisha. When 
this affair was discovered by her husband, Wushour, Gusongbibi went back to her 
natal home. There she continued to engage in sexual intercourse with Aisha. When 
the suspicious husband finally seized them in the act of adultery one day in 1891, he 
used a hoe prepared in advance to kill not only the two but also Gusongbibi‘s mother, 
who he blamed for having connived at her daughter‘s misconduct (zong jian zhi xian 
縱姦之嫌) and who was at that moment trying to stop him from completing his 
violent act. As we have seen, according to the Great Qing Code states, a husband who 
catches his wife and her paramour in adultery can kill them on the spot without risk of 
punishment. But this did not apply to the killing of the mother-in-law, who had 
committed yijue—which means that she had broken the bond between the two 
families—by conniving at her daughter‘s adultery. The Qing law dictated that a 
person who killed a parent who had committed yijue should be punished in the same 
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way as a person who has killed a non-relative. As a result, Wushour received the 
penalty of suspended decapitation for having willfully killed his mother-in-law.
281
  
Sometimes the relations between a married daughter and her parents could be 
even closer than described above.  In a criminal case that took place in 1886, a 
Uyghur mother had been living together with her daughter and son-in-law since the 
young couple had married three years before.
282
 The records of this case do not tell us 
why the mother decided to live with her daughter instead of with her husband or her 
own natal family. In another case of domestic homicide, in Shule prefecture in 1889, a 
Uyghur named Simayi who had married a girl named Hailijie the previous year had 
made a marital agreement that the man would not be obliged to hand over any 
betrothal gifts (cai li 彩禮), but in return for this the young couple would have to live 
with Hailijie‘s mother, Jimilihan, and support her throughout her life (shan yang qi 
mu, tong ju gong du 贍養其母，同居共度). Again, whether or not this mother was 
widowed is not mentioned. However, we do know that one day in that same year, 
after an argument with her son-in-law, Jimilihan went to her natal nephew (nei zhi 內
侄)‘s home together with Hailijie (this implies that the mother was probably either 
widowed or divorced, as she would not otherwise have preferred to live with her 
daughter than with her husband). Some days later, Simayi went to the nephew‘s home 
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and declared that he was going to bring his wife home and leave his mother-in-law 
with the nephew, which further angered both Hailijie and Jimilihan. In the ensuring 
conflict Simayi beat both of the two women to death with a stick.  
This example takes us to the question of marriage payment in Xinjiang. There 
existed two forms of it in the Xinjiang Uyghur community, one is toyluq, a Uyghur 
custom; the other is the Islamic practice known as mahr. Toyluq usually refers to the 
wedding presents received by the bride and her family from the groom‘s family. After 
the wedding, the toyluq typically stayed with the bride.
283
 According to Islamic 
marriage customs, mahr refers to a bridal gift offered by the groom‘s side to 
guarantee the bride‘s financial independence, which is usually decided by the girl‘s 
father before the marriage. This property belongs to the wife exclusively. According 
to Beller-Hann, mahr did exist in the Uyghur context during the Qing period, but as a 
kind of provisional agreement rather than an actual payment. In the Republican period, 
mahr have persisted only in name, and it seems to have become inextricably 
intertwined with the practice of toyluq.
284
 My study also suggests that the two 
institutions were quite similar and intertwined during the Qing. Later in this chapter I 
will discuss this issue again in some details.  
As far as I can tell, neither term appeared in the case records held in the local or 
central legal archives written in Chinese, where we can only find marriage payments 
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referred to according to Han Chinese usages, such as cai li, pin wu or pin li, meaning 
betrothal gifts or bride price – agreements over marriage payments between Uyghurs 
were thus recorded in Chinese documents without mentioning whether they related to 
toyluq or mahr. Xinjiang cases involving betrothal gifts show that when processing 
cases, Qing officials, Chinese scribes or translators (who wrote legal plaints or 
confessions for Uyghurs) usually treated Uyghur norms of marriage payment as 
consistent with Chinese tradition and the details of each premarital agreement was 
recorded without reference to their specific ethnic or religious nature. This leaves it 
unclear as to whether Uyghur norms of marriage payment had become mixed with 
Chinese ones by the late Qing period, or whether Chinese scribes just avoided using 
local terminology. It seems likely that, as long as it was not critical to adjudication of 
the case, local officials were not willing to consider local customs where these 
differed strikingly from Chinese ethical conventions and from the Qing code.  
While Uyghur women might have enjoyed more freedom in their choice of 
marriage or sexual partner and suffered less scrutiny from their in-laws and the 
community, their financial rights within the household remained limited as long as the 
marriage continued. Generally speaking, Uyghur husbands held the purse strings of 
the family. But traditionally they needed regularly to give items of clothing to their 
wives, at least twice a year at the time of the major Islamic holidays.
285
 Sometimes 
women had to fight for this. An 1890 case from Wushi ting (sub-prefecture) illustrates 
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that ignorance of such a requirement could even lead to tragedy. When a woman 
called Xialihan asked her husband for new clothes and was rejected, she cried and 
returned to her natal home. After about ten days, his husband went there in hope of 
bringing her home. But Xialihan‘s brother would not let her go and scolded him for 
―treating his sister too stingily‖. In the fight that followed, Xialihan and her brother 
both suffered mortal injuries at the hand of the angry husband.
286
  
Besides controlling the purse strings, Uyghur men had exclusive power to make 
domestic financial decisions, even when the bulk of a family‘s property had been 
brought into the marriage or subsequently acquired by the wife. A Shufu woman 
named Saigenaibibi brought rather large assets from her natal home when she married 
Keqike. The fortune, however, was dissipated by him and the conditions of the family 
declined day by day. In 1892 Keqike secretly married another woman and arranged 
for her to live in another village. When Saigenaibibi learned this, she asked Keqike to 
divorce her but was rejected by him. From then on she held a grudge against him and 
frequently argued with him. One day she gave some cotton yarn she had spun to 
Keqike and asked him to sell it. In the evening when she questioned him about the 
proceeds of the sale, Keqike said he had already spent it. Irritated, Saigenaibibi 
scolded him for no longer caring for the family or her after marrying the second wife. 
During the quarrel, Keqike declared that he would definitely divorce her. Saigenaibibi 
was still very upset after they both went to bed. The fact that Keqike had 
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impoverished the family by using up the property she had brought into the marriage 
and that he was going to divorce her because of the other wife made her so desperate 
that she killed him in his sleep. She then tried to get Keqike‘s body to sink in a nearby 
pond, but was seen by a Uyghur akhund who then reported this to the xiangyue. 
Saigenaibibi was finally sentenced to death by slicing for murdering her husband.  
This is one of the very few cases I found in Xinjiang that involved ―the other 
wife‖. Polygamy was allowed among Xinjiang Uyghurs as in many other Muslim 
societies. Forsyth records that in a Uyghur wedding ceremony the groom promised to 
his wife that he would not take another wife without her consent,
287
 which is also 
evidence that polygamy was permitted. However, the practice was by no means 
prevalent and men, like Keqike, often secretly took second wives. Valikhanov noted 
in his travel notes that ―polygamy is not common in Xinjiang‖288 and Kuropatkin 
stated more explicitly that ―the plurality of wives in Kashgaria, as in other Mussulman 
countries, is open to all, and yet in practice it is a custom that is within the reach of 
the opulent alone.‖289 In other words, having a plurality of wives could often be an 
economic issue as well as a gender issue.  
In the case of Saigenaibibi, it was largely her financial contribution to the 
family that made it possible for Keqike to marry his concubine, but nonetheless it 
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seems that once Saigenaibibi married him, she lost any control over their domestic 
property, not only what she had brought from her natal home but also the income she 
earned every day. Shari‘a provided Uyghur women the right to inherit property from 
their natal family. However, when they entered into marriage, it was the husband who 
held the purse strings, which meant that if the wife brought some asset into the 
marriage, she might lose control over it.  
In this case, both marrying and settling a concubine and spending the proceeds 
of the sale of the yarn were economic actions, but neither of them was made known to 
Saigenaibibi. Saigenaibibi‘s case illustrates the lack of institutional protection for the 
rights of an existing wife to influence or interfere in her husband‘s decision to marry a 
second time, suggesting that a Uyghur husband at that time had exclusive control on 
domestic finances.  
Though material conflicts could lead to serious crimes between a husband and 
his wife, I have not been able to find even one civil case in the Chinese archives that 
is about an economic dispute between a Uyghur couple. But they did go to religious 
courts to resolve such problems. Beller-Hann cites two such cases in her article to 
show that ―neither Islamic nor customary law considered husband and wife as a legal 
unit whose interests always coincided‖.290 One of the cases she describes is about a 
husband accusing his wife of stealing his money; the other is a legal agreement in 
which a husband made some promises including giving his wife a regular allowance 
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to run the household. The two cases suggest that Uyghur women were not completely 
passive in the face of their husbands‘ domination over family property and income. 
However, Chinese courts seemed not to have been the recourse they chose to exercise 
what legal rights they had in the fight for their interests.  
 
Chinese court as an option for the resolution of 
domestic disputes  
Throughout the years of Qing rule in Xinjiang, the influence of the state on the 
civil affairs of local Muslims was very limited. However, after the establishment of 
Xinjiang province, the state did try to impose more of its authority over the everyday 
lives of Uyghur people, and to encourage them to go to the Chinese magistrate‘s 
yamen to resolve their civil disputes. Therefore, there was one more alternative way in 
which a Uyghur might solve a marital dispute; and this became a realm in which the 
Chinese state interacted with Uyghur commoners, although to a very limited extent. 
Under these circumstances, the secular yamen and the religious court found 
themselves in an undeclared relationship of competition.  
Because they would have existed outside the official bureaucratic structure 
cases that were mediated have not survived as part of the documentary record.  We 
therefore cannot say how many cases were mediated or how many Uyghurs brought 
their cases directly to the magistrate‘s court or how many cases arrived on the 
magistrate‘s desk because the native mediators failed to settle disputes. A similar 





solving civil disputes in the neidi. However, the existing sources do suggest that 
indigenous Uyghurs were fully aware of the different natures of the two different 
legal systems and they were able to choose different strategies and discourse to serve 
for their interests.  
The large difference in family and marital norms between Uyghur and Han 
communities made it possible for a Chinese magistrate to issue a judgement different 
from the Shari‘a court. For instance, the distaste Chinese officials harbored for the 
Uyghur practice of wives‘ ―returning to the natal home‖ may have provided Uyghur 
husbands with additional grounds for enhancing their own interests in a marriage and 
keeping their wives with them. It may explain why in some cases Uyghur husbands 
went directly to the Chinese magistrate instead of consulting the local Uyghur village 
heads or religious leader in order to resolve minor domestic disputes and to retrieve 
their wives from their natal homes.  
For example, in 1898, a Turfan man named Ruohemang charged that his 
mother-in-law had frequently asked his wife to return to live with her after the 
mother-in-law‘s remarriage to another man. When he went to look for his wife, he 
saw her surrounded by several single young men at his mother-in-law‘s home. His 
outrage led to a fight with his mother-in-law, who insisted that he had already 
divorced her daughter, a claim that the man denied. Ruohemang finally brought a case 
before the Chinese magistrate, who sent the case for settlement to the xiangyue of this 





him‖.291 Here the magistrate either did not know about the Uyghur custom or did not 
acknowledge it: he, and the Chinese civil law system he represented, were on the side 
of the husband, even though if Ruohemang‘s own account was true, according to 
Uyghur custom, he had no right to prohibit his wife from staying frequently with her 
mother.  
But not every Uyghur man was as lucky as Ruohemang. Not all the magistrates 
sent wives back to their husbands. In 1898 a Uyghur man was sued by his 
father-in-law for beating and wounding him. He defended himself by telling the 
Chinese magistrate that since he had no family members of his own, he had made an 
agreement with the bride‘s family in front of the matchmaker and witnesses stating 
that she was not allowed to stay at her natal home for too long after getting married 
(娶過不准久住娘家qu guo bu zhun jiu zhu niang jia); in return for this concession he 
had paid twenty taels of silver more than the usual bride price as a betrothal gift (cai li 
彩禮). However, after their marriage, his father-in-law‘s mother visited their home 
every six or seven days and lured his wife back to her natal home and would not let 
her return, despite the husband repeated requests. Muslim marriage is a legal 
agreement to which either partner is allowed to attach conditions, such as the 
condition in this case that ―the wife must not stay at her own home for long‖. In 
addition, he noted that the marriage contract had not included any undertaking that he 
was obliged to support his father-in-law‘s mother (并未提說養伊母到老 bing wei ti 
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shuo yang yi mu dao lao), and it was this that had led to the conflict. Hearing this case, 
the Chinese magistrate, Master Shen, did not punish any party but simply asked them 
to ―resume proper relations‖ between relatives.292  
This case shows that the husband could make an exception to the custom that 
allowed one‘s wife to pay frequent visit to her natal home only by increasing the 
marriage payment. This suggests that this custom remained salient within the local 
Uyghur community after the establishment of Xinjiang as a province, and even in 
eastern Xinjiang, where the Chinese rule had deeper roots. More importantly, the 
magistrate in this case did not try to challenge the Uyghur custom protecting women‘s 
right to visit their natal home. Actually, later I will talk about that the magistrate‘s 
court had a very flexible attitude toward Uyghurs‘ ethnic customs and in many cases 
the state was willing to enforce them.  
Although few in number, these cases suggest that Uyghurs would bring their 
ethnic marriage and divorce customs to the Chinese court as a way of asserted 
contested rights. Next I am going to discuss an interesting case in some detail to show 
the extent to which Uyghurs saw the Chinese courts as willing to be used to enforce 
their customary rights. Also, this case offers us a good chance to observe various 
Uyghur marital customs and the complex relationship that could exist between a 
Uyghur couple.  
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In 1903 a Uyghur man from Turfan named Bazier sued his mother-in-law, 
sisters-in-law and a man called Shali for having prevented his wife, Manlikesi, and 
their son from staying with him when he was planning to bring the whole family to 
another place. He explained that the reason for his move was that he found that his 
wife had committed adultery with Shali, a coal miner, and that the move was 
necessary in order to ―avoid any possible big disaster in the future‖ (mian zhi jianglai 
niang chu dahuo 免致將來釀出大禍). However, he declared, ―my mother-in-law, 
sisters-in-law and Shali ganged up and kept my wife and son from staying with me. 
What a villainous thing they have done…seizing my wife and taking my son…‖ The 
prefect of the Turfan zhiliting (independent sub-prefecture), Master Liu,
293
 then 
summoned the wife, Manlikesi, to a hearing, where she responded: 
In the sixth month of Guangxu 28 my husband divorced me for no 
reason at all [after more than 15 years of peaceful marriage]. According to 
Uyghur customs (yi chantou jingli 依纏頭經理), if a man divorces his wife 
he should return money to her and send her back to her natal home (tui yin 
gui niang 退銀歸娘), while if a woman divorces her husband, she can only 
go out of the door without taking anything with her. However, I left home 
without one penny but with a debt (dai zhang chumen 帶賬出門). Life in 
my natal home was really hard but still I have been raising our son and 
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daughter for one year [under these conditions]. Now he suddenly came and 
attempted to take our son back without mentioning one word about how to 
compensate me for my suffering and hard work and expenses, and in any 
case, it is too hard for a mother to separate from her son. Since during the 
past year he did not get remarried and neither did I, if he did want our son 
back, isn‘t it better for us to go back with him together? If he does not 
agree, he may take our son back after he marries a new wife. Our son is 
too young now to be raised [by him alone]. Moreover, since he divorced 
me for no good reason, it‘s hard for me to marry again to a good husband 
because of my damaged reputation I would rather remarry my original 
husband (xu pei yuan fu 續配原夫) than marry another person only 
because it‘s unbearable to separate from my son. If he does not agree, he 
should return me the children‘s maintenance payment (jiang zinv fuyang 
xinku bugei xiaonu 將子女撫養辛苦補給小女). As long as he does this, 




Obviously two different stories were told to Magistrate Liu by the husband and 
the wife. To Bazier, the husband, their marriage was ongoing although he had 
discovered that his wife had committed adultery with another person, and he was now 
taking measures to protect his family by moving to another place. But as a Uyghur, he 
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must have known that besides the right to return to the natal home, a wife has the 
customary right, as mentioned previously, not to be taken from one city to another 
without her consent.
295
 When he decided to move, according to these customs, his 
wife had a valid reason to reject his proposal. However, perhaps believing that the 
Chinese magistrate would not support or even know about this custom, the man did 
not hesitate to tell the story in a way that emphasized the accusation that his wife had 
committed adultery, which according to Chinese sexual orthodoxy can deprive a 
woman of almost any moral standing. For Manlikesi, the marriage had already 
finished when her husband had divorced her one year earlier, and so when forced to 
attend the Chinese court, she did not respond at all to the accusation of ―adultery‖, but 
instead tried to protect her economic interests by telling the Chinese magistrate about 
Uyghur customs concerning property distribution upon divorce. The custom she 
referred to – ―if a man divorces his wife he should return money to her and send her 
back to her natal home, while if a woman divorces her husband, she can only go out 
of the door without anything taken with her‖ – could be found in both Chinese and 
Western sources at the time. We have already noted that the Manchu civil officer, 
Qishiyi, had written in his travel notes, Xiyu Wenjianlu, that ―if a wife divorces her 
husband, she is not allowed to take even a piece of grass away from their home; if a 
husband divorces his wife, the wife is allowed to take anything she want with her,‖296 
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and Valikhanov had made a similar observation in his report.
297
 These descriptions 
are in accordance with Islamic law, which requires that a divorced wife receive a 
payment (mata) from her husband if he instigates the termination of their marriage.
298
  
But why does Manlikesi describe Uyghur custom as requiring that a husband 
should return money (tui yin 退銀) instead of giving money or compensation in some 
form to his divorced wife? And in her case, why does she say that she left home ―with 
a debt‖? This appears to recall the mahr practice. As Beller-Hann has suggested, in 
early 20
th
 century Xinjiang, mahr was not an actual payment and was regarded only as 
a debt that could theoretically be claimed by the wife following divorce. However, 
upon divorce, husbands were usually able to waive their obligation by various 
methods. Beller-Han quotes an account of a marriage arrangement in 1935:  
With nika is meant that on the side of the girl three or four of the very 
important people and on the boy‘s side three or four people act as 
witnesses and having fixed the marriage portion (mahr) of the girl at four 
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 ―If a wife wants a divorce, she cannot take anything away from home, if a husband wants a divorce, 
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113.  
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 The Quranic text cited is verse 241 of Surah 2. ―For divorced women (a one time provision should 
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meaning of the Holy Qu’rān, (Beltsville, Md. : Amana Publications, 2008), p. 98.  
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The gifts of clothes given by the man‘s side to the woman immediately after the 
fixing of mahr in this reference, according to Beller-Hann, ―raise the possibility that 
the notions of mahr and toyluq were inextricably intertwined.‖ However, as we know, 
in many Islamic communities, the amount of mahr is usually divided into two parts: 
immediate payment (given upon marriage) and deferred payment (given upon divorce, 
death of either party, or other specified events).
300
 Thus the gifts of clothes in this 
account could also refer to the immediate part of mahr. It seems to me that this 
reference could raise another possibility as well: that in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
community in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, the practice of mahr was prevalent and 
that, as in other Muslim communities, it was divided into two payments or potential 
payments. The immediate payment might have become intertwined with the Turkic 
tradition of toyluq, or even with the Chinese practice of caili in some cases, while the 
deferred part was deemed to be a ―debt‖ that a wife had a right at least theoretically to 
claim upon divorce. In the case of Manlikesi, it is highly possible that her description 
of Uyghur custom as ordaining that the husband ―should return money to her‖ 
referred to the deferred element of mahr, and that the ―debt‖ to which she referred 
upon divorce was this element of mahr that he owed her, not a debt that she owed 
him.  
                                                                                                                                            
Turkestan (With translation and notes). IV. 1951. (Ethnological and Historical texts from Guma, in 
Lunds Universitets Arsskrift N. F. Avd. 1, Bd 47. Nr 4, 1946-1951), p. 11. I quote it from Ildiko 
Beller-Hann, ―Law and Custom among the Uyghur in Xinjiang‖, p. 189.  
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Manlikesi made another point in her response to the Chinese court: she 
complained that the divorce had damaged her reputation as a good woman and thus 
hindered her chances of remarriage. As we know, this was an accusation that was 
likely to resonate with a Chinese judge, since Confucian orthodoxy required a woman 
to be absolutely sexually loyal to her husband and a chaste woman had to remain true 
to her first husband until the end of her life (cong yi er zhong 從一而終); it was said 
that ―a good woman does not marry again (hao nv bu jia er fu 好女不嫁貳夫)‖. In the 
imperial Chinese context, a wife was allowed to propose a divorce only if her husband 
had disappeared or mistreated her severely and even in that case the husband‘s 
consent was needed. In almost all cases the initiative for a divorce came from the 
husband, in which case the law recognized seven conditions (qichu 七出) allowing 
him to divorce his wife (these were disobedience to the husband‘s parents, infertility, 
adultery, loquacity, jealousy, incurable disease, and theft), but imposed three limits 
(san bu qu三不去) that could trump any of the seven reasons: if the wife had nowhere 
to return to, if she had completed a three-year-mourning for her deceased 
parents-in-law, or if the husband‘s family had been poor at the beginning of their 
marriage but had since become wealthy.
301
 These regulations alone indicate that 
divorced status for a woman in Chinese society would necessarily indicate a 
physically or moral flawed and thus dramatically damage her reputation.  
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Would a divorce ―with no good reason‖—although to her husband, the reason 
would certainly have been adultery—have really reduced the chances of a Xinjiang 
Uyghur woman marrying again? As shown earlier, both Chinese scholars and officials 
noticed the frequency of divorce and remarriage among Uyghurs and considered that 
divorce even tended to heighten a woman‘s value on the marriage market. Manlikesi‘s 
complaint thus seems somewhat suspicious. It is unlikely that she could have been 
referring to her chances of finding a Han husband, because Muslim women in 
Xinjiang were strictly prohibited from marrying with the Han and there are hardly any 
accounts of such marriages. There were more Chinese living in Turfan and in Hami 
than in south Xinjiang, but as we discussed previously, the everyday life and civil 
practices of Uyghurs in all parts of Xinjiang at that time largely followed their 
customary laws and social norms. So we can speculate that in this part of her 
statement Manlikesi was trying to use Chinese moral standards to empower herself in 
the Chinese court.  
Therefore we see that even by the 1880s local Uyghurs, not necessarily literate, 
much less scholars, were already able to deploy different legal norms within the same 
argument to a court in order to get the best chance of persuading a Chinese magistrate, 
clearly recognizing his likely prejudices and assumptions, or his possible respect for 
local norms, in order to support different aspects of their cases.  
Unfortunately, the archives do not contain the record of Master Liu‘s judgment 
after that hearing: the relevant document has been lost. But we do have another 





Master Liu had judged, right there in the court (dang tang xun duan 當堂訊斷), that 
Bazier could bring Manlikesi ―back to discipline‖ (ling hui guan jiao 領回管教) as 
long as he repaid his mother-in-law 20 taels of silver as compensation‖. This shows 
that Master Liu ruled nominally in part according to Chinese norms, according to 
which the wife could not disobey the husband, but still respected local norms which 
required a payment of the mahr debt alluded to by Manlikesi in her statement.  
But in a subsequent indictment, Bazier accused his mother-in-law and Shali yet 
again, saying that when he had gone to reclaim his wife and make the payment, his 
mother-in-law had refused to take his money or return his wife to him. When the 
magistrate, Master Fang (Master Liu had left this position by then) received the suit, 
he summoned all the relevant parties to the case to make an appearance before him. 
This is the last information we have about this case.  
We can see here that as in previous cases from the Turfan archives, again it was 
the husband who chose to go to the Chinese court to resolve the family‘s domestic 
disputes, and that he accused his wife of committing adultery, not with the aim of 
punishing her infidelity but in order to bring her and their son back to live with him. 
In this situation, the wife mobilized both Uyghur customs and the Chinese discourse 
of female virtue in order to show that she was the person who had been treated 
unjustly, in order to gain the magistrate‘s sympathy. Her ultimate goal is more likely 
to have been to get sufficient compensation for her and her parents. The subsequent 





changed her mind, or that she or her family considered the compensation awarded by 
the court to be insufficient.  
The magistrate‘s attitude here seems to have been largely the same as that of 
magistrates in neidi, for whom the prevention of the collapse of a marriage was the 
primary aim.
302
 Master Liu seems not to have taken any action to clarify whether or 
not the husband had divorced her wife, or if she had committed adultery, since he 
made his decision right in the court. His decision included a main part and an 
additional condition: firstly, that Manlikesi should be sent back to her husband, a 
standard solution employed by Chinese magistrates to protect the husband‘s interests 
in cases of ―back-home-wives,‖ and additionally, that the husband should pay his 
mother-in-law a sum of money based on Uyghur customs. While trying to protect a 
stable patriarchal social order, the additional condition of his decision shows a respect 
for local custom (in this case, a non-Han ethnic custom), as sometimes happened in 
late imperial China when law officers had to deal with civil disputes in areas with 
non-Han populations.  
The case shows another way in which Chinese officials adjusted local norms in 
the direction of Confucian principles, even when showing respect for those local 
practices. In the first round of this case, the plaintiff was Bazier, the husband, and the 
accused were his in-laws and the alleged adulterer. The person who presented an 
elaborate defense to the court was his wife Manlikesi, in which she argued that 
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compensation should be paid to her for her maintenance. Compensation was indeed 
awarded by Master Liu – but it went to Manlikesi‘s mother rather than to the 
supplicant. So why didn‘t Master Liu instruct that the payment be made to Manlikesi? 
In Qing legal culture, marriage was considered more as a union between two families 
than between two people. Likewise, conflicts between a young couple were usually 
treated as between two families. That may have been why whenever there was a case 
of wife who had taken flight, the husband (or his family) usually sued her family 
instead of her alone, even in cases where her natal family had not sheltered the 
woman at all.
303
 In such a dispute, the husband and the wife were merely regarded as 
representatives of their natal families‘ interests. Thus in Bazier‘s case, whether the 
compensation was awarded to Manlikesi or to her mother was probably much the 
same in Master Liu‘s eyes. At the same time, Qing legal culture usually treated a 
couple as a community of interests dominated by the husband. Thus it would look 
strange if a man was judged to pay a sum of money to his wife to whom he remained 
married; this would have upset the perceived natural hierarchy of the relationship as 
seen in Chinese terms. This might be another reason why Master Liu awarded the 
compensation to the mother-in-law, and why he instructed Manlikesi‘s family to 
return her to Bazier as his wife.  
In short, in this case both the Uyghur husband and wife were able to mobilize 
Chinese discourse in order to win the magistrate‘s symphathy. More importantly, 
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facing the Chinese magistrate, they did not hesitate to refer to Uyghur customs to 
protect their interests. The Chinese magistrates, though eager to uphold Confucian 
principles, did show respect for local custom and enforced it in practice.  
 
Western travelers who went to Xinjiang in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
such as Skrine, Forsyth and Valikhanov, had similar observations about the high 
social status enjoyed by the local Turkestani women compared to their co-religionists 
in the Middle East, particularly because they could divorce and remarry with ease. As 
for Uyghur women‘s status, Chinese legal archives do not contribute much more 
information about divorce and marriage institutions in Xinjiang, but they do provide 
us with more knowledge of gender relations in other respects. On the one hand, these 
case records show that while suffering less scrutiny from in-laws and the community, 
ordinary Uyghur women were able to maintain a very close relationship with their 
natal family after marriage, much more so than their Han Chinese neighbors. This 
provided Uyghur women with stronger grounds on which to fight for a better 
domestic status and more freedom of emotional and sexual life. On the other hand, 
19
th
 century Uyghur women also suffered frequent domestic violence and extremely 
limited economic rights in their marital life, like many women in China proper and 
other places at that time. These ―rights‖ enjoyed by Uyghur women flowed from 
Turkic customs or in some cases from Islamic law, not from Qing law.  
In the early period of Qing rule over Xinjiang, the everyday life of Uyghur 





made a province in the 1880s, a group of new provincial officials began to implement 
a Chinese-style administration there, including an effort to impose greater supervision 
over the gender order and relations among Uyghurs. The practical results of their 
original efforts turned out to be insignificant: We have every reason to believe that 
most of Uyghurs continued to deal with their marriages and divorces within the 
framework of their religion and their customs. Nonetheless, the existence of a Han 
Chinese yamen in every county did have a real impact on Uyghurs‘ marital lives, and 
the records show that many Uyghurs were fully aware of the more patriarchal nature 
of the Qing legal system and its norms, and that Uyghur men soon learned of ways in 
which this system could be handled to some extent to their advantage. In at least some 
cases, a husband whose wife was flouting his wishes in a way that he had no grounds 
to counter according to customary law, such as returning to her natal home, would go 
to the Qing court to seek a judgment in his favor by appealing to Chinese norms. 
However, no Uyghur, whether a husband or a wife, would go to the Qing court to 
settle a dispute, such as a divorce, which could be resolved with more ease and 
efficiency by religious or customary law. In our case records we do not find even one 
Uyghur woman who went to the Qing court voluntarily to fight for more conjugal 
rights, because, as the women must have known, the Qing code and the Chinese 
customary system offered no advantage to them in this respect. 
Certainly Qing and Uyghur legal norms and systems were based on different 
beliefs and principles, and the gender issue was one of their most prominent 





Chinese magistrates to respect local customs when dealing with civil disputes. Aware 
of this, Uyghurs were good at mobilizing both Chinese discourse as well as Uyghur 






CHAPTER 4   
UYGHURS’ CIVIL MATTERS (II): CONTRACTS AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
After the Qing conquest, Islamic law, local customs, and Qing state law worked 
together in establishing, protecting and adjusting Xinjiang Uyghurs‘ property rights. 
For a long time, the Qing central government maintained an indirect system of rule in 
which native inhabitants were largely governed by local elites. In such circumstances, 
Uyghurs continued to observe their existing civil law system when establishing 
property rights and undertaking private transactions. Generally speaking, the religious 
court in Xinjiang played a dominant role in adjusting the inheritances, transactions 
and transfer of property rights of native Muslims. This was a result of both the Qing 
rulers‘ indifference to the regulation of Uyghurs‘ civil matters, as well as the flexible 
and customary features of Qing civil legal tradition. Nevertheless, after the 
establishment of Xinjiang as a province in the 1880s, the Qing state did try to play a 
more active role in intervening in Xinjiang Uyghurs‘ economic life. This was mainly 
manifested in the state registration of Uyghur contracts as well as its cooperation with 
local Uyghur religious and secular authorities to protect people‘s property rights. In 
this chapter, I will discuss how Uyghurs used written contracts to establish and 






A group of written agreements drawn up originally in Chagatai language are the 
primary materials studied in this section. They mainly come from two different 
sources. One of them – Xinjiang Weiwu’erzu qiyue wenshu ziliao xuanbian 
(Collection of Contractual Documents of Xinjiang Uyghurs) – a precious collection 
comprising 314 documents dated from 1773 to 1949, that was compiled in the South 
and East Xinjiang countryside and translated into Chinese by scholars at the Xinjiang 
Academy of Social Science from the 1950s to the 1980s. Among them, 66 documents 
date to the Qing dynasty. The other material source is presented in a master‘s thesis 
written by Erkenjiang ∙ Yidelisi, a young Uyghur scholar. He collected 62 Chagatai 
documents, among which 30 were provided by Japanese scholar Jun Sugawara. In his 
thesis, Yidelisi classified all of them into seven groups by content and translated into 
Chinese sixteen documents which were complete and in the best condition. The 
Chagatai documents include but are hardly limited to contracts. Basically, all of them 
are signed and witnessed statements confirming ownership of certain properties or 
securing certain transactions. Beside these Chagatai materials, Uyghur civil matters 
that related to some Chinese contracts, petitions, and agreements written after disputes 
were settled by court (jujie 具結) constitute another important part of the ―database‖ 
of this study. They will help us understand the influence of the Chinese judicial 
system on Xinjiang Uyghurs‘ economic behaviors during the late Qing period.  
 






Property transactions contracts 
The Muslim community has a long tradition of respect for private property. 
Many verses in the Qur‘an give a clear indication that everything is owned by Allah 
and that property in the absolute sense belongs to Him. But God‘s ultimate ownership 
of the universe does not conflict with every individual‘s private ownership. Private 
ownership and individual rights are gifts from God. Private property in Islam was 
protected so well that until the present day some traditionalist countries would not 
interfere with private property and rights.
304
 A contract received just as much 
protection as property did from the Shari‘a. The concept of a contract in Islam does 
not exist merely as a legal institution. A contract means much more in Islamic law 
than in other legal systems. For many scholars, the Shari‘a itself is regarded as a 
system of law based on a pact between God and man and ―the entire fabric of the 
Divine law is contractual in its concept and content.‖305 Shari‘a does not present a 
formal definition of the term of contract (‘aqd), nor does it develop an explicit general 
theory of contract. Nonetheless, Islamic law recognizes the principle of freedom of 
contract, though this freedom is not unlimited. ―It established the rule that in matters 
of civil and commercial dealing (Mu‘amalat) any agreement not specifically 
prohibited by the Divine Law was valid and binding on the parties and could be 
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enforced by the courts.‖ 306  People‘s agreements could not violate Islamic 
prohibitions, such as those on usury (riba), uncertainty (gharar), and gambling 
(maysir).
307
 Besides the principle of freedom, there were some other basic ideas that 
directed and stabilized commercial and other transactions in the Islamic world, such 
as justice (adala), faithfulness (amana), equality and liberality.
308
  
Although the resources of this specific study all come from written documents, 
it is misleading to think that there were no property transactions before the time of the 
earliest known written contract in Xinjiang. For Xinjiang Uyghurs, as long as there 
were witnesses, an oral agreement had legal power as well. The situation was largely 
the same in other Islamic societies, such as Sudan, where ―in Islamic law the role and 
function of witnesses is quite crucial in many connections and their testimonies 
regarded as more valid than written evidence‖.309 Nevertheless, in Xinjiang, people 
might share the belief that tangible evidence would provide a greater chance of 
success in the event of future possible disputes. This appears to have been the reason 
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for the following document, which recorded a written contract that re-established a 







 day (Nov 15, 1885) 
Bayi
310
 Saipaier, in his lifetime donated 2 arver
311
 of land located 
along Hejie Canal Rebaqi, as waqf
312
 land. This was not written down 
when the agreement was made and only orally told to people such as Bayi 
Kasimu and Bayi Minhan living in the village. They all provide 
testimonies. This evidence is valid in the presence of Shari‘a. Now I 
establish a (written) contract again for this matter.   
The boundaries of this land extend eastward to the wasteland; 
southward to Maimaiti Yousufu‘s land, divided by the bush; westward to 




                                                 
310 Bayi means people who controlled large amount of wealth and vast area of land.    
311 Arver was originally a Uyghur unit of weight. One arver roughly equals to 191 kilogram. In 
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indicated a land where an arver of seeds can be sown. See Xinjiang Weiwu’erzu qiyue wenshu ziliao 
xuanbian, pp. 10-11. Wang Dongping, ―Qingdai Huijiang liangfu zhidu yanjiu (Study on the grain tax 
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 Uyghur charitable trust, later I will talk more about it.  
313 The contract is converted from Chagatai language into Latin letter and translated into Chinese by 
Yu Hongmei, The English translation is based on her Chinese translation. Yu Hongmei, ―Qing dai 
Tianshan nanlu Chahetaiwen qiyue wenshu yanjiu (A study on Chagatai contractual documents of Qing 





The documents studied in this chapter range in date from 1773 to 1911, and 
were written for various purposes. Generally, these documents include contracts for 
sale of land, real estate, gardens, water mills, underground canals (karyz)
314
 and so on; 
written agreements about the transfer, endowment, tenancy, partnership of arable land; 
endowment statements regarding waqf properties; documents concerning inheritance 
and distribution of property during family division, and agreements of all parties of a 
civil dispute which was settled by Shari‘a court.  
Sale contracts, especially of land, were among the most important written 
documents for Uyghurs who had a long history of agriculture. The following is an 







 day, Saturday 
The executor of this contract, Maredilisufei
315
, voluntarily sells 50 
mou of farmland and 10 houses located at Rebaqi Street, which were left 
by my parents, to Yakufubayi, for a fair price of 100 silver dollars. Now 
I‘ve received the money in full. This land is not a land for pledge sale, or a 
gift, or a waqf land. No one is allowed to muscle in on the land or the 
house. Henceforth, if my descendants or I cause any trouble by disavowing 
or damaging this contract, it is invalid in the presence of religious law.  
Boundaries in four directions: eastward it extends to the graveyard, 
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southward to the main road, westward to the seller‘s left houses, with the 
wall as a dividing line, northward is Yakufubayi‘s previous ***(damaged 
part of the document), with the wall as a dividing line.  





This document, written in 1801, exemplifies the standard format of land sale 
contracts: first, the contract is dated and the executor is named. The land to be sold is 
identified in terms of location and its four boundaries (which is very similar to 
Chinese land contracts), with the purchaser and price indicated. The voluntary and 
justice principles for settling the transaction price were usually emphasized in the 
contract.― ‖ 
(voluntary and fair) is a standard phrase that is frequently encountered in Chagatai 
sale contracts.
318
 In Xinjiang as in other societies, fields and real estates inherited 
from the parents often became one‘s main property. In these Chagatai documents, if 
the land or other property in question was inherited by one of the trading parties, it 
was often indicated in the contract. The boilerplate of ―this land is not a land for 
pledge sale, or a gift, or a waqf land‖ was also widely used for irrevocably selling 
land, in order to avoid possible disputes.  
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Completion of the payment had to be recorded. In the end, all the witnesses had 
to sign the contract. Witnesses were usually of some standing in the local community, 
and could include one who was a Mullah (people having abundant religious 
knowledge), Imam (religious scholar, or person in charge of worship in a Xinjiang 
Mosque), Sheikh (person in charge of a mazar for Muslim sages, elderly people, or 
religious leaders in a community), Bayi (a rich person) and so on. The executor(s) did 
not sign their names in these Chagatai documents.  
A crucial expression shared in common by a majority of these Uyghur contracts, 
which is also a significant difference from traditional Chinese contracts in terms of 
both formality and substance, lies in the sentence of this contract which states: ―if my 
descendants or I cause any trouble by disavowing or damaging this contract, it is 
invalid in the presence of religious law (Shari‘a).‖ This standard expression shows 
that in Xinjiang, local Muslims were fully aware that they were signing these 
agreements within the framework of Shari‘a. They believed that the religious court 
would enforce their private agreements, though in many cases simultaneous 
performance had alleviated the need for outside enforcement. For these people, whose 
everyday lives were comprehensively regulated by a sacred civil law system, a 
contract seemed to be more of a legal and religious document than a self-enforcing 





lawsuits contracts were routinely upheld by court, ―there is a strong tendency toward 
self-enforcement in late imperial and early Republican contracts‖.319 
This 1801 contract, concluded more than 40 years after the Qing conquered this 
area, is the earliest contract of sale found so far from Xinjiang. During that period, the 
Qing rulers maintained a non-intervention policy toward the civil matters of local 
ethnic people. The above standard usages and phrases appeared frequently in 
documents of the same type from various counties of South and East Xinjiang till the 
end of the Qing dynasty. Generally speaking, Xinjiang Uyghurs, speaking the same 
language, shared a unified contractual vocabulary.  
The following is another contract of land sale, whose format and usages were 
largely the same:  
（Islamic calendar）, 1266th year, 2nd month, 17th day (Jan, 1st, 1850)  
I, Yousufuhejia, hereby sell one carak of land located in Mogala area 
and irrigated by Kaluke Canal to Mullah Xiahejia, at the price of 30 
tunga
320. I‘ve received the money in full, the buyer does not owe me any 
more. This land is not a waqf land, nor does it belong to any other partner. 
About this land, if my descendants or myself or anyone else initiate a 
lawsuit for whatever reason, the lawsuit will be groundless and rejected 
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according to religious law. Therefore, we conclude the contract by 
ourselves. The land‘s boundaries extend eastward to the buyer‘s land, 
divided by the ridge; northward to the buyer‘s land as well, divided by the 
ridge; westward to a waqf land, divided by the pit. These are the 
boundaries.  




In contrast to contract vocabulary in China proper, Chagatai documents did not 
indicate that a transaction was a ―permanent sale.‖ Without specific notification, all 
the sale transactions were final, in which the seller lost all rights to make further 
claims. As yet not even one Chagatai source has been found recording that a seller 
asked for additional payments for land or other property already sold by him at a 
settled price. This probably can be explained in part by the more absolute and 
complete character of Islamic rights of ownership than in Western or Chinese 
contexts.  
Besides the land sale contracts and transfer agreements, there are two other 
main groups of surviving documents: one involved waqf endowments, and the other 
the succession of family property.  
Waqf documents  
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An important institutional economic practice of Uyghurs in Xinjiang was that of 
waqf, which means charitable trust. This institution was introduced to and developed 




 century with the spread of Islam. Two types of waqf 
existed in Xinjiang as well as in other Islamic societies: the waqf khairi (a public or 
charitable endowment), and the waqf ahli or dhurri (a family endowment). This 
dissertation is primarily concerned with the former.  
Originally waqf means ―to detain‖ in Arab language. According to the Hanafi 
school of Islamic law, a waqf was ―the detention of the corpus from the ownership of 
any person and the gift of its income or usufruct either presently or in the future, to 
some charitable purpose.‖322 While ownership of the waqf property was relinquished 
by the founder, it was not acquired by any other person; rather, it was ―arrested‖ or 
―detained.‖323 In other words, as long as a property became a waqf, the ownership of 
it was detained, while its usufruct was donated to the beneficiaries of the trust. In 
Xinjiang, the three main waqf types were Mosque waqf, mazar (tomb) waqf, and 
madressehs (religious school) waqf; while the property most commonly made waqf 
was land and real estate.  
Before the Qing conquest, waqf lands were awarded by secular rulers or donated 
by commoners. During the Qing ruling period, most of waqf lands came from 
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endowments created by common Muslims. But the Qing emperor left the majority of 
waqf lands and properties untouched when they started their domination over 
Xinjiang from 1759. For instance, one memorial presented by Amban Aliyan to 
Emperor Qianlong states that ―the tomb of the old Khoja in Islamic Kashgaria owned 
30 patman
324
 of land which was taken care of by 12 Muslim households. They are 
allowed to manage the land as before in order to meet expenditures for sacrifice and 
repairs, as well as their own living.‖325 Actually there were surprisingly few records 
of Xinjiang waqf that can be found in Chinese sources. All transactions involving 
waqf properties were handled within the sphere of Islamic law. Though waqf 
endowment was widely and frequently practiced among Uyghurs during the Qing 
dynasty, this fact is almost impossible to sense by reading both central and local 
Chinese materials. The Qing‘s attitude toward Xinjiang waqf was in line with their 
general ―non-interference‖ policy on Uyghur internal affairs. What we do know is that 
the state did not levy tax on waqf lands.
326
 Moreover, I found no restrictions imposed 
on waqf endowment by the state in practice.  
The reason for a Muslim to make public waqf endowment was complex. 
Generally and nominally every public waqf was made in order to perform good works 
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and to please God. This motive was often declared in the written agreements. 
However, founders used the law of waqf for a variety of undeclared, personal reasons. 
For instance some impoverished people donated their lands to avoid paying the land 
tax; some old people waqfed their land because they were childless; some poor people 
created a waqf because they were not able to make a pilgrimage to Mecca while some 
rich ones created it to seek atonement.
327
  
Islamic law did not mandate a particular form to create a waqf. As previously 
shown, it is valid for the waqif (founder) to indicate his intention to create a waqf 
orally. However, it is much more common for Xinjiang Uyghurs to make this 







 day (Aug 16, 1828) 
The executor of this document is Teacher Tuerdi. I hereby donate my 
land at Hejie Canal, Rebaqi, which can grow 100 jin of seeds as well as 
trees and houses on it, to the local Mosque as waqf. From now on, I, as 
well as others have no right to interfere. These properties are not for 
redeemable sale or deposited. There is no turning back.  
The land‘s boundaries extend eastward to the donor‘s land, with the 
village canal as the dividing line, southward and westward to Supi
328
 
Niyazi and Wuresi‘s lands, with the field ridge as the dividing line; 
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northward to Yisimayier‘s land, with the lake as the dividing line.  
Witnesses: Bakeniyazi, Yibulayimu.  
Islamic law allowed the founder of a waqf (waqif) the right to designate a 
mutawalli (trustee) for the trust or he could also appoint himself to be the mutawalli. 
Though ordinarily the founder would appoint a mutawalli in the waqf document,
329
 it 
seems Xinjiang waqifs usually did not write about this in their contracts. As in the 
above example, the majority of the present Xinjiang waqf documents
330
 show that the 
donor chose to give up all of his rights on the waqfed property as soon as he 
concluded the document of endowment. In the meantime, they did not mention the 





 month (May 1905)  
The executor of this document, Hadj
331
 Yisilan, with the conscience 
bestowed by Allah, following the proverb that ―the best donation is the 
donation that never dries up,‖ now endows 5 mu of land irrigated by 
Oleaster Canal as well as trees grown on it which is located at Bazzar 
Village, to Yishan
332
 Nuer Maimaiti‘s Hedumu Mosque as permanent 
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waqf. The conditions include: no selling, no transfer, no conditional sale, 
and no privatization. When I‘m alive, the landlord is me. When I‘m dead, 
all the income of the land is to be managed by the one who teaches in the 
Mosque; my son or nephew shall not intervene.  
Witnesses: akhund Muming, akhund Wumai‘er333 
In this case, Yisilanaji clearly appointed himself as the mutawalli of the trust in 
his lifetime and the Mosque leader upon his death. Also, the conditions of his 
endowment were underlined in a stricter way than is found in other such documents.  
The main duties of the mutawalli were preservation of the waqf, collection of 
waqf income, distribution of that income to the appropriate beneficiaries, and so forth. 
According to Shari‘a, a mutawalli was also a beneficiary of the waqf.334 It is hard to 
know exactly why in some cases the waqifs made themselves the mutawalli and in 
others they relinquished the right of management to the mutawalli (usually the power 
holder of the beneficial religious or charitable institutions). A Brief History of 
Xinjiang lends an insight to the identity of mutawalli by stating that ―a mosque or 
religious school, as the legal owner of waqf land, only received part of the rent 
income, while the majority of it went to the mutawalli, who was very likely to be the 
donor‘s relative.‖335 This, however, could just be a hypothesis, since insufficient 
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sources were found to support it and there is an obvious weakness in this statement. 
Firstly, as mentioned previously, mosques or schools did not ―own‖ the waqf 
properties. Secondly, a religious leader of the mosque or school often acted as 
mutawalli; in this case, their interests and that of the institutions‘ were not always in 
conflict.  
The three basic principles that governed waqf institutions were: the trust had to 
be irrevocable, perpetual (which means if a person waqfed a property, he should make 
it a perpetual waqf from the day he declared the waqf) and inalienable (which means a 
waqf could not be sold, mortgaged, inherited, or alienated by any other means).
336
 
Theoretically, the principle of perpetuity implied that once a waqf was created with a 
written agreement, no other contract was needed to secure this endowment. 
Nevertheless, there are several documents which were written to reiterate the waqf 
status of a plot of land or a real estate after tens of years either by the founder 
himself
337
 or by his descendants. The following is an example:  
Give thanks to Allah…(a prayer) After the praise and prayer, it‘s 







 day (Aug 31, 1850)  
The executors of this document are successors of Mullah 
Abulahailipai: his wife, Rugeiyebaba, and son, Aibudujielali.  
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When my father was alive, he donated 9 chengzi
338
 of land located 
along Hejie Canal, Rebaqi, to the Mosque as waqf.  
The executor (of this agreement) has passed away. We, his successors, 
also admit that this is a waqf land. The land has no connection with us. 
From now on, whether we or our descendants, if trying to raise an 
objection or to change this agreement, or to damage the land, or to 
appropriate the income of it, will be punished severely.  
So we generate this agreement.  
(Boundaries of the land)  
Witnesses: Maimaiti Sailimu, Tuerdi, Maimaiti Yiming, Yousufu 
The existence of this type of document indicates that the waqf properties could 
be misappropriated after a while. The above case represents one typical situation that 
could occur when the founder of a waqf land had died. His descendants might till the 
land and possess the harvest as an inheritance, especially when the founder was the 
mutawalli (trustee) himself before he died. Perhaps that is why the beneficiary 
institution (mosque, mazar, madresseh and so on) asked the descendants of a waqif to 





 year, the 10
th
 day of Eid al Fitr (Aug 8, 
1851) 
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My name is Buweixike. The madresseh owns 2 carak of land in 
Kuerma Village, which has been a waqf for 30 years. However, it had 
always been in control of the waqif Bayi Husaiyin‘s successors Bibi340 
Ayishe, Bibi Tuohetaxi, and Bibi Tuohaxi, as their father‘s inheritance 
land, since the contract could not be found. Now knowledgeable 
elders certify that the 2 carak of land is waqf of the madresseh, and 
they admitted this. So we conclude this contract again to show the 
truth. From now on, whoever upholds this waqf will be happy forever, 
while whoever defies or changes it or makes a dispute will be 
punished in this life and the next.  
(Boundaries of the land) 
Witnesses: Maimaiti Yousufu, Mullah Niyazi, Mullah Kanji, Supi 
Dulaiti  
Unlike most of the previous documents of waqf endowment, the first person of 
this document was Buweixike, who represented the beneficiary and is highly likely to 
be the mutawalli. It seems that the children of the waqif had occupied this land for 
quite a long time after their father died. Without the original document, the school had 
no grounds to get the land back until they found attesters who appeared to have legal 
                                                 





validity as well. But still, a written and stamped affidavit was needed to maintain the 
clarified ―truth.‖  
Besides the waqif‘s relatives or descendants, the clergy of the beneficiary 
institutions and their descendants constituted another group who were able to usurp 
waqf properties without much difficulty. Both Chinese scholars‘ investigations341 and 
the Chagatai documents at my disposal suggest that on occasion this actually 
happened. The following document records such a dispute:
342
 
(Shache343 Calendar) 1215th year, 7th month, 3rd day (1800)  
The executor of the document, Bayi Silamu, comes from Rebaqi. I 
hereby donate one year‘s harvest of my 20 carak of land located along 
Hejie Canal to the local Mosque as waqf. Meanwhile, I accuse Imam 
Mullah Yakufu of the mosque of not returning my land. Mullah 
Yakufu said: ―The land was donated to the Mosque as waqf by my 
father when he was alive. I became the Imam after my father died. I 
make a living by tilling one part of the land. The rest is dry land and 
reclaimed by me. Bayi Silamu does not concede it.‖ But the villagers 
all confirmed that the 20 carak of land were donated by Bayi Silamu 
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as waqf, and persuaded Mullah Yakufu to make an apology to me. So 
Mullah Yakufu gave me 10 carak of wheat. I‘m satisfied with this. 
Now I declare the land is waqf. From now on, if my descendants or 
myself make any dispute, it will be null and void.  
In this case, Bayi Silamu donated much more grain as waqf than he received 
from Mullah Yakufu as compensation. This might be regarded as a moral gesture 
showing that he was not lodging the lawsuit for profit. The case faintly implies that if 
waqf land was donated by a high level clergyman himself or his elders, he could have 
more (or almost all) rights on it than simply receiving a share of its income. 
Otherwise it is hard to explain why Iman Mullah Yakufu fabricated the fact that his 
father waqfed the land.  
Another more common method was to usurp waqf property by targeting its 
usufruct rights, instead of actual ownership. In Xinjiang, waqf lands were usually 
rented out for cultivation in order to make profit. In practice, the tenancy relationships 
seem to have been flexible. The land rent required by muttawalli or the charitable 
institution depended on the particular facts of each case. A Chagatai document shows 
that when previously arable land became a ―dry land‖ (han tian) on which crops could 
no longer grow, the tenant was allowed to build houses and plant trees on it (in order 





Also, the waqf landlord consented to the tenant‘s request to reduce the land rent.344 
Moreover, a tenant was allowed to transfer the tenancy to another person.
345
  
A waqif had considerable latitude in setting up the terms and conditions of the 
operation of the waqf.
346
 Besides designating a mutawalli of the trust, he was also 
allowed to make a decision on how to distribute the income of the waqf. However, in 
the majority of Xinjiang waqf documents people did not mention the distribution of 
waqf income. The information they always specified was only the nature of the 
property to be waqfed and the charitable purpose, for instance, for the good of certain 
mosques or madresseh.  
According to Chinese modern historians, there existed some established 
regulations about the distribution of the waqf income of a certain institution in the 
Xinjiang Islamic community before 1949. Perhaps that is why in most cases the 
founders did not need to make their own arrangements. In Shufu county‘s Qiapan 
Mosque, before 1949 the total annual of waqf lands was distributed in accordance 
with the rules stipulating that those in general charge of the Mosque received 
one-tenth (of the total income); those in charge of Mosque properties received 
one-tenth; missionaries and classics researchers received four-tenths; those in charge 
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of public worship on the Day of Assembly (Friday) received one-tenth; those 
guarding the Mosque received one-tenth.
347
 According to an earlier written record, in 
Imam Kazimu‘s Mazar at Hetian county, South Xinjiang, ten-sixtieth of the total 
income was used for renovation of the grave; eight-sixtieth went to the two Sheikhs 
who were governing the Mazar.
348
 
As for madressehs, according to a Western observer, ―every year the mutawalli 
collects the total income of waqf lands and hands it over to the akhund, who will 
divide it into ten shares and distribute it in accordance with the following rules: four 
shares belong to the akhund and the mudarrs (teachers); one share goes to the 
mutawalli, one share is to be used for the renovation; four shares go to the jarubkas 
(sextons) and sometimes the students as well.‖349 
Certainly, these rules could not completely prevent disputes from arising. In 
practice, the actual distribution of waqf incomes of a mosque, a madresseh or a mazar 
was controlled by several of the highest akhunds. It is hard to say to what extent these 
rules were followed by them.
350
 Several Chagatai documents recorded disputes on the 
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distribution of waqf income. For instance, in 1901, two madresseh students accused 
the school teachers of withholding one share of waqf land income due to them. The 
Shari‘a authority had the two sides confront each other face to face while they 
mediated. Finally they reached an agreement in which the students received their 
portion of 200 carak of wheat and 200 carak of maize every year, while the rest of the 
income was at the teachers‘ disposal.351  
Documents about inheritance of household property  
Among the Chagatai written agreements at my disposal, a large part can be 
classified as inheritance-related documents. In Eastern Turkestan, the inheritance of 
family property took place either when the parents were alive or after their death. In 
the latter situation, whenever a father or a mother died, his (or her) property would be 
divided and inherited immediately. In the absence of any will-like document, the 
successors would have to invite qadi akhund and village elders come to determine the 
distribution of property. They would serve as mediators and even more forceful 
participants in the process whereby family holdings are identified, divided into shares, 
and then distributed among the parties holding rights to them. Based on their 
decisions, all parties would sign an agreement with stamped with a maor seal to 
represent the authority of the religious court.  
As in any other Muslim society, among Uyghurs inheritance of family property 
was regulated by Shari‘a law. Among the numerous and detailed inheritance rules laid 
                                                 





down by the Qur‘an, the two most important ones were that all sons inherit equally; 
and that where the deceased has both male and female children, a male child receives 
a share equal to that of two females.
352
 The Islamic inheritance rules presuppose a 
patriarchal organization of the family, as well as providing females one half of the 
rights of males. Xinjiang Tuzhi records the basic rules of Uyghur inheritance as such: 
―if the person (whose property is to be inherited) has son(s), the property goes to him 
(them); his daughter(s) and son(s) of an ex-wife (and himself) receive half of the son‘s 
share. If the person only has daughter(s), the property goes to her (them). A childless 
person does not have an heir. The foster son does not get his inheritance. Instead, his 
brother(s) and relatives get it. If the person‘s wife does not bear a son, she gets half of 
the daughter‘s share. If a son dies before his parents, their property cannot be 
inherited by their grandchildren.‖353 These rules were largely in accordance with the 
general Islamic inheritance law. However, the two differ in that the ―classic‖ Islamic 
law would not bestow all legacies to the daughter who has no brother or half-brother. 
She can only get one-half. Regretably, I failed to find such a Uyghur case that can 
provide us more illustrations about this kind of situation.  
Among ten surviving Xinjiang inheritance cases written in Chagatai language, 
two were handled by qadi and akhund after a father‘s death. In both of the two cases, 
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the rule of ―daughter gets half of son‘s share‖ was strictly respected.  The following 









 day (July 1
st
, 1837) 
Respected Mullah County head and Master Beg: 
We are successors of Mullah Abula Hailipai.  
We are his wife Rukeya Ayila, daughter Bibi Hailimaixi, Bibi 
Haibibai, Bibi Hailiqi, son Aibudu Jilili and Aibudu Heilili. When our 
father was alive, he bestowed the lands in Hejie Canal to us through 
Shari‘a. It has been 7 years. Part of the estates that was not bestowed 
to us at that time was spent on the costs of his funeral. Some discord 
arose over the distribution of the rest, so we asked for a religious 
settlement. When the Shari‘a was dealing with this, we all showed our 
bestowing documents. During the course of trial, father‘s debt of 189 
silver coins was found out. The legacies given to us by father were not 
enough to pay the debt. So it has been decided that each of us men 
should pay 10 silver dollars, and each woman pay 5 dollars. In this 
way we paid father‘s debt and the dispute was resolved. We sisters 
and brothers do not owe each other. From now on, in the presence of 
Shari‘a it will be useless for any of us to make trouble again over 
father‘s legacy. 
                                                 





Witnesses: Hadj Tuerdi, Hadi Maimaiti Sailimu, Maimaiti 
Yiminghailipai, Hadj Yibula Heimu, Hadj Tuoheti, Supi, and so on.  
 









 day (Mar. 19 1897)  
The executors of this agreement were Naelaqi Street‘s dweller, 
Akhund Yaqufu‘s successors, including his wife Bibi Maizure, 
daughter Bibi Tajiye, Son Yusufu, Yibulayin, Aiyoufu, and Akhund 
Yisihage, that‘s all.  
After Yakufu passed away, before the distribution of his estate, 
Yisihage died also. His mother Bibi Maizure, younger sister Bibi 
Tajiye, older brothers Yousufu, Yibulayin, and Aiyoufu were left by 
him.  
Now successor Maizure invites Akhund Nuer and Qadi Silamu to help 
us to value and distribute the deceased‘s properties. The total 
estimated value is 1450 silver coins, which is divided into 216 shares 
according to Allah‘s willing. The distribution should be: 36 shares to 
go to his wife; Yousufu, Yibulayin and Aiyoufu each receive 52 
shares; 26 shares go to Bibi Tajiye. Based on the cash value, each of 
them will receive some properties as listed below:  
                                                 





His wife should receive: a felt blanket, worth 8 silver coins; a red 
blanket for worship, 8 silver coins; a carpet, 8 silver coins; a old 
blanket for worship, 6 silver coins; five big bowls, 15 silver coins; a 
big jar, 26 silver coins, a Russian pot, 10 silver coins; …356 The sum 
is 228 silver coins and 6.5 pennies.   
Yousufu should receive: a felt blanket, 6 silver coins; a white blanket 
for worship, 5 silver coins; a trowel, 6 silver coins; a teapot, 3 silver 
coins; an Islamic classic, 30 silver coins; an Islamic classic, 2 silver 
coins, a Qur‘an, 8 silver coins; a pair of leather shoes, 1 silver coin; an 
Islamic classic, 30 silver coins; a big oval bowl, 3 silver coins; a 
Beijing-style saddle, 2 silver coins; a tray, 80 copper coins; a iron 
hammer, 1 silver coin; a pair of copper shoes, 12 silver coins; a jar, 28 
silver coins; a scythe, 1 silver coin; a door, 2 silver coins; 8 houses in 
the village, 143 silver coins; 7 carak of land in the garden, 105 silver 
coins. The sum is 349 silver coins.  
Yibulayin should receive: a felt blanket, 4 silver coins; a blanket for 
worship, 2 silver coins; an ax, 5 silver coins; a pair of bowls, 3 silver 
coins; a teapot, 1 silver coin; a poem collection, 5 silver coins; a 
Qur‘an, 10 silver coins; an Islamic classic, 5 silver coins; an Islamic 
classic, 1 coin; a leather shoes, 1 coin; a iron lamp, 1 silver coin; a pot, 
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8 silver coins; a copper bowl, 12 silver coins; a jar and a basin, 18 
silver coins; a teapot, 6 silver coins; 3 wood boards, 2 silver coins; an 
Islamic classic, 5 silver coins; houses in the village, 143 silver coins; 7 
caraks of land, 106 silver coins. The sum is 346 silver coins.  
Aiyoufu should receive: a white felt, 2 silver coins; a book, 5 silver 
coins; a black blanket for worship, 2 silver coins; an Islamic classic, 6 
silver coins; an Islamic classic, 5 silver coins; a tray, 3 silver coins; a 
wood box, 8 silver coins; a jar, 12 silver coins; a teapot, 10 silver 
coins; a plate, 14 silver coins; a tall pot, 40 silver coins; houses in the 
village, 140 silver coins, land in the garden, 102 silver coins. The sum 
is 349 silver coins.  
Bibi Tajiye should receive: a while felt, 6 silver coins; a thread 
blanket for worship, 2 silver coins; 2 dishes, 80 copper coins; a 
earthen jar, 1 silver coin; a tray, 1 silver coin; an iron hammer, 2 silver 
coins; a amphora, 10 silver coins; a pair of copper shoes, 10 silver 
coins; two iron plates, 1 silver coin; a iron *, 30 copper coins; a bag, 
80 silver coins; houses and land, 54.5 silver coins. The sum is 174 
silver coins.  
We are all pleased with the above arrangements and received the stuff 
distributed to us. From now on, if whoever raises more requirement, it 
will be invalid in the presence of Shari‘a.  






(Boundaries of kitchen, living room, front corridor, front arbor, 
toolhouse, barn, and randa received by Yousufu, Yibulayin, Aiyoufu 
and Tajiye, omitted) 
(Boundaries of the 8 carak of land that tilled jointly by Maizure, 
Yousufu, Yibulayin, Aiyoufu, and Bibi Tajiye, omitted) 
The road to the farmland and guesthouse given to Bibi Maizure, keep 
unchanged.  
Half carak of land in the garden should go to Akhund Aiyoufu‘s 
daughter, Bibi Reyisi.  
The contract is written based on truth.  
Witness, Akhund Mudelisi Aizezi  
Both of the two inheritance disputes were resolved by the religious legal 
authority. The daughter received half of the son‘s share, not only of the father‘s estate, 
but also the debt. This principle was respected by both judges of the two cases. The 
first case also shows another important principle of Islamic succession: debts and 
claims have precedence over obligations and rights. The exact sequence should be: 
first, the costs of the funeral; second, the debts; and then the distribution of the rest of 
legacies among successors.
357
 As we have seen in this case, this sequence was strictly 
followed. In both of the cases, the widow was one of the successors waiting for the 
                                                 





qadi‘s arrangement. As for a widow‘s fixed share of inheritance, typical Islamic 
regulation laid down in the Qu‘ran is ―the wife receives one-quarter if there are no 
children or son‘s children, receives one-eighth in the contrary case‖.358 In the first 
case, all the debt paid by the wife, three daughters and two sons were 40 silver dollars. 
The wife did pay one eighth; while in the second case, the wife‘s share was one sixth, 
the rest was distributed among the four children. Moreover, in both of the cases, all 
sons/daughters inherited equally.  
Although both of the agreements were signed based on qadi‘s verdict, the 
situations differed slightly. In the first case, the deceased father had made his own 
arrangements about the succession before he died. But the rest of his estate (as well as 
his debts) still stirred up controversies, which made it necessary to bring the case to 
Shari‘a court. The previous dispute among the successors can presumably explain 
why there were at least six witnesses signing this fairly lengthy agreement. In the 
second case, all of the estates were not pre-arranged by the deceased person; under 
these circumstances his wife invited an akhund and a qadi to make a decision on the 
inheritance according to the custom. So it is not surprising that the number of 
witnesses is far smaller than in the other document. The job the religious power 
holders did at least seemed to be impartial. Every family belonging, ranging from a 
house to a tray, was valued precisely. All successors received house and land. Among 
                                                 





all the Chagatai documents at my disposal, this was one of the most detailed and 
meticulous.  
In traditional China, family division usually included two simultaneous 
processes: the physical division of the household (symbolized by the establishment of 
independent stoves) and the division of family property, with the ―division sheet 
(fendan 分單)‖ type of division taking place immediately, while the ―will (yizhu 遺囑)‖ 
type which only took place after the death of the parents.
359
 But in Xinjiang, things 
were different. On the one hand, as shown earlier in this dissertation and confirmed 
by other scholars, generally speaking, Uyghurs‘ basic family unit was a nuclear 
family. It was not common for married sons to live with their parents under one roof. 
Obviously this custom implied an early physical dispersal of the household. On the 
other hand, however, an independent son could not ask to inherit the family property 
until his father had died. Unless the father was willing to bestow some propertieson 
his children during his lifetime, all other properties were to be inherited after his death. 
Therefore, Uyghurs‘ household division often did not take place simultaneously with 
the inheritance of family properties. One result of this situation was that in Eastern 
Turkestan, many Uyghur fathers rented their lands out, while their sons had to be the 
tenants of other people.
 360
 In our second case, although not stated explicitly, the 
appearance of the daughter of Aiyoufu (the third brother) at the end of the document 
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suggests that these children were all married and perhaps had their own children. 
They were very likely to finally inherit the father‘s estates (especially lands) after 
living on their own for years.  
This Uyghur custom seems to reflect a strong paternal authority. Uyghur fathers 
continued to be the controller of the family properties throughout their lives, while 
among Han Chinese, at the time of family division when the parents were alive, most 
of the properties were divided among the brothers, with only a small portion set aside 
for elderly parents. In order to avoid a one-off division of all family properties, but to 
support their children well, a Uyghur man often gave them some properties as 
presents during his lifetime, as mentioned in the first agreement. The bestowal can 
also be regarded as a form of ―partial‖ inheritance. Moreover, in the first case all the 
successors showed their ―bestowing documents‖ to the qadi when there were disputes. 
This suggests that the drawing up of a written document was essential for legalizing 







 day (Jan 23 1903)  
I am Muhammad Xielifu‘s son, Yibulayin Hailipai, living in Huzer 
village. I admit that I bestow a mule and a big ingot to my son Batisi. I 
admit that I bestow a small milk cow, two oxen, a house worth 10 
taels of silver, and a kettle worth 2 taels of silver to my daughter, 
Haifuzihan. Since they are both too young, the properties were 
collected by others on behalf of them. From now on, I have no right to 





Witness: another son of the bestower.  
In Uyghur society, when properties were given to children by a father, the 
transfer of ownership usually went into effect immediately. This case is even more 
extreme. The two children were not old enough to collect and make use of these 
properties but the father still settled part of his estate on them. The daughter seemed to 
receive a larger gift than her brother, though we do not know exactly the value of ―a 
big ingot‖. Most importantly, the daughter received a house from her father when she 
was still young. As I have mentioned in previous chapter, this actually reflects a 
Uyghur custom that parents usually granted their daughter a house from the family 
properties so that whenever she got divorced, she had her own place to live. This was 
certainly related with the frequency of divorce among Uyghurs. Moreover, it is worth 
noting that the witness of this agreement is another son of the father. It is not 
necessary for Uyghur parents to bestow their estates to all the children at the same 
time or at one time. Also, the family members that appeared in this document—the 
father, the daughter, the son receiving gifts and the son acting as a witness—were all 
acting as independent agents of their own interests.  







 day (Aug, 9, 1909)  
The executor of the agreement is Ubulihaishan.  
I give two mu of the five-mu land irrigated by Sugatai Canal that I 
bought using gold to my elder daughter, Amina; one and a half mu of 





son, Aibudu Laihaiyi. They all receive the lands and will farm them 
themselves. From now on, the lands have no connection with me.  
(Boundaries of the lands, omitted) 
The land tax will be paid in their own names.  
Witness: Saidihan, Hadj Tuoheti Maimaiti, Hadj Wusiman and so on.  
In this document the father divided land among his three children. We have no 
further clues about how he divided his other estates among the children. But for this 
particular portion of his land, he did not obey the rule that a daughter receives half of 
a son‘s share. Land tax was mentioned in this late Qing document, which implies a 
general understanding by Uyghurs of the day that payment of taxes would help to 
establish property rights. As in the previous case, the father relinquished all the rights 
as well as obligations relating to the properties to his children as soon as the document 
was drawn up.  
A Uyghur man would grant not only his children, but also his wife certain 









 day (Dec 1, 1897)  
I am Hadj Aisha, a cordwainer, coming from Hetian County. I have 
been married with Rebiya for 42 years. She is a good wife and keeps 
the house very well. In order to support her life after my death, and to 
please the God and the Prophet, I bestow her the south living room, 
                                                 





half of the courtyard, and the cowshed. In case the sons will encroach, 
I hereby draw up this agreement. Besides, I give her a good iron pot, a 
kettle and two felt blankets.  
Witness: Akhund Abulasilimu 
Executor: Haji Aisha   
In general, all the inheritance-related Qing Chagatai documents at my disposal 
can be classified into two types: one is about distribution of a person‘s property after 
his death; the other is about a person‘s bestowal of certain estates to his successor 
during his lifetime. However, the above agreement is a bit unique. It seems to stand 
somewhere between a bestowal agreement and a will. Although the husband stated 
clearly that the purpose for giving these properties to his wife was ―to support her life 
after my death‖, we do not know whether or not the bestowal took effect immediately 
or after his death. In other words, it is not clear whether the wife had received these 
properties or she could only receive (inherit) them after her husband‘s death. In 
practice, these properties, including the living room, courtyard, and housewares, were 
very likely to be used together by the couple before and after drawing up of the 
document. Moreover, this document implied that disputes over person‘s estate could 
often take place between his widow and his children (since the couple in question had 
been married for 42 years, the children might well be the wife‘s own children, too).  
One question that remains is why drawing up a typical will did not seem to be a 
preferral choice for Xinjiang Uyghurs dealing with succession of their properties? 





(Islamic last will) can apply to no more than one third of the net estate of a testator; 
there are precise rules for the amount of the other 2/3 that goes to people in particular 
relationships to the testator. More importantly, for a Sunni Muslim, a will cannot be 
made for fard (Islamic legal heirs) who are allowed to inherit automatically in the 
estate of the deceased.
362
 These heirs include parents, grandparents, children, 
grandchildren, brothers, sisters, some other agnates such as uncles and nephews. The 
fundamental reason of these regulations is to prevent the lawful heirs from developing 
conflicts over potential inheritance while still protecting  their inheritance rights. 
Nevertheless, these rules als limit the testator‘s right to distribute his own estate. As 
for Qing Uyghurs, when they did not want to bequeath estates to the successors 
according to the fixed share, they chose to bestow certain properties to them (usually 
children and wife) when they were alive, since otherwise, no matter by writing a will 
or letting a qadi to distribute their estates after their death, their particular purpose 
could not be accomplished. This could also explain why, in one of the previous cases, 
the father would rather find an agent for his very young children to receive his gift 
properties than to write a will for them.  
The Uyghur community was not the only one that saw a tension between the 
orthodox Islamic rules on succession and their original customs. For instance, the 
Bedouins living in the Jerusalem-Bethlehem region also invented various ways to 
circumvent the Shari‘a rules of succession, particularly by distributing their land to 
                                                 





their children during their lifetimes. However, their main purpose was to leave their 
property to male agnates only.
363 
In all, the Qing Uyghur practices of inheritance were a combination of both 
Islamic law and native customs. On the one hand, many basic Islamic inheritance 
rules were strictly obeyed, especially by the legal and religious power holders.  
These included equal distribution among sons (daughters), the daughter‘s receipt of 
half of the son‘s share, the provision that debts and claims came before obligations 
and rights, and so on. On the other hand, common Uyghurs tried to stick to their 
customary lifestyle and had their own ways to protect and even improve their rights 
on distribution and succession to family properties. For instances, Uyghur fathers 
were not willing to divide all the family properties at once when married sons started 
their own independent households. Also, they might have different plans of their 
properties from the fixed share. Due to the tension between personal calculations and 
religious and legal rules, most Uyghur fathers chose to bestow certain properties on 
their heirs whenever they felt necessary. Judged by the Chagatai documents, to leave 
an ahkund the right to distribute their estates after their death seemed not to be their 
first choice. Finally, we can detect little Chinese on the practices of Uyghur 
inheritance. The state seems to show its face only when ―land tax‖ was mentioned in 
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one of the bestowal documents. Uyghurs handled their inheritance issues mainly 
within the framework of Islamic law and local customs. 
 
The role played by Chinese courts  
Cooperation of the two courts  
After the 1880s, when Xinjiang was established as a province, every beg yamen, 
as the lowest level of local government, was replaced by a county yamen in the charge 
of a Chinese magistrate. Previous begs were now given the new title of―village 
compact head‖ (xiangyue). As we have already discussed in chapter 4, from that time 
Shari‘a courts and the magistrate‘s courts both worked to deal with local Uyghurs‘ 
civil disputes. However, this does not mean that the two courts existed side by side 
and were always in competition. Nominally, the two shared a hierarchical relationship 
with the Chinese court on the top, since the appointment of akhunds had to be 
sanctioned by the magistrates. An 1897 petition from thirty-two (eminent) Uyghur 
villagers to the Turfan ting magistrate attested to this. In this petition these people 
reported that following the order of Master Zhu (the magistrate), they had already 
recommended three akhunds to handle local villagers‘ ―red and white affairs‖364 
(hong bai shijian 紅白事件) as well as the writing of contracts (xie li ziju 寫立字據), 
with each of them holding a maor seal respectively. This appointment awaited Master 
Zhu‘s endorsement.   
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Nonetheless, this procedure of resignation does not mean that Uyghur religious 
elites‘ legal decisions were also to be sanctioned by the magistrates sent from Beijing. 
As long as local Uyghurs went to the akhunds directly, the latter were free to judge 
the case on their own. From this point of view, the Qing was still by and large adhered 
to a laissez faire attitude toward Xinjiang Uyghurs‘ civil and economic life. The only 
difference from the past lies in the fact that after the 1880s the existence of the Qing 
court provided an alternative to Uyghurs to resolve their civil disputes. When the 
Chinese magistrate received a Uyghur‘s suit, it was possible for the plaintiff to get a 
different result than he would get by bringing the case to the religious court directly. 
In Chapter 4, I have discussed the influence of the existence of two courts on Uyghur 
couples‘ marital disputes. Here I will continue to discuss the two courts‘ cooperation 
and competition in adjusting Uyghurs‘ economic relations and protecting their 
property rights. Generally speaking, in the economic field, the two legal systems 
worked in a closer cooperative relationship, although they did encounter conflicts 
when judging certain cases. 
The most distinct and effective cooperation between the two courts was 
exemplified in the fact that the legal power of maor-sealed Chagatai contracts and 
other agreements were recognized and protected by Chinese authority after the 1880s. 
Materials show that Xinjiang magistrates were very familiar with this Uyghur legal 
tradition. In contrast to the case of the Uyghur term ―waqf‖, which never appeared in 





legal archives and magistrates‘ edicts. It was usually written as ―mo 摹‖, ―mao’er 毛
爾‖, ―mao’er tuji 毛爾圖記 (maor seal)‖ or ―mao’er chuoji 毛爾戳記 (maor seal)‖.  
As we know, all of the Chagatai documents studied so far were stamped with 
one or more maor seal. These legal documents were extremely valuable to their 
owners. The documents could be mainly divided into three groups in terms of the role 
the religious court played in their enforcement. The first group includes those 
contracts recording transactions or transfer or bestowal of certain important properties, 
such as land or real estate, drawn up by private individuals voluntarily. The fact that 
so many people had these documents of private transaction stamped by maor seal 
points to the legal power of the religious court in establishing property rights, and its 
power to even enforce those rights in the future when disputes arose. As in other 
Muslim communities, these land contracts and transfer documents also functioned as 
legal deeds of ownership.
365
 Turfan archives show that Uyghurs had to pay a certain 
fee to akhunds of the religious court for stamping the maor seal on their contracts or 
purchasing an official form of contract with the maor seal.
366
 
 The second group includes those agreements written by the parties to a dispute 
about certain properties which were settled by Shari‘a authority. Shari‘a solved the 
disputes by either holding a trial or offering mediation. In most cases, all parties to the 
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civil disputes would have to reach a written agreement and have it endorsed by the 
court. Most agreements for the distribution of an estate also belong to this group. The 
third group is the records of endowment of public waqf properties. People were 
inclined to have these properties registered with the Shari‘a court, although it is also 
valid for the founder to indicate his intention to create a waqf orally. 
 
In brief, all of these documents with maor stamps, although often quite brief, 
had eminent legal power, as did the Shari‘a court‘s function of regulating social, 
economic, and religious affairs before and after the establishment of Xinjiang 
province.  
What was the attitude of the Chinese court‘s toward maor contracts? Turfan ting 
archives indicate that Uyghur contracts with proper maor seals were regarded as a 
valid proof of ownership or possession of rights of property. For example, in 1906 a 
Uyghur woman went to redeem a plot of land that her father sold when he was alive. 
But the buyer insisted that it was an outright sale, instead of a conditional one and he 
had a contract with an akhund‘s maor mark as proof. The Uyghur woman then went 
to the magistrate‘s court and accused the land buyer of bribing the akhund and faking 
a maor contract. However, the Chinese magistrate did not believe that the akhund was 
bribed and accepted the maor contract as a valid proof of the legitimate land sale.
367
  
                                                 





On the other hand, a Uyghur contract without a maor mark would be regarded 
as fake or invalid. For instance, in 1905 a Uyghur called Shawuti sued another 
Uyghur, Semaiti, for secretly and illicitly selling a plot of land purchased by Shawuti 
from Semaiti 25 years ago to a Chinese Muslim called Ma Shuangqing. But the 
Chinese magistrate found that the land sale contract between Semaiti and Shawuti 
submitted by the latter did not have a maor stamp (akhund maor chuoji) on it, nor did 
the neighbors know about this transaction. Therefore, the contract was judged to be 
forged by Shawuti, and Semaiti was deemed innocent.
368
 Cases like this prove that 
the Shari‘a‘s legal authority as well as some judicial customs of Uyghurs, such as 
both maor stamp and witness‘s oral testimony, had legal power, and continued to be  
respected by the central authority.  
Another important form of cooperation betweem the two courts can be found in 
their legalization of Uyghurs‘ real estate transactions. It is worth noting that when two 
or more Uyghurs made a deal concerning land properties, besides signing a contract 
in Chagatai language, some of them also chose to sign a Chinese contract or had their 
transaction registered with the magistrate‘s office. We find such examples in both 
Turfan ting archives and Chagatai documents, both before and after the Muslim 
rebellion.  
Among all the Chagatai documents I examined, several land sales were 
recorded as ―reported to yamen‖. The following are some examples:  
                                                 











 day (Jan 21, 1885) 
Akhund Zunun‘s son, Akhund Zohuridin, the agent of Salihkar‘s 
daughter Turdihan, is the executor of this document. I sold my client‘s 
approximately 10 carak of land located at Uzun Saqualdaki Village, 
Tagongmu (area), as well as the certificate (of the land) to Mullah 
Gayasi‘s son, Akhund Amin, at a price of 100 tanga. This has been 
reported to yamen. The money has been received in full. My client has 
no right on this plot of land any more. (The boundaries of this land, 
omitted)  
Witnesses: Akhund Karim, Akhund Osur. The people who reported 










 day (Aug 4, 1896) 
I, Khoja Hasan‘s son, Akhund Isma‘il, am the executor of this contract. 
In the past I inherited from my mother a store (and two living rooms 
within it) which was located at Guzar Street, near Tosuk Gate, 
Kashgar City. Today I sold the store, the rooms, all the furniture in it, 
as well as its pathway and empty space to Akhund Faxriddin, son of 
Mullah Islam, the nan
370
 maker, at a price of 1100 tanga. This has 
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been reported to yamen. I‘ve received the money in full. From now on, 
I have no right to do anything about these properties for whatever 
reason. (The boundaries of this real estate, omitted) 
Witnesses: Imam Sahabiddin, Imam Yusuf, Akhund Muniriddin Sabir, 
Khoja Salih, Khoja Yusuf, Akhund Mohammed, Khoja Talib, Akhund 








 day (Sep 21, 1899)  
The executor of this document is Mullah Haji Muniyazi Bayi‘s son, 
Mullah Hudabaier. I sold my garden at Aisikewole, Dawulaitebage,
371
 
as well as the trees, the path and the canal (in it) to Mullah Yisilamu‘s 
son, Akhund Faheerding at a price of 90 tanga and reported this to 
yamen. I‘ve received the money in full. The land will have no 
connection with me hereafter. (The boundaries of the garden, omitted)  
I hereby draw up this document as a credential.  
Witnesses: Imam Ahkund Aimin, Akhund Yisilamu, Akhund 




 (Islamic calendar) 1324
th
 year, **month, 15
th
 day, (1906) 
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My name is Akhund Hawazi. I admit that I have sold three houses I 
inherited in the town as well as furniture in it to Mullah Mijiti 
Maihemu for 25 taels of silver. I‘ve received the money in full. This is 
reported to yamen.  
(The boundaries of the houses, omitted) 
I hereby draw up this document as a credential.  





All of the four late Qing private transactions were reported to local Qing 
government. In the original text, this was usually written as ― ‖ 
(reported to yamen). Here ―yamun‖ is a transliteration of Chinese word ―yamen‖, 
which means the magistrate‘s court, rather than Shari‘a or any other Uyghur authority. 
After the establishment of Xinjiang province, the Qing state tried to enlarge the state‘s 
governance sphere. A policy required that besides drawing up a contract with a maor 
seal, Uyghurs carrying out private transactions involving land and houses had to pay 
tax to the prefecture or county government and obtain the official contract tag. As for 
the tax rate, in 1901 it was 9% for irrevocable sale and 6% for conditional sale.
374
 
This policy had been reiterated by many Chinese magistrates who were sent to work 
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in Xinjiang. For instance, an 1891 edict sent by the magistrate of Turfan prefecture 
announced that ―all civilian transactions of lands and houses are subject to tax… I 
have been working here for several months, but nothing about the tax collection 
situation has been reported yet…From now on, whenever Han, Hui, or Uyghur people 
purchase lands or houses, they must submit their contracts (qizhi 契紙) to the 
government and have it examined and registered. Then the contract shall be stamped 
by the (official) seal and attached with an official contract tag (qiwei 契尾) after the 
tax is paid according to the regulation.‖375 This is not the last official edict to urge 
Xinjiang dwellers to pay tax for their real estates transaction—government documents 
of the same content were also found in the Xuantong reign,
376
 which suggests that 
this tax policy did not become compulsory or universally implemented in the province 
until the end of the dynasty. Actually this is not so much different from cases in neidi, 
where the practice of ―white contracts‖ commonly existed in local society.  
So now many Uyghurs living in South Xinjiang went to register their real estate 
transactions with the Chinese authority as well as following Shari‘a procedures to 
sign a contract. Moreover, they did this openly and did not seem to need to conceal 
the fact that they had registered their transactions with one court from the other court.  
The above 1885 contract mentioned two ―reporters‖ together with the witnesses 
who seemed to have relatively high social status (one‘s title was beg, the other‘s bayi). 
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This implies that there might be certain professionals working as agents whose main 
duty was to help Uyghur commoners to register their transaction with the magistrate‘s 
yamen. Moreover, the full procedures of registration were known and accepted by 
Shari‘a, otherwise it would not have appeared on the maor sealed contract. The 1908 
document mentioned the transaction tax levied by Chinese government explicitly, and 
there were both a maor seal and a Chinese tax seal affixed to it. On the one hand, 
private parties managed to establish relationships with both the state and the religious 
authority to gain dual protection for their arrangements. On the other hand, the two 
authorities both received information and revenue along with the convenience of 
regularization and control through this process.  
By the very end of the dynasty, some Uyghurs even mentioned in their Uyghur 
contract obtaining a red contract by paying a transaction tax to the Chinese yamen for 







 day (Jan 16 1908) 
I am Hadj Razi‘s son Akhund Metnijaz, living in the town. I sold 3.5 
mu of land irrigated by Canal Oq aral as well as the trees growing on 
it to Khoja Yehja at a price of 50 taels of silver. The money has been 
received in full. Tax has been paid to yamen and a tax seal has been 
affixed. (The boundaries of this plot of land, omitted)
377
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Clearly, Akhund Metnijaz now had both a Uyghur contract and a Chinese red 
contract to endorse his property transaction. As we saw in the above contracts, among 
the Chagatai documents at my proposal, a lot of late Qing ones were indeed registered 
with both Shari‘a court and the magistrate‘s yamen.  
Chinese legal archives stored in Turfan ting provide more information about 
how Qing Uyghurs legitimized their transactions by following Chinese rules. In 
disputes recorded in Turfan ting documents, some Uyghurs claimed to the Chinese 
magistrate that they had a ―red contract‖ to prove their ownership of properties 
purchased from other Uyghurs, which could be either a written understanding in 
Chagatai language with a seal of the Chinese yamen and/or an official contract tag or 
a red contract written in Chinese. I found among archives from the same place a land 




The earliest reference to a red contract signed between two Uyghur parties was 
in an 1890 plaint submitted by a Uyghur widow Gunisha, who told the magistrate that 
she owned a grape garden purchased by her husband from her father and two brothers 
before the Rebellion and that for this property she ―had a red contract as evidence.‖379 
In another case, a Uyghur plaintiff claimed that he had three papers including a 
Chinese contract, a Uyghur contract, and a red contract (han chan wenyue, hongqi san 
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zhang 漢纏文約，紅契三種) to prove his rights on a plot of land purchased by his 
father from one of their relatives in the early Guangxu reign.
380
 Another 1905 petition 
submitted by a 74-year-old Meilike, is as follows:  
A Uyghur woman named Guluqu had a grape garden left by her 
former husband, within which there are 32 dun
381
 of grapes, a plot of 
empty area (about 2 mu), a small vegetable field, two huts and a 
drying room (for making raisins). In July last year, she sold (the 
usufruct right of) this garden to me for a period of 19 years at a price 
of 275 teals of silver, with Hadj Aijiang, Akhund Yiming, Mirab 
Huerban, Xiangyue Aji as witnesses. We have drawn up a 
maor-sealed contract (mao’ er ziju 毛爾字據) and a red contract 
(hong qi yi zhang 紅契一張) that are to be submitted and examined. 
Guluqu then made a pilgrimage to the West on the income. After 
coming back this June, she bought a hut from me to live in and 
prevented me from tending this garden. On the 22
nd
 of this month, 
when going to the garden to pick some vegetables, I did not expect 
that she would suddenly appear on the way with a knife in her hand 
and threaten that ―if you dare to enter the garden today, I will either 
kill you or myself!‖ I dared not to argue with her there and had no 
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choice but to come to the court to bring this complaint…382 
It seems that by the very end of the Qing dynasty, more and more Uyghurs were 
used to obtaining both Uyghur and Chinese (red) contracts for their purchased 
properties. Therefore, when disputes occurred, they would be able to go to any court 
to protect their property rights. Uyghurs were willing to fulfill the procedural and 
documentary requirement of the Chinese legal system by various methods including 
paying a transaction tax, obtaining the yamen seal, and drawing up a contract in 
Chinese. Upon doing this, they believed the contract would be enforced by Chinese 
court as well whenever there was a dispute. 
A Uyghur‘s petition to the Chinese court found in the Turfan ting archives 
suggests that people living in the Eastern part of Xinjiang were fully aware of the 
regulation that transactions of real estate had to be taxed by the government. In this 
case, two Uyghur brothers inherited their father‘s karyz and a plot of karyz land after 
his death. After several years they received a notification from the county magistrate 
asking them to pay taxes for the properties. Feeling that this was unfair; the brothers 
appealed against the command by stating that they acquired the properties as 
inheritance, and not through sale, so they need not pay the tax. Moreover, they 
asserted that the original contracts of both the land and the karyz were red contracts 
and the properties had real estate certificates (zhi zhao 執照).383 The two Uyghurs in 
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this case showed a comprehensive knowledge of the state‘s policies on real estate, that 
they knew that land and house transactions rather than inherited real estate were to be 
taxed by the government, and that the red contract (contract with a red tax stamp of 
local government) as well as a certificate bestowed by the yamen could strongly 
legitimize property rights. 
One of the Turfan ting archives I collected was a list of contract taxes paid by 
Turfan ting residents for their real estate transactions from the first month to the tenth 
month of Guangxu 15 (1889).
384
 There was a total of 139 taxed transactions and 
among them about 60 were conducted between two Uyghur parties.
385
 That is to say, 
about 43% of the total taxed real estate transactions were conducted between Uyghurs. 
If we include those transactions engaged in by a Uyghur and a person of another 
ethnicity, calculations show that around 87% of the total taxed real estate transactions 
were conducted by at least one Uyghur (party). While in a late-Qing population 
survey, the total Muslim population of Turfan ting (including a very small number of 
Hui immigrants) was 29726, the total population was 41704.
386
 The ratio of Uyghur 
population to total population was less than 71.2%. Surprisingly, these data show that 
compared to Chinese dwellers, Uyghurs were not any less, if not even more eager, to 
register their real estate transactions with the Chinese government. Why was this? 
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Firstly, in terms of the contract registration and legalization, the two courts 
might appear identical in these Uyghurs‘ eyes. Our previous discussion shows that 
Uyghurs were fully aware of the rule that a potential future legal sanction in 
protecting one‘s property rights depended on satisfying procedural and documentary 
requirements of the legal (religious) authority. That is why all the Chagatai contracts 
were witnessed by Shari‘a akhunds and affixed with one or more maor seals. 
Presumably, the practice of affixing maor marks to contracts made the procedure of 
buying contract tags and registering real estate transactions familiar and more 
acceptable to Uyghur people. Unlike the Chinese who signed a lot of ―white contracts 
[that is, untagged and untaxed contracts]‖ Uyghurs had to have their property 
transactions written and endorsed by the religious/legal authority, otherwise they 
would not gain their protection once there was a dispute. Therefore, the endorsement 
from another authority—the Chinese government—could be as necessary and 
effective for Uyghurs. Chinese officials‘ repeated promotion of this policy in Xinjiang 
after the 1880s was certainly another reason that prompted these Uyghurs to register 
their transactions with the government. After all, in an unstable society like late Qing 
Xinjiang, itwas understandable for people to take advantage of all methods that could 
protect their property rights.  
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the legitimizing power of the Chinese court 
on Uyghurs‘ economic transaction was still limited, As far as the existing documents 
indicate, no Uyghur signed only Chinese contract. In other words, no Uyghur dared to 





acquiring a maor contract. Obviously, the Qing rule in Xinjiang had never been strong 
enough to defeat local religious authority in the civil realm.  
Moreover, though the Chinese government kept working on becoming another 
authority to legalize people‘s property transactions, they did not seem to attempt to 
limit the Islamic court‘s legal power in the same field, or at least they did not achieve 
this result. This can be illustrated by the Chinese magistrates‘ continuous 
acknowledgement of the legal power of the Islamic judge‘s maor marks.  
In general, the two authorities were working in peace with each other in the 
same judicial sphere. Their operating mechanisms were similar, too. Uyghurs were 
permitted and willing to acquire protection from both of the courts.  
Competition of the two courts  
The extent to which the two courts cooperated or were in competition was a 
crucial factor for a Uyghur as he determined where he would lodge his case. As one 
can imagine, if a Uyghur knew that the village akhund‘s comments would become an 
important reference for the Chinese magistrate to make a decision on his case, or that 
his case would ultimately be sent to the akhund whom he might want to avoid at the 
very beginning, it would be meaningless for him to bring it to the Chinese magistrate. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that some Uyghur men went to the magistrate‘s court to resolve 
their domestic disputes. That is because they knew that it was likely that the 
magistrate would rule differently from the religious judge and the magistrate‘s 
decision would be more favorable to men. Therefore, in what circumstances did 





property rights? In other words, in which realms was it more likely that the Chinese 
court would handle an economic dispute differently from the Shari‘a court?  
In total, I collected 19 archived cases about Uyghur-Uyghur economic disputes 
all of which were stored in the Financial Department (hu fang 戶房) of Turfan ting. I 
have classified them into five groups based on their content.    
1. The first group includes of those cases that had initially been handled by 
xiangyues or akhunds. However, their judgments or mediations failed resolve the 
disputes or could not be enforced. The plaintiff himself or local leaders then 
submitted the cases to the magistrate.
387
 For instance, in 1892 a Turfan Uyghur went 
to the South to make a living after renting his house to another Uyghur. Five years 
later, when he came back to collect the rest of the total rent the tenant owed him, he 
surprisingly found that the tenant himself had applied for a red contract on the house 
(si che hongqi 私扯紅契). Local akhunds judged that it was incorrect for the tenant 
to do that and ordered him to continue to pay the rent (minus the money he spent on 
applying for the red contract). However, the tenant did not obey this judgment and 
continued to occupy the original owner‘s house. The original owner had no choice but 
to bring the case to the magistrate.
388
 Since only this petition was left regarding this 
case, we do not know how the magistrate dealt with it in the end. In this case, the 
religious judges provided a clear judgment which was nevertheless simply ignored by 
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the wrongdoer. One of the things that enabled him to act so boldly was perhaps the 
fact that the red contract was issued by another authority: the Chinese yamen. We do 
not know the details of how a tenant was able to get a red contract only by paying 
some money (the property tax, I assume), but this case does indicate that there were 
some loopholes in the whole mechanism relating to real estate property registration 
and red contract issuance when it was operating in Xinjiang. This can also explain 
why some Uyghurs were willing to register their real property with Chinese yamen.  
2. The second group of cases was also initially handled by local akhunds. But 
one of the parties at odds claimed that the akhunds had been bribed and made unfair 
decisions, so they brought the cases to the magistrate‘s court. Also, this group 
includes those cases that came to the magistrate‘s desk because one of the parties had 
tried to challenge the authenticity of the contract held by the other party or the 
justness of the akhunds who endorsed the suspicious contract.
389
 For instance, in 
1882 Yunusi pledged a plot of land to Shada Haji for 25 years. The land was 
originally set aside for his daughter, Agesi, as her dowry. Several years later, Yunusi 
died and Shada Haji went to Mecca to make a pilgrimage. When the time was due, 
Agesi found Shada Haji‘s son, Zibaihawei, to claim her land. But Zibaihawei 
―fabricated a fake agreement of outright sale and bribed the second akhund to get his 
maor mark.‖ When Agesi went to the first akhund and argued about this issue, the 
akhund ―was also bribed and dismissed my case‖, as Agesi told the magistrate. 
                                                 






However, the magistrate was suspicious about the truth of Agesi‘s account. He 
remarked that ―her accusation that the akhunds had been bribed were particularly 
unbelievable.‖390 At last, the magistrate supported the authenticity of Agesi‘s father‘s 
maor contract of land sale with Zibaihawei, which means he believed that the land 
was first pledged and then sold to Zibaihawei. However, like many other Chinese 
magistrates, he asked Zibaihawei to give Agesi 25 taels of silver, as a supplement to 
the previous land price in order to show some mercy to the the weaker members of 
society. Among Xinjiang archives, this is not the only case in which the plaintiff 
reported to the magistrate that one or more local akhunds were bribed and fabricated 
maor contracts. However, so far I have not found any ahkund who was found guilty 
by the magistrate‘s court of accepting bribes and abusing their rights to use maor 
seals.  




4. This group of cases consists of property disputes among family members, 
including those that took place between a mother-in-law and her son-in-law, a 
father-in-law and his son-in-law, a woman and her brother-in-law, sisters and brothers, 
sisters having different mothers, two brothers, an uncle and his nephews, and so on.
392
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Among all the eight cases, three of them were brought to the court by women 
plaintiffs through the unique Chinese legal procedure of proxy litigation (baogao 抱
告).393 It seems that compared to disputes with other persons, Uyghurs brought more 
financial disputes with their family members to the Chinese court. This is not very 
different from the situation in the neidi, where a large percentage of Chinese litigation 
also involved family members. One reason might be that at that time people tended to 
transact more with family and people they knew well.  
A Uyghur woman called Bibiyasi had three married daughters and a son. Her 
late husband had bequeathed a plot of land to their son when he was alive. But still, 
the son was now in bad financial condition and owed a debt of more than one hundred 
taels. Now Bibiyasi‘s three sons-in-law ―conspired‖ together and kept asking her to 
divide her (and her late husband‘s) karyz land property (among all the family 
members). The old woman insisted that she would not divide the property unless she 
died and the debt of her son was settled. In 1895 her oldest son-in-law brought the 
case to the first sumu.
394
 The sumu ordered that the property to be divided only after 
the widow‘s death. The son-in-law then brought the case to the first akhund (ailanmu 
akhund), who was ―bribed (by him) and told me that if I don‘t want to divide the land, 
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I have to give twelve taels of silver to each of my daughters‖, according to the 
mother.  
Not willing to divide the family property or give cash to her daughters, the old 
woman finally went to the magistrate‘s court and accused her daughters of ―fighting 
for the natal family‘s property by force‖ (qiang bi niangjia zhi chan 強逼娘家之產), 
although they had the husband‘s family to rely on.395  
At the end of the petition, the magistrate wrote his this remark: 
It has been investigated that Uyghurs do have the rule that the 
son-in-law is allowed to acquire a share of his parents-in-law‘s 
property. However, it is improper for him to force (his mother-in-law). 
If what Bibiyasi said was true, Daguti and the other two sons-in-law 
were really outrageous and the akhund should not have accepted his 
bribes and taken sides with him…Now the first sumu should stop 
Daguti and other sons-in-law from forcing the old woman to divide 
the family property. If they dare to disobey, they shall be brought here 
and receive severe punishments.  
On another instruction attached to this petition, the magistrate again asked the 
local sumu to hold a hearing and settle this dispute as soon as possible and that if the 
akhund was really bribed, he should be reprimanded (shenchi 申斥).  
                                                 





Though at the beginning of her lawsuit, Bibiyasi summarized the reason of her 
accusation as ―sons-in-law seizing family property and threatening my life,‖ the 
dispute actually took place between two parties: the mother (allying with her only son 
who had already received his share of the father‘s legacy), and the three daughters 
(allying with their husbands, who had not received their share of the family property 
due to them). In this case, both Bibiyasi and her sons-in-law were doing court 
shopping and trying to find the court that could protect their interest best. When 
Bibiyasi approached the Chinese magistrate, she was careful to make sure her 
accusation resonated well with a Chinese judge. For instance, she emphasized that she 
was old and weak and bullied by her sons-in-law. More importantly, she managed to 
use Chinese civil rules and discourse to win the magistrate‘s sympathy by saying ―the 
daughters have their husband‘s family (to rely on), how could they still fight for their 
natal family‘s property by force?‖ (nü you xu jia, he de qiang bi niangjia zhi chan? 
女有婿家，何得強逼娘家之產). It seems that she was perfectly aware that her female 




But actually the Chinese magistrate was not confused by the Uyghur mother and 
knew the Uyghur (Islamic) rule regarding this issue clearly. As we have discussed 
earlier, according to the Islamic law of inheritance, a daughter receives half of a son‘s 
share. That is why the local akhund asked Bibiyasi to give a part of her husband‘s 
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legacy to the daughters, whether or not he was really bribed. I believe that the view 
that ―a son-in-law was allowed to acquire a share of his parents-in-law‘s property‖ 
(nüxu de fen yue jia zhi chan 女婿得分岳家之產), which was quoted by the Chinese 
magistrate as a ―Uyghur custom‖ (chan su 纏俗), was his interpretation of the 
Islamic legal protection of a daughter‘s inheritance right to her natal family‘s property, 
since Chinese did not recognize that a married woman had an independent economic 
right. This clearly indicated the Chinese magistrates were aware of Uyghur customs 
and had no intention to defy them.  
However, by ordering that the daughters should not ―force‖ their mother to 
divide the property, on the ground of a Chinese ethical formula: people should be 
filial to their parents and parents-in-law and not force them to do anything against 
their wishes, the magistrate‘s decision actually implied that the mother could pay off 
the son‘s debt before dividing the property among all the children. The daughters‘ 
inheritance right was actually jeopardized.  
It is also worth noting that the magistrate told the county authority that if the 
akhund was really bribed, he should be reprimanded. I have mentioned above that I 
have found few legal materials confirming that a Uyghur akhund had accepted bribes 
and, as a result, was punished severely by a Chinese magistrate. This case showed that 
even if an akhund was really bribed, a magistrate might be able or willing to do no 
more than simply reprimand him.  
Another case occurred in 1884. A Uyghur, Aihaiti, together with his son, 





Aihaiti‘s son-in-law, Wushouer, for agreeing to purchase land (through zumai) but 
failing to pay. The magistrate asked their village authority (the second sumu) to verify 
that their contract of sale was valid and that Wushouer had made the payment. After 
an investigation, the second sumu reported that the purchase was real but whether 
Wushouer had paid Aihaiti was difficult to confirm. The magistrate then judged that 
since Aihaiti changed his stories frequently and had waited five years to suehe must 
have made a false accusation. However, besides rejecting this false accusation, the 
magistrate still ordered that Wushouer give Aihaiti 10 taels of silver to help him since 
Aihaiti was very old and was his father-in-law.
397
    
In this case, although the magistrate already discerned that Aihaiti‘s narrative of 
the story was logically flawed and concluded that he was making a false accusation 
against Wushouer, he still asked Wushouer to help him financially simply because he 
was his father-in-law. In fact it is not rare for a Chinese magistrate to force the 
winning party to make a compromise with the losing party for certain moral reasons, 
such as ―to promote harmony of family members.‖398  
5. The plaintiffs of these cases voluntarily brought their regular financial 
disputes to the magistrate‘s court.399 For instance, in 1884 a man called Yusufu told 
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the magistrate that he had bought a plot of land and paid the transaction tax,However, 
the original owner sold the land to others so he lost both money and the land. The 
magistrate‘s comment was: ―since you have both witness and contract, how could he 
sell the land to others?‖ No other record about this case was found.  
In general, the 19 cases give me the following impressions:  
1. At least some Uyghurs believed that the magistrate‘s court had more power to 
enforce their judgments than local akhunds, otherwise they would not have gone to 
the magistrate‘s court to try to resolve the disputes that the akhunds failed to resolve.   
2. Some Uyghurs tried to challenge the authenticity of a maor contract and the 
impartiality of local akhunds at the magistrate‘s court, but this was rarely successful. 
The Chinese magistrates might declare that a Uyghur contract without a maor mark as 
fake. However, they never discredited a contract with a valid akhund’s maor mark, 
even if it was possible that the akhund was bribed to affix his maor seal.  
Chinese magistrates rarely overthrew a Uyghur akhund‘s judgment, nor did they 
really want to know if an akhund was bribed or had faked a contract by using his 
maor seal. It seems that the two legal authorities had an unspoken understanding that 
they did not intervene in each other‘s affairs when dealing with civil cases. They were 
aware that respecting each other‘s power and authority among their subjects was 
beneficial to both sides. 
Particularly, it seems to me that Chinese magistrates were not willing to become 
enemies with Uyghur religious authorities (at least openly); they would rather keep 





might be secretly aware that they were actually not powerful enough to really punish 
Uyghur akhunds. Therefore they were trying to avoid getting overly involved in the 
cases of alleged bribary or challenging the akhunds‘ innocence. 
3. Chinese magistrates usually respected Islamic civil rules and did not try to 
challenge them openly, even in the realm of family inheritance, in which Uyghur legal 
regulations differed dramatically from those of the Chinese. However, if a Uyghur 
plaintiff was able to describe his (or her) situation by using proper Chinese discourse 
and made the magistrate feel that his (or her) suffering showed a violation of any 
basic Chinese ethical standards, such as filial piety, it was possible for the magistrate 
to issue a judgment to his (or her) advantage which was to a limited degree in 
opposition to Uyghur civil law. 
4. In some cases in which the plaintiff had no grounds to win the case in either 
court, if he (or she) was the weaker or poorer party, the Chinese magistrate might still 
ask the winning party to compromise with him (or her) for moral or compassionate  
reasons. This happened more frequently in financial disputes between relatives, 
whereas in the Islamic court, the akhunds‘ judgments were usually black and white. 
This was another important reason for a Uyghur to bring his case to the magistrate‘s 
court.  
5. Generally speaking, not many Uyghurs went to the Chinese court to settle 
their economic disputes. Two reasons can mainly explain this situation. One is the 
close cooperating relationship between the two courts, which created a high 





magistrate‘s yamen and the indigenous religious authority. The other is the official 
tolerance of ethnic law and customs. This was manifested particularly in Chinese 
courts‘ acknowledgement of contracts signed according to Uyghur tradition. As we 
have discussed, contracts were widely used in the Uyghur community and the written 
document was the main source of property rights. As long as a person had a valid 
contract, the result of his case could largely be predicted no matter which court he 
went to. At the same time, it was natural to find more people brought their cases to the 
court they were more familiar with.   
  
Late Qing changes  
Xinjiang legal archives show that, during the very end of the Qing dynasty, 
some new phenomena appeared. It seems that Chinese officials worked more closely 
with local Islamic religious authorities to deal with civil disputes among Uyghurs.  
First of all, cooperation between the two legal authorities, which was tighter 
than the mutual recognition of contract registration, came into being at least in some 







 day (Jan 25, 1904) 
The executor of this document, akhund Maimaiti Niyazi, is teaching in 
the religious school established by Khoja Muhammad Xielifu Younusi. 
My partner Haji Rouzi Hailipai and I had a disagreement on the 
distribution of (school) income. So I brought a lawsuit against him to 





students of the school also sued him. Akhund Ailanmu also made 
comments on the two indictments, which were regarded as reasonable 
by him. Right before the trial, many good persons came to mediate 
between us. Finally we reached an agreement that from now on, after 
the maintenance cost and students‘ expenses were deducted from the 
total income, Rouzi Hailipai and I will share the rest equally. 
400
 
The ―income‖ discussed in the document was very likely waqf income since the 
income of Xinjiang madresseh schools mainly came from rent of waqf lands, and the 
whole dispute was about two madresseh teachers and their students‘ disagreement on 
the distribution of waqf income. As mentioned previously, Chinese materials give one 
a vague impression that the Qing officials had a distaste toward the idea of waqf 
property, perhaps this distaste could explain why this document used the term 
―income,‖ instead of ―waqf income‖.  
Cooperation between the Chinese secular court and the Shari‘a authority 
happened more than once in the course of settling this case. Before the teacher and 
students submitted their petitions to Magistrate Chen, they had them assessed by 
Ailanmu akhund, who was the highest judge of the local Shari‘a court. This action 
suggests that the local religious court‘s opinions on a dispute may have had great 
influence on the Chinese magistrate‘s decision, and the local natives were fully aware 
of this. The second instance of cooperation took place when the magistrate withdrew 
                                                 





the trial and sent the case for local level (and religious level) mediation. That is why 
the final agreement of this dispute was written in Chagatai language and attached with 
a maor stamp.  
As indicated by the above example, Chinese magistrates‘ handling of 
Uyghur-Uyghur cases often relied heavily on the local religious court. On the one 
hand, they need to consult local religious professionals about Uyghur legal customs. 
On the other hand, as they did in the Chinese neidi too, Chinese magistrates often sent 
cases back for local mediation, which is to say, these cases would return to the desks 
of akhunds and other religious professionals‘.  
Another dramatic late Qing change can be seen in some records of civil disputes 
which happened in the very last several years of the Qing dynasty. The following are 
some examples of these case archives:  
Case 1: In 1907, a Uyghur woman named Niurehan sued five other Uyghurs for 
selling a plot of land, which was her late grandfather‘s property, without her 
permission. The magistrate remarked that ―the akhunds in charge of that area shall 
call all the parties together to investigate the case carefully and judge it fairly 
according to (Islamic) classics and Uyghur norms‖ (zhaoyi chansu yi jingdian 
binggong lichu 照依纏俗以經典秉公論處). Local akhunds soon reported to the 
magistrate that the plot of land had been sold by Niurehan‘s father, and according to 
Uyghur norms and the Islamic classics, the property transactions performed by a 
father when he is alive have nothing to do with his sons or daughters. The magistrate 





lawsuit over a plot of land that has nothing to do with her. I was originally going to 
punish her according to the regulation on false accusation, but since the akhunds have 
mediated between the two parties, I finally decided not to take any action against 
her.‖401       
Case 2: In 1907, a Uyghur woman sued her brother at the magistrate‘s court for 
illegally occupying her land. The magistrate remarked that ―the two parties were 
actually blood relatives…the akhunds of her village shall go to investigate this case 
carefully and then deal with it fairly according to (Islamic) classics and Uyghur norms 
(zhaoyi chansu yi jingdian binggong lichu 照依纏俗以經典秉公理處), in order to 
sustain the blood relations. 
402
 
Case 3: In 1905 a Uyghur called Mayiti told the magistrate in his lawsuit that he 
had bought a plot of land more than 10 years ago and had a valid contract. However, a 
man called Maimaiteli who had been renting and living in an old house on the land 
for many years was now trying to occupy the house and part of the land. In the end of 
the petition Mayiti asked the magistrate to ask the first akhund of his village to 
resolve the dispute according to the Islamic classics (anzhao jingdian banli 按照經典
辦理) and prevent the illegal occupation.403   
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It is quite interesting that among the Chinese case archives dating to the last 
decade of the Qing dynasty, I have surprisingly found that phrases such as ―according 
to Islamic classics and Uyghur norms to deal with (the case)‖ and ―to resolve the 
dispute according to Islamic classics‖ appear frequently in the remarks of Chinese 
magistrates acting on Uyghur-Uyghur cases. Above I only list 3 examples but there 
are easily more than twenty cases like these that can be found.  
Before 1900, when a civil dispute among Uyghurs was brought to the Chinese 
magistrate‘s desk, he either tried the case himself, or turned the case over to local 
secular authorities, such as xiangyue, or sumu, to investigate or mediate. As to 
whether or not these secular local level authorities would ask local religious judges to 
help or take over the investigation, they seemed to not care. Particularly, they never 
told local leaders to handle the cases according to Islamic classics or Uyghur norms.    
It was only after the 1900s that the magistrates began to pass this type of cases 
directly to local akhunds and clearly asked them to deal with the cases according to 
Islamic classics and Uyghur norms. The above Case Three shows that Uyghur 
commoners were even able to go to the magistrate and ask him to send the case to 
local akhunds and let them deal with it according to Islamic classics. It indicates that 
by that time, it had been well known that an akhund‘s handling of civil cases 
according to Islamic classics was accepted and supported by Chinese magistrates.  
Why did the attitude of the Chinese magistrate toward local akhunds and their 
way of handling civil cases experience such a transition? As I have discussed in the 





have tried to intervene in the civil lives of Xinjiang Uyghurs more, and Governor Liu 
Jintang once said the Uyghurs should ―eliminate their bad norms‖. Although this goal 
soon turned out to be too ambitious, Chinese officials were still reluctant to openly 
express their opinions on Uyghur norms or Islamic classics. The two legal realms had 
been operating in parallel and not meddling in each other‘s affairs for a long time, 
though the Chinese secular authority theoretically acted as superior. But as time went 
on, the interests of the two ruling authorities might have become more and more 
identical. Moreover, all of the local akhunds were nominally designated by Chinese 
officials after the establishment of Xinjiang province, so it is natural for the two to 
experience closer cooperation than before. By the 1900s, the vertical relationship of 
the superior and the subordinate had became very obvious, that is why in Case Three, 
a Uyghur commoner went to the Chinese yamen and asked the magistrate to arrange 
his case to be handled by village akhunds.  
However, it is wrong to conclude that by the very end of the Qing dynasty, 
Chinese officials in Xinjiang controlled local religious authority more tightly than 
before. To the contrary, the above cases show that by that time, the magistrates had 
completely given up trying to deal with Uyghur‘s civil disputes. Their remarks to on 
Uyghur petitions were a clear declaration to all Xinjiang Uyghurs that from then on, 
their civil cases were all to be judged by religious leaders and according to Islamic 
classics and Uyghur norms. Toward the end of the dynasty Chinese magistrates 






CHAPTER 5  
TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN UYGHURS AND CHINESE  
 
This chapter, based mainly on Turfan ting legal archives, focuses on how 
Chinese immigrants and native Uyghurs traded with each other and settled their 
economic disputes, especially those involving land-related transactions. It also 
discusses the role played by Chinese and Islamic courts in handling this type of 
dispute. The practice of land transactions between Chinese and Uyghurs indicates a 
very cautious relationship between the two ethnic groups, both of which were eager to 
reduce risk in their economic transaction.  
In addition to such inter-ethnic relations, it appears that in this frontier region, 
where social connections among different ethnic groups were very weak, different 
from in inland China, there was hardly a so-called ―self-regulating community‖ to 
enforce their agreements in Xinjiang. Therefore, the existence of state adjudication 
and its enforcement were crucial for both Chinese and Uyghur dwellers interacting 
through economic transactions. Many sources show that they developed useful 
strategies for adjusting their relations with each other and protecting their own 
interests whenever necessary by means of the law. 
 





Property conflicts, especially those concerning land, between Uyghurs and 
Chinese
404
 were frequently recorded in Turfan ting archives. Though most of these 
legal archives date from after the 1860s, property transactions that happened well 
before that time are mentioned and owners even brought forth old contracts in order to 
protect their properties. The civil conflicts presented in this chapter mainly range in 
date from the 1860s to 1911. As we know, during this half century-long period, the 
Turfan dwellers, both Uyghurs and Chinese immigrants, experienced the Muslim 
Rebellion, the establishment of a Muslim state led by Yaqub beg, and the restoration 
of the Qing regime, as well as the final collapse of the last imperial dynasty. People‘s 
everyday lives were dramatically influenced by these political and military events.  
Before the establishment of Xinjiang province, Eastern Turkestanis living in 
Turfan were organized under the jasak banner system, which was a gesture of 
appreciation the Qing showed to local Uyghur chieftain, Emin Khoja, for his 
cooperation and contribution in their expansion project in this place. As jasaks, Emin 
Khoja and his offspring enjoyed hereditary authority over their subordinates. 
However, fearing that jasak chieftain might monopolize rule in Turfan, in 1761 and 
1778, the Qing adjusted the boundary of jasak land and population twice and put 
several hundreds of Uyghur households into direct rule of the state.
405
  
                                                 
404 The term ―Chinese‖ is here taken to include Han and Hui peoples, the majority of which came 
from the inland provinces after the Qing conquest of 1759. 
405 Shen Suli, ―Qingdai tuerfan zhasake qizhi yanjiu (A study on the jasak system of Qing Turfan)‖, 





Obtaining land from the state 
Manchu rulers since the Qianlong emperor encouraged migration to northern 
and eastern Xinjiang in order to impose better political control, promote agricultural 
production and relieve population pressure in China proper. During the Jiaqing and 
Daoguang reigns, many Han and Hui peasants and merchants migrated to Urumchi, 
Hami, Turfan and nearby places. This influx of immigrants, mostly from the 
provinces of Gansu and Shaanxi, was only temporarily interrupted by the Muslim 
Rebellion of 1864-1877.  
At the very beginning, this immigration was state-sponsored and each settler 
received a travel allowance, animals, agricultural tools, and seed as well as land. They 
were arranged into different places and organized as colony farmers. Land 
reclamation in the Xinjiang oasis turned out to be difficult and needed specific skills 
such as those for digging the karyz for irrigation. In Xinjiang most new lands were 
opened up by state-organized programs that encompassed various types of frontier 
settlements, such as military settlement (juntun 軍屯), criminal settlement (fantun 犯
屯), civilian settlement (mintun 民屯), and even Manchu bannermen settlement 
(qitun 旗屯)406. As we know, tuntian was a time-honored frontier strategy practiced 
by various dynasties.  
                                                 
406 As for the history, allocation, and change of various Xinjiang tuntian settlements, see Wang 
Xilong, Qingdai xibei tuntian yanjiu, (Lanzhou: Lanzhou University, 1990), pp 1-230; Feng 
Xishi,‖Qingdai Xinjiang de tuntian‖, in Ma Ruyan and Ma Dazheng ed., Qingdai bianjiang kaifa 
yanjiu, (Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1990), pp. 244-274, and Wang Jianmin ―Qing qianjia shiqi Xinjiang 
tuntian fenbu zhuangkuang chutan‖ A brief study on the distribution of Xinjiang agricultural colonies 





After the establishment of Xinjiang province in 1884, various kinds of state 
sponsored settlements were all ―upgraded into taxed land‖ (sheng ke 升科). The state 
gave title of the land to their cultivators and required that the new owner pay tax on 
the land.
407
 Meanwhile, Chinese policy makers, such as Zuo Zongtang and Liu 
Jintang, launched land reforms and a series of ―gaitu guiliu‖ (改土歸流) policies in 
Xinjiang, to limit the independent authority of native chieftains and to control over 
the frontier in a tighter way.
408
  
In Southern Xinjiang, the beg system was abolished, their dependent peasants 
(talanqi) freed, and emolument land (yanglian dimu 養廉地畝 ), which were 
previously granted to them according to their rank, confiscated. In former jasak areas, 
the Qing stripped the native Uyghur nobles (jasak) of their privileged rule and 
incorporated the whole area into the regular provincial administrative system. Their 
enfeoffed land was given to the Uyghurs who had farmed their land previously. In 
Turfan, Emin Khoja family‘s was largely deprived of control over jasak. The Khoja 
                                                                                                                                            
the criminal settlements, see also Joanna Waley-Cohen, Exile in Mid-Qing China. (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1991). 
407 Yuan Dahua and Wang Shunan, (Xuantong) Xinjiang tuzhi, 30:3a-4b.  
408 The Qing‘s ―gaitu guiliu‖ (administrative incorporation of native chiefdoms) policy was first 
launched in the Southwest during the Yongzhen reign (1723-1735), as a response to the increasing in 
inter- and intrachieftainship violence. By abolishing the native chieftainships and extending direct 
bureaucratic control over the former autonomous frontier area, the state managed to promote 
assimilation of frontier (ethnic) people into the empire. See Madeleine Zelin, ―The Yongzheng Reign" 
in Cambridge History of China, v. 9, Willard Peterson, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003, pp. See also John Herman, ―Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native 





family was allowed to retain their title but no longer levy tax or corvee from Uyghur 
commoners. All the original jasak Uyghurs who had been subordinate to Emin Khoja 
now became subjects of the State. 
Together with the unification of Xinjiang‘s administrative institutions, a new 
system of land rights also came into being. From that time onwards, the majority of 
Xinjiang‘s arable land became privatized, with official land in a subordinate 
position.
409
 Most native Uyghur commoners became self-cultivating peasants and had 
to pay a land tax to the state. In Turfan, they all received an official land certificate 
(zhizhao wenyue 執照文約) indicating the size, quality and boundary of their land. 
Four characters were printed on this certificate: now responsible for regular land tax 
(gai gui ezheng 改歸額征410).  
Both before and after the official organization of civilian settlement ceased after 
1781, individual Chinese peasants continued to arrive in Turfan. Some Chinese 
immigrants purchased guandi (official land 官地) from the state and became private 
landowners immediately. But local records do not show many cases of this kind. The 
small number of cases was usually dated around the 1880s, when much land was 
designated as ―waste land‖ or ―unclaimed land‖ and controlled by the state. New 
immigrants were allowed to purchase this guandi and pay a fixed tax annually. When 
                                                 
409 Li Lei and Tian Hua, ―Xinjiang jiansheng hou de tianfu zhidu‖ (The institutions of land tax after 
the establishment of Xinjiang province), Xinjiang Daxue Xuebao, Sep 2000, pp. 76-81.  
410 Ezheng means the tax quota of a place assigned by the state. See Wang Dongping and Guo 






doing this, they could obtain an official land certificate (zhizhao 執照) from the 
Turfan Reconstruction Bureauc (Shanhouju 善後局)411 to support their property 
rights. For instance, an 1879 zhizhao shows that a Han merchant named Yang 
Zhankui purchased for 310.815 taels of standard silver (kuping yin 庫平銀) from the 
Turfan Shanhouju 518.25 mu of third-class guandi that was irrigated by a 
government-built irrigation system. This land was considered his property in 
perpetuity (yongyuan guanye 永遠管業) and he was also liable for the regular land 
tax (ezheng 額征).412 Compared to the interior provinces, the price (0.6 tael/mu) was 
exceptionally low.
413
 The low price was one of the most important reasons inland 
peasants or merchants invested in Xinjiang land. Like Yang Zhankui, many Han 
immigrants brought large sums of capital to Xinjiang and were able to purchase large 
plots of land. This appears to account for the change of state policy away from official 
reclamation programs and toward private development during this transitional period. 
Archives show that local Turfan Uyghurs, most of whom were dependent 
peasants of former jasak nobles, enjoyed both a priority and a lower price in their 
                                                 
411 After suppressing the Muslim rebellion and before the establishment of Xinjiang province, Zuo 
Zongtang set up a Shanhouju (rehabilitation bureau) in each big city including Turfan, which was 
actually a provisional government in charge of various kinds of reconstruction matters. See Liu Min, 
―Lun Qingmo Shanhouju‖(Shanhouju in the late Qing), Anyang Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao, no. 4, 2007, 
pp. 69-71.  
412 XJA 15-4-178  
413 See Kang Chao, Man and land in Chinese history: An Economic Analysis, (Stanford, Calif. : 
Stanford University Press, 1986), p 130. The table shows that the average land price in the neidi from 





purchase of newly confiscated guandi from the Shanhouju. In 1879 a Uyghur named 
Hailier was allowed to pay 36 taels of silver to the Shanhouju to purchase 60 mu of 
guandi, which he might had been cultivating for a jasak before it was confiscated.
414
 
The land sold here was first-class, but the price was 0.6 tael/mu, which was same as 
the rate Merchant Yang had paid for his third-class land (0.6 tael/mu). 
This fact shows that when the state was privatizing land that had formerly 
belonged to native elites and agents of the Qing state, they sought to privatize quickly 
and discounted the land. The state appears to have considered it desireable that local 
Uyghurs be able to own the land they had farmed. However, the Qing did not just 
give the land to the former dependent Uyghur peasants and because of this, many 
Uyghurs were unable to buy the land they had farmed. This explains how some of this 
land came into the hands of wealthier Chinese immigrants. An example of this can be 
seen in the case of Hailier.  
Although the ―favorable‖ land price offered to him was quite low, it was still 
too high for a Uyghur peasant who had been living in a slave-like condition under the 
jasak system. Not willing to lose this preferential treatment, through a middleman, 
Hailier mortgaged this plot of land to a Turfan Chinese called Ma Wenchang for 70 
taels of silver, although he did not yet legally owned the land. Receiving the money 
from Ma, Hailier only paid 25 taels to the Shanhouju and seems to have spent all of 
the remaining 45 taels he received from Ma. When the magistrate demanded the 
                                                 





arrearage (11 taels), Ma was also summoned to court. Finally, the magistrate decided 
that the land should go to Ma, as long as he paid the 11 taels. Also, Hailier was asked 
to return 45 taels to Ma by the end of the year. Ma paid the money at once and 
acquired the land as well as the official certificate. By the next year, Hailier returned 
only 25 taels in kind and still owed him 20 taels. 
Again this case shows that the official land price (guanjia 官價) offered by the 
Shanhouju was lower than the market price. The official price Shanhouju charged 
Hailier was 36 taels, while the price offered by him in the mortgage sale was 70 taels. 
It is easy to understand that indigenous Uyghur chieftains usually owned the most 
fertile land. Local Uyghurs who had been farming jasak land before the confiscation，
such as Hailier, had priority access to this rare source. However, it is noteworthy that 
in this case, when the Uyghur peasant had no enough money to purchase the official 
land, the magistrate simply gave this priority to the Chinese who he owed a debt to 
and could afford the favorable price, instead of reserving the priority for another 
Uyghur.  
Rental sale (zumai) practiced in Turfan 
Because of the limited amount of guandi, a large number of individual 
immigrants were unable to purchase land from the government. Based on the archives 
under study, there were mainly two ways for these immigrants to get land in Turfan: 
one was through the Uyghurs‘ pledge sale (dang 當), the other by ―rent-purchase‖ 
(zumai 租賣). Conversely, these constituted two ways by which local Uyghurs could 





will explain below, it seems that Uyghurs seldom transacted their land to Chinese 
immigrants through direct sales. The Turfan archives show that since the Xianfeng 
reign (1851-1861), many immigrants arriving from the interior chose to rent a plot of 
land from native dwellers. People there invented a unique term for land transaction 
combining purchase and tenancy — zumai, which literally means rent-purchase — 
and used it for the majority of Chinese-Uyghur private land trades. Closer inspection 
reveals that zumai was actually a long-term rental arrangement. Due to the time limit 
and the regulations of the Xinjiang Archives, I was able to copy only 30 pieces of 
zumai cases. However, the total number of this type of archives was much larger, at 
least several hundreds. The following 1861 contract is the earliest complete zumai 
contract I have found in Turfan ting archives, but several more cases mention earlier 
land transactions of this kind. 
Ailihezhe, Hasenmu, Shayitihezhe, Manlahezhe, and Bilaerhezhe, the 
executors of this contract for the chuzumai (sale and renting out) of a 
grape garden together with the trees growing on it, are brothers. 
Owing to financial difficulties, after discussing [the decision] with our 
mother, we are willing to sell (chumai 出賣) the grape garden located 
in front of our home and east to the Big Canal as well as some unused 
areas whose boundaries are the garden wallto the Yongshengxing 
Shop. [The garden is] for them to cultivate for five years. The period 
starts from the spring of Xianfeng 10 (1860) and extends to the 





have agreed that the total rental price (zujia) is 3500 taels of silver. 
The money has been paid in full immediately. After signing the 
contract, the money-owner (qianzhu 錢主), [which means the tenant 
here] has the freedom to pledge or sublet the land to others. The 
landowners shall not disagree. Should there be any relatives of the 
landowners making trouble in the future, it will be the responsibility 
of the landowners that is the five brothers, to deal with that. This 
transaction is made by the two parties voluntarily and without any 
coercion. Because we fear that verbal agreement is not reliable, we 
have drawn up this contract as evidence.  
Also, through the middlemen, the two parties have agreed that every 
year the landowners are allowed to eat or use 1500 jin of fresh grapes 
and 200 jin of raisins for free.  
Executors of the contract: Ailihezhe, Hasenmu, Shayitihezhe, 
Manlahezhe, Bilaerhezhe 
Mediators/witnesses: Molla Selinmu, Yang Jucai, Fu Dengke, 
Translator (tongshi 通事) Bahai  
Xianfeng eleventh year (1861), first month, twenty-sixth day 
(The contract is bilingual and the Uyghur language version is written on the 





This contract is similar in format to a typical Chinese land lease or sales 
contract,
415
 except that the Uyghur executors mentioned they had ―discussed [the 
decision] with their mother‖ before signing this contract. A mother‘s opinion, would 
never be seen in a Chinese contract.  
This contract contains basic elements of the zumai transaction which was 
practiced most frequently in Turfan. Through zumai, the party who paid a lump-sum 
cash payment acquired the rights to work on a plot of land. The land was for 
him/them to cultivate or otherwise put to use for a specified period. When the term of 
the contract ended, the land had to be turned back to the landowner unconditionally. 
 Like in Chinese contracts found in the neidi, it is also emphasized that this 
transaction was made voluntarily by the two parties and the possible interference of 
the sellers‘ relatives was considered in advance. Whether or not the money had been 
paid was always mentioned. As in most of the other Uyghur-Han land transactions I 
have seen, the one above involved both Han and Uyghur middlemen, as well as a 
translator. Another feature of these contracts is that a description of the boundaries of 
the land was always included, while the size of the plots of land transacted was not 
necessary. (This, as well as the ever-changing currency exchange rate in Xinjiang, 
made it impossible to do any quantitative analysis of changing rent rates or the size of 
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Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3 (May, 1986), pp.499-525; and Myron L. Cohen ―Writs of Passage in Late 





plots involved in transactions, a problem faced by scholars working on many parts of 
inland China as well).  
Turfan people treated zumai as a temporary sale of land rights sale rather than as 
a long-term rental arrangement. In contracts written in Chagatai, Uyghurs usually 
used the verb ―sut-‖, which means ―to sell‖, to refer to this type of transaction.416 In 
Chinese contracts, zumai was referred to in different ways even in a single contract, 
such as the one above. The executors also used terms like chuzumai (出租賣，to rent 
and sell out) or chumai (出賣，to sell out) to describe this transaction, and zujia (rent 
price) for the payment involved. In other contracts, people also call it ―mai nianxian 
買（賣）年限‖, which means to sell/purchase (cultivation) rights for a period. Due to 
the highly developed agricultural economy and the long history of immigrants 
investing in land there, apparently tenancy rights had become independent of land 
ownership and been highly commodified in Turfan. Moreover, unlike most rentals, 
the zumai was a sale of rights also in the sense that all of the cost of the rights was 
paid up front.  
Why was the practice of zumai so popular in Turfan? First of all, the reason 
might lie in that zumai was an important way for poor Uyghurs to get money, since 
Islam prohibits usury and neidi Chinese were prohibited to lend money to the frontier 
                                                 
416 Jin Yuping, ―Qingji Tulufan diqu de zudian qiyue guanxi‖ (tenant-landlordism and contractual 





ethnic peoples by the Great Qing Code.
417
 Thus zumai became a legitimate way to 
borrow money. Secondly, the practice of selling use rights for a period of time was 
probably the result of the jasak system whereby all Turfan Uyghur commoners were 
tenants of their jasak chieftain before the 1880s—it was the Emin Khoja family who 
in theory owned the land. Having no freedom to sell their land or the right to rent it 
directly, instead they sold use rights for a limited period. Moreover, it seems that 
Uyghur Muslims were not willing to lose their land permenantly, especially to 
non-Muslims outsiders.  
As a commodity, tenancy rights could be transferred freely. In this particular 
contract, the owner of the Yongshengxing shop was allowed by the landowners to 
sublet or pledge the grape garden to another party within the contracted period of five 
years. 
Though the period of tenancy recorded in Turfan zumai contracts varied from 
several to several tens of years, it was an indispensable element that must be explicitly 
indicated in this type of written agreements. Before the Muslim Rebellion, the data 
deriving from the contracts and lawsuits at my disposal show that in more than half of 
the zumai agreements, people signed tenancy leases of 30 or 40 years and even longer 
(see Table 1).  
Table 1. Duration of zumai Relationship Recorded in Contracts or Mentioned in 
Lawsuits before the Muslim Rebellion  
                                                 
417 The Great Qing Code, Article149, substitute 06. Quran, verses 275, 276, 278, 279, 280 of Surah 2. 





Date  Length of Tenancy  SourSource (Archive Number)  
1848  18  15-4-101  
1850  30  15-4-101  
1851  32  15-4-101  
1851  32  15-4-101  
1853  48  15-4-14  
1857  42  15-4-14  
1857  10  15-4-101  
1860  30  15-4-101  
1861  5  15-4-176  
1862  32  15-4-88  
1862  14  15-4-125  
1862  107  15-4-235  
1866  30  15-4-40  
As indicated in the above data, it was not uncommon for people to sign 
long-term agreements. On the eve of Muslim Rebellion, some Han Chinese still 
signed long-term zumai contracts with Turfan Uyghurs. For instance, an 1862 contract 
shows Yang Shuyan paid a Uyghur named Shawuti 4000 taels of cash
418
 to rent 
                                                 
418 4000 taels of cash here means they weighed 4000 taels of copper coins As recorded in the Turfan 
ting archives the tael (liang) was used as a measuring unit for not only silver (yin), but also copper coin 
(qian), which differed dramatically from inland provinces. In Chinese contracts I found that whenever 
people talked about certain amount of taels of cash, the amount was always big. Chagatai contracts 
stored in the archives attest to this finding, which show that people paid hundreds of taels of ―yarmak‖ 





(zumai) a vineyard for 107 years, and another in 1866 indicates Ma Gong rented three 
plots of dry land from Shayiti for 30 years. Both of them paid off the total rent at the 
beginning of the transaction and both Uyghurs threw their tenants off the land when 
warfare broke out. Chinese who survived the Rebellion had to escape and Muslim 
landlords took back their lands without returning any money to the tenants.  
Chinese commoners realized that in this remote frontier area, imperial authority 
could easily be too weak to guarantee their long-term investments. Probably this 
explains why after the Qing reconquest of Xinjiang, few zumai leases dating around 
the early Guangxu reign were longer than 15 years, while most of the leases were no 
more than 10 years. When the tenancy went well, the two parties would renew their 
lease once or even several more times.
419
 But to sign a one-time long-term zumai 
contract was not much less common than before the Muslim Rebellion.  
Nevertheless, given no external risks, long-term tenancy was usually welcomed 
by Chinese tenants with enough capital because it gave them more freedom to 
determine how to best use the land. Particularly for those who grew cash crops, such 
as grapes, the dynamic market situation needed flexible management and long-term 
skillful cultivation; besides, long-term tenancy would reduce tenants‘ annual cost. On 
the one hand, it is worth noting that the longer a zumai agreement was, the cheaper 
annual rent the tenant could get. Although in zumai contracts, the rental price was 
                                                                                                                                            
Chagatai written agreements into Chinese. See Jin Yuping, ―Qingji tulufan diqu de zudian qiyue 
guanxi‖, Xiyu Yanjiu, 2001, No. 3, pp. 46-52. 





always calculated for the rental period as a whole and the annual rent was never 
specified. For example, in 1896 two Uyghur brothers, Maimaitasheng and Hailier, 
leased (zumai 租賣) a piece of dry land to Wang Zhaoqi for 16 years. The price was 
said to be 116 taels of silver. Soon, due to financial difficulties they asked a 
middleman to extend the tenancy on the same land with Wang for another 14 years. 
The total rental price for 14 years was another 32 taels of silver. Therefore, ―(the 
usage right of) the land was sold twice…the total price was 148 taels of silver.‖420 In 
this case, when the land was to be rented for 16 years, the annual rent averaged 7.25 
taels; but when considering the extension, for a mere additional 32 taels, that brought 
the rental period to 30 years, the average annual rent was reduced sharply to 4.93 
taels.  
Similarly, when a landowner tried to extend or renew his zumai tenancy with 
the same tenant, the rental price would always become cheaper. For instance, in the 
Uyghur language archives in 1889, 1893, and 1894, a Uyghur landowner leased 
(zumai) his vineyeard composed of 430 grape vines, to the same tenant three times, 
with total rent listed as 110 taels for 10 years (averaging 11 taels/year), 60 taels for 8 
years (7.5 taels/year), and 30 taels for 6 years (5 taels/year), respectively.
421
  
How the land tax and labor responsibilities were arranged was another 
important issue mentioned in zumai contracts. Before the Muslim Rebellion, Turfan 
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had two administrative systems. One was the jasak system, under which the Uyghur 
Turfan commoners paid land tax and corvees to their jasak chieftain, instead of the 
state. The other was the regular Qing civil administrative system, under which the 
peasants of other nationalities were all under the direct charge of the Turfan 
independent prefecture and were responsible for the state land tax.
422
 After the Qing 
reconquest of Turfan, the state privatized most of the jasaks‘ effeofed land and 
various kinds of official land settlements and also began to levy regular land tax on 
these lands. At the beginning, Zuo Zongtang levied a tithe on private land modeled 
after the old Turkestani tax tradition.
423
 The first Xinjiang provincial governor, Liu 
Jintang, regarded this tax rate as too high for peasants to afford. In 1887 he had all 
private land surveyed and classified into three groups according to quality. In Dihua 
(Urumchi), Turfan and other parts of Northern and Eastern Xinjiang, tax was levied 
differently in each category: 
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 See Saguchi Toru, ―Shinchō shihai-ka no Torufan‖ (Turfan under Qing rule), Kanazawa daigaku 
Hobungakubu ronshu, shigakuka (Kanazawa University, Studies and essays. History) no.26, 1978, pp. 
25-50; and Shen Suli, ―Qingdai Tulufan shehui jingji xingtai yanjiu‖(Studies on social-economic 
situation of Qing Turfan), Qinghai minzu yanjiu,Vol. 15, No. 4, Sep 2004, pp. 67-71.  
423
 Tithe levied on private land was regulated by the Islamic law and this institution was valid in both 
Northern (under the Zunghar rule) and Southern Xinjiang (Yarkand Khanate) before the Qing conquest, 
The tithe had been long borrowed by the Qing to impose on Uyghurs‘ private land. Early before 1759, 
the Qianlong emperor had asked his imperial officials to investigate the taxes levied by Zunghar on 
Uyghurs and made it the model of the tax system of Qing regime. See Saguchi Toru, Shiba dao shijiu 
shiji Xinjiang shehuishi yanjiu (Study on Xinjiang society during 18th-19th century), (Ulumuqi: 





First Class: seven sheng
424
 of cereal per mu 
Second Class: four sheng of cereal per mu 
Third Class: three sheng of cereal per mu
425
 
Those cultivating vegetables or fruits, such as grape, were responsible for a 
―garden tax‖ (yuan shui 園稅), which was usually paid in cash. This kind of tax was 
also called as ―land duty‖ (di ke 地課).   
Land taxation was a strong impetus for Turfan Uyghurs to sell or rent out their 
land. After the establishment of the province, the tax levied by the Qing in Southern 
Xinjiang was significantly less than that extracted by begs before the Muslim 
Rebellion.
426
 In Northern and Eastern Xinjiang, the land tax had also been decreased, 
but it was still higher than in the South.
427
 Moreover, due to the severity of damage 
from the war, land tax turned out to be a much heavier burden on the peasants in 
Northern and Eastern Xinjiang, in which tax arrears were universal and where some 
peasants even chose to give up their land and escape. By contrast, in the South, tax 
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 Sheng was a traditional Chinese unit of volume, which equaled to 1035.4688 cm³ in the Qing 
dynasty. See Qiu Guangming, Qiu Long, and Yang Ping, Zhongguo kexue jishu shi –du liang heng 
juan (Chinese history of technology, volume of weights and measures), (Beijing: Kexue press, 2003), p. 
427.  
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 Liu Jintang, Liuxiangqingong zougao, 12: 36a-b.  
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 For land tax levied before the Muslim Rebellion in Southern Xinjiang, see Saguchi Toru, Shiba dao 
shijiu shiji Xinjiang shehuishi yanjiu , pp. 244-245. 
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 See Li Lei and Tian Hua, ―Xinjiang jiansheng hou de tianfu zhidu‖ (The institutions of land tax 







 Moreover, labor corvee was another heavy burden of 
Turfan Uyghurs. Under the circumstances, looking for a tenant became a crucial way 
to relieve one‘s tax responsibility in Turfan. There were landlords who, in the tenancy 
agreement, explicitly attributed their decision to enter into a tenancy relationships to 
the heavy tax burden. For instance, a zumai renewal contract signed in 1881 recorded 
that because the Uyghur landowners were ―not able to afford the land tax money (di 
ke yinliang 地課銀兩), they are willing to renew the zumai tenancy for five more 
years. (During this term) the land tax is to be paid by Cao (the Chinese tenant) and 
has nothing to do with the landowners.‖429 
Among all the zumai written agreements we have been considering, the majority 
of them mentioned how to deal with the land tax and labor services. There were 
mainly three ways to arrange the tax payment in zumai transactions: to be paid by 
landowners themselves; to be paid by tenants; or to put aside a plot of land from 
which the harvest would be submitted as land tax. The most common practice was 
tenants paying the land tax. The following contract is an example:  
The executors of this vineyard sale renewal (xu mai 續賣) contract are 
Shawuti, Maimaitieling and Ailibahai. Owing to financial difficulties, 
we are now willing to renew our sale agreement of a vineyard, which 
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was our inherited property and is located to the east of the river in 
Shahezi, with Yang Shuji for 8 years. There are about 430 grape vines 
(growing in this garden). Through a middleman, the total price of 60 
taels of silver has been agreed upon. Today the money has been paid 
in full. The period will start from the spring of Guangxu 46 and 
extends to the autumn of Guangxu 53… The boundary (of the garden) 
is clear. Land tax follows the land (liang sui di xing 糧隨地行) and 
labor service has nothing to do with the buyer. Because we fear that 
verbal agreement is not reliable, we have drawn up this contract as 
certification.  
Witnesses: Shadilang, Tayiermila, Sun Qinglian, Zhao Wande, and 
Mullah Heshenmaiti 
Scribe: Li Guilin 
Executors: Shawuti, Maimaitieling and Ailibahai 
Guangxu 15 (1889), tenth month, twenty-second day. 
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(The contract is bilingual and the Uyghur language version is written in the 
same piece of paper, left of the Chinese version. There are 6 big characters written in 
the middle of the paper, stating ―each party keeps one copy of the contract.‖ Three 
Chinese official seals were stamped on it, which indicates that this is a red (official) 
contract upon which there is a deed tax being collected by the state.  
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Although the two parties called this contract a sales renewal contract, the 
content of this document shows that it is actually a zumai contract, through which the 
buyer (tenant) received the usage rights to the land for a certain period (8 years). As 
we know, the Guangxu reign lasted 34 years, so the three Uyghur landowners (who 
could be brothers) were contracting out the cultivation rights of their land for 30 more 
years, which shows that their family condition may have been worsening. Apparently 
the cultivation rights from Guangxu 15 (1889) to Guangxu 45 (1919
431
) for this 
vineyard had already been leased, very likely to the same Mr. Yang. (The Yang 
brothers, Shuji and Shuyan had been renting land from the same three Uyghurs since 




When talking about the tax burden associated with the land in question, the term 
―land tax follows land‖ (liang sui di xing 糧隨地行) was often used. This means that 
it was the tenant‘s responsibility to pay the regular land tax, which was usually called 
―eliang 額糧‖, ―zhenggong 正貢‖, ―zhengfu 正賦‖, or ―dike 地課‖ in Xinjiang. In 
all the contracts I have been considering, most Uyghur landowners made their tenants 
pay the land tax. For instance, besides the above tenancy agreement, five years after 
Guangxu 15 (1889), Shawuti, Maimaitiling and Ailibahai leased another piece of their 
land to a man called Wang Shouren for 8 years. The contract also made it Yang‘s 
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responsibility to pay ―official cereal‖ (guanliang 官糧 ) every year, while the 
landowners (yezhu 業主) were to perform labor service (chaishi 差事).433 Many 
more contracts were found designating the tenant responsible for the land tax.
434
  
Compared to ―land tax follows land‖, the landlords-paying-land-tax cases are 
much fewer. Among all the written agreements dating after the establishment of 
Xinjiang province I collected there is no such case. However, the Chinese scholar Jin 
Yuping did find such a case in the Turfan ting archives, which was written in 
Chagatai language. The case shows that in 1883 a Uyghur sold (zumai 租賣) the 
usage right of half of his karyz to a Chinese for 23 years. He himself was responsible 
for paying land tax and labor service.
435
 Besides this case, I found another court 
archive which suggests that the pattern of landlords paying land tax once existed 
widely. In 1880 a Uyghur xiangyue went to the magistrate‘s court and sued about 20 
Han and Hui Chinese (Tungan) under his jurisdiction because they resisted paying the 
land tax. These Chinese appellees soon filed a defense to argue for themselves:  
…It is right and proper for a person cultivating land to pay land 
tax. However, in the peaceful years, when Uyghurs sold land to 
tenants, they only sold tenure, instead of conditional sale (zhi mai 
nianxian, bing bu dianmai 只賣年限，并不典賣). When the agreed 
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upon period was over, (the tenants) lost both money and vineyards. As 
for the land tax and labor service, (the landlords) raised the price when 
selling land, so they were willing to take care of them. (These tax 
responsibilities) had nothing to do with we tenants, we have contracts 
to prove this. (This format) has not changed much since the Rebellion. 
Now the Uyghur xiangyue made a false accusation against us saying 
that we resisted paying land tax. Actually he is conspiring with the 
landowners (yu yezhu chuantong yiqi 與業主串通一氣) and trying to 
impose their tax burden on us, which is favoritism and intolerable by 
Heaven (tianli bu rong 天理不容). We simply refuse to accept such 
treatment. Moreover, nowadays when the Shanhouju sells former 
official vineyards (guanyuan 官園), the unconditional sale (du mai 
杜賣) price of each grapevine is 6 qian436 of silver, while the price 
those landowners offered us was 4-5 qian for only one year. The 
additional price they charged us was just meant for (them) to pay land 
tax and labor services. And now the landowners are actually willing to 
pay land tax. However, the Uyghur xiangyue did not urge them to do 
that, but only accused us of tax resistance (kang liang bu na 抗糧不
納), which is really unfair. So we would also like to elect other Han 
and Hui xiangyues and let them be in charge of our public affairs. 
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Now Han and Hui Chinese are in the charge of Uyghur xiangyues, 
which is not bearable at all. After serious consideration, we have no 
choice but to beg your eminence to make decisions for us.
437
 
―Peaceful years‖ in this document refers to the period before the Muslim 
Rebellion. According to this document, before the Rebellion when Chinese 
immigrants moved into Turfan villages where the landowners were Uyghurs the most 
frequent type of land transactions between Uyghur land owners and Chinese tenants 
was zumai (selling tenure, mai nianxian 賣年限), which was not really different from 
the situation after the establishment of the province.  
According to these Chinese tenants, in zumai transactions Uyghur landowners 
undertook the tax responsibility themselves before the Muslim Rebellion. But in 
return, these Chinese tenants had to pay a higher rent. The fixed sale price charged by 
the Shanhouju was 0.6 taels of silver per grape plant, while by private landowners it 
was 0.4-0.5 taels per plant annually. It means that a two-year zumai tenancy would 
cost more than a permanent sale. If what these Chinese farmers said was true, then 
either the amount of the purchasable land offered by the Shanhouju was really limited, 
or the tax and corvée responsibilities associated with the land were very heavy. 
Otherwise the Chinese immigrants would have directly purchased vineyards from the 
Shanhouju, instead of leasing from Uyghurs at such a high price. 
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It is interesting to see the economics laid out. If the tenant pays the tax, the zujia 
is lower. If the owner pays the tax, the zujia is higher. But materials are not enough 
for us to answer the question: what were the benefits of each to the respective parties? 
We can only guess that the reason for the Uyghur landowners to be willing to 
undertake the tax responsibilities perhaps lies in that when they raised up the land 
price, they could raised an amount that was higher than the tax and thus make more 
profit. But if they chose to let the tenants pay the land tax, they were able to avoid the 
risk of tax increases.  
The magistrate‘s final comment on this report ordered that the Uyghur 
landowners pay the land and corvee tax: ―it is alright to pay land tax and corvée 
according to the original contracts.‖ This archive also shows that the practice of land 
transactions often contradicted the interests of native Uyghurs and Chinese 
immigrants and, at the local level, Uyghur xiangyue could not represent the interests 
of both his fellow Uyghurs and Chinese immigrants. That is why these Han and Hui 
Chinese asked the magistrate to install Han and Hui xiangyue for them. Actually most 
of the archives show that in Xinjiang xiangyue of different ethnicities were indeed 
appointed to serve different ethnic groups.  
An 1878 zumai case shows us another way to deal with land tax. Among the 
160 grapevines in the transacted vineyard, 120 plants were given to the lessee to 





to be used to pay land tax and labor service (chai liang shiwu 差糧事務).438 
However, this seems to be an exceptional practice since only one example was found.  
Besides land tax and labor service, another responsibility often came with the 
transaction of karyz, which was the maintenance of the karyz irrigation system. Every 
karyz required constant maintenance, which included clearing the canal runway, 
reinforcing the vertical shafts, and so on. The contractual documents under study 
suggested that these tasks were usually undertaken by Uyghur landowners, because 
they were more experienced and familiar with the professional skills required.
439
 
Moreover, ultimately this infrastructure was a valuable commodity of their land. They 
could not afford to let these infrastructures be damaged or neglected. 
In all, these contracts give a rough impression that prior to the Muslim 
Rebellion Turfan Uyghur landlords usually assumed the land tax and labor 
responsibilities themselves, while after the Muslim Rebellion the most commonly 
practiced pattern of zumai transactions put the lessees in charge of land tax, and 
landowners in charge of labor service. Why was there this change? It probably can be 
linked to the detrimental effect of war on people‘s confidence in their transaction with 
others from a different ethnicity. On the one hand, before the Rebellion, Chinese 
tenants paid higher prices to rent cultivation rights from Uyghurs in order to have the 
land tax paid by landowners. But during the Rebellion, all of a sudden land was taken 
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back by landowners and tenants were driven away. These Chinese immigrants 
immediately lost their cultivating rights on the land for which they had already paid a 
lump-sum rental price in advance, which included, moreover, the additional tax 
charge for the whole agreed upon lease period. It is highly likely that this experience 
taught the Chinese immigrants a lesson so after the Rebellion, they only signed 
short-term zumai lease and they took the responsibility for paying land tax themselves 
and paid it to the government on a year to year basis. In this way, had there been 
another rebellion and the zumai contract broken again by the Uyghur landowners, 
their lost would be reduced effectively. On the other hand, when Chinese tenants took 
on the responsibility of paying land tax, the Uyghur landlords also avoided the risk of 
tax increases. 
Regular tenancy was widely practiced in Qing Xinjiang, not only between 
Uyghur tenants and Chinese ―landlords‖, but more often between Uyghur landlords 
and Uyghur tenants. Unlike regular tenancy, rental sale (zumai) only occurred 
between Uyghur landlords and Chinese tenants. As far as I know, zumai was not 
found practiced in other parts of China. In Turfan, no zumai contract was signed by 
two parties of the same ethnicity. The most remarkable difference between zumai and 
regular tenancy was that in zumai transactions the rent price of the whole leasing 
period was paid full in advance, and in cash, while a regular tenant only paid rent on 
an annual basis, in kind or in cash. Not even one zumai contract ever mentioned an 





Zumai transaction indicated a cautious relationship between the two trading 
parties. First of all, with the duration period specified and all rent pre-paid, the two 
parties did not have much space to change the terms and generate disputes. This is 
different from pledge sale, in which disputes often arose when the pledge holder tried 
to get the redemption earlier. On the other hand, zumai effectively prevented original 
landowners from evicting their lessees arbitrarily except when war broke out. Among 
Turfan archives concerning zumai, I find no case recording that a Uyghur landlord 
evicted his Chinese lessee before the agreed-upon rental period was over, except 
during the Muslim Rebellion when many Uyghur landlords simply seized the land 
after their Chinese lessees fled or died. Since all rent was pre-paid, this transaction 
was more like an ourright sale; both parties were not able to terminate it arbitrarily.  
Secondly, through zumai Uyghur landowners were able to acquire a sum of 
money and, in the meantime, reserved ownership of their properties. The use of rent 
deposits in the inland provinces was similar to this practice. In Sichuan, people used 
large rent deposits as a way to get capital out of the land to use for other purposes, 
while rents came in small amounts every year.
440
 The wide practice of zumai in 
Xinjiang indicates that most Xinjiang Uyghurs, even those badly in need of money, 
were not willing to lose their land permanently to Chinese immigrants. In the previous 
chapter, I have discussed that straight land sale was commonly practiced among 
Uyghurs. But Turfan archives show that Uyghur peasants seldom sold their land 
                                                 
440





unconditionally to Chinese. Even when the family was in really bad shape, they only 
renewed their zumai contracts with Chinese lessees. While some of such contracts 
exceeded 100 years, the land was in theory to be returned to their descendants. 
Moreover, the land was to be returned automatically when the zumai agreement was 
over, no matter how bad the landowner‘s financial situation was. This dramatically 
differed from the practice of conditional sales.  
Thirdly, the existence of so many zumai transactions also indicates the 
ambivalence of Chinese immigrants toward their life in this frontier area. On the one 
hand, they needed more autonomy in managing land and making a profit. On the 
other, they were not willing to invest in immovable assets, since most of them had no 
plan to spend the rest of their lives in Xinjiang. As Xinjiang Zhi Gao commented, 
―those coming from within the Pass (guan nei 關內) travel a long way (to Xinjiang), 
and mainly focus on making profit. They do not want to give up their asset in their 
hometown. They will go back to their hometown as soon as they save enough money 
(in Xinjiang). To purchase land or to bring up offspring here was beyond their 
consideration.‖441 Therefore, zumai was more suitable for them than regular purchase 
or tenancy.  
Pledge sale practiced in Turfan  
The Chinese farmers told the magistrate in the aforementioned 1880 court 
document that Uyghur landowners did not sell their land by conditional sale to 
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Chinese immigrants. However, I found that the term dian 典, or dianmai 典賣 was 
frequently used in Turfan contracts and court archives, both before and after the 
Rebellion. So, did the Chinese farmers tell the truth?  
The answer is yes. After scrutinizing all the Chinese legal archives, I found that 
in Turfan, dian or dianmai was actually used interchangeably with diandang 典當 or 
dang 當, which means simply ―to pledge‖. As we know, in neidi, conditional sale 
(dianmai) was a very important and widely practiced form of land sale. Contrary to 
the irrevocable sale (juemai 絕賣), the seller of the land reserved the right to redeem 
his land and/or ask for supplemental payment from the buyer when the land price 
increased (zhaotie 找帖). The original owners tried to make more profit from the sold 
land even after a very long time, which generated a lot of disputes. This was the 
reason that the Qing tried to limit the time during which land could be redeemed. In 
1753, a substitute was issued providing that if a contract was made more than 30 
years ago and did not specify redemption, even without including the words 
―irrevocable sale,‖ the property would be treated as irrevocable property and may not 
be redeemed.
442
    
As a unique Chinese practice, conditional sale was seldom established between 
a Uyghur party and a Chinese party in Xinjiang, although the term dianmai was 
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frequently used to indicate a pledge sale of land.
443
 I never found a case in which the 
pledgor tried to ask for a supplemental payment for the land he pledged out. When 
doing dianmai in the neidi, many Chinese sellers had no real intention to buy back the 
land, the reason for them to sign a contract of redeemable sale could simply be to 
reserve the right to make more profit when the land price increased. In Turfan, the 
Uyghurs who pledged their land really did not want to lose their land, especially to 
non-Muslims. When they claimed that they were going to redeem the land, they 
meant it. More so, they did not have the expectation of making more money from the 
land by threatening to redeem it.  
Pledge sale (diandang or dang) was widely practiced between Uyghurs and 
Chinese in Turfan. It was a transaction whereby land or another commodity was 
turned over to the party advancing funds, with the understanding that the original 
owner was allowed to buy back the property. In Xinjiang, dang bears some 
similarities to zumai. In both practices land was turned over to the party advancing 
funds, for that party to cultivate or put to other use, while zumai was for a specified 
period of time and dang not necessary. The most prominent difference between zumai 
and dang were as follows. In the former money was paid as rent and was not 
refundable. In the latter, money was given to the landlords as a loan and was 
refundable. Therefore, a typical dang agreement usually contained this phrase— ―the 
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land or other commodity would be redeemed upon the money‘s return (yin dao hui 
shu 銀到回贖)‖.444 Usually Turfan pledge sales did not have an agreed-upon time 
limit. Many transactions provided that as long as the original owner had enough 
money, he could redeem the land; if not, the party holding the land would maintain 
long-term control (you yin shu qu, wu yin chang zhong 有銀贖去，無銀常種).445  
Whenever their financial situation allowed, Uyghur pledgors tried to redeem 
their land immediately and court archives show that the duration period of this type of 
land sales in Turfan could be very short.  
In the spring of 1890, a Uyghur named Ruoziyasi pledged a vineyard to a Hui 
Chinese, Youbuer at a price of 700 hu
446
 of grape, which was 4.5 taels of silver. In 
the presence of a middleman, the two parties agreed that the land would be redeemed 
upon return of the price; otherwise Youbuer would manage the land continually. After 
only one year, Ruoziyasi had already saved enough money and returned to redeem the 
land.
447
 The market price of grapes that year had increased to 2 taels per 100 hu. So 
besides returning the 4.5 taels of redeemable price to Youbuer, Rouziyasi gave him 
9.5 more taels to redeem the vineyard. However, the pledge holder seemed to be 
unsatisfied with this profit, so he refused to return the land. In a separate case in 1886, 
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Uyghur Bayisi pledged his land to Wang Junqing for 15 taels of silver.
448
 The deal 
had no redemption deadline and the land was to be redeemed upon the money‘s return. 
The next year Bayisi began to redeem his land. He paid Wang a total amount of more 
than 30 taels but still could not redeem the land.  
It is regretful that no further documents about the above two cases were found. 
So we cannot know what happened next or if the magistrates intervened to make the 
holders of the pledge allow the redemption. What we do know is that both pledgors 
tried to redeem their land according to the current market price, instead of the original 
price. Even so, the Chinese pledge holders refused the immediate redemption. In both 
cases the original owners paid much more than the original price, but still failed to 
redeem the land successfully. It seems that these Chinese pledge holders either 
expected a more lucrative profit, or they regarded the pledge sale as a way to acquire 
manageable land, so that an immediate redemption was not welcomed.  
Another case was about a more complex situation, in which the pledgor asked 
the pledgee to reduce the interest of the loan (to return part of the usage right of the 
property). In 1887 a Uyghur, Akenmu, pledged his water (irrigation) right by karyz of 
4 days in summer and 6 days in autumn as well as a plot of land to a Chinese 
immigrant, Ma Huakui, for 150 taels of silver. They signed an agreement and 
promised that the land and water could be redeemed upon the return of money; 
otherwise the pledge holder would maintain long-term control (yin dao hui shu, wu 
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yin chang zhong 銀到回贖，無銀長種). Meanwhile, Akenmu worked on this land as 
Ma‘s tenant. After two years, through several middlemen, Akenmu asked Ma to 
return part of the usage rights for the irrigation water to him because he was 
desperately poor. At first Ma rejected this idea, but faced with the middlemen‘s 
repeated persuasion (zaisan wanyan shuohe 再三婉言說和), he finally conceded. In 
1890, Ma gave ―summer (irrigation) water‖ of one and a half days and ―autumn 
(irrigation) water‖ of two days back to Akenmu. Meanwhile, the remaining water 
rights and land was again sold to Ma to manage for a total of 18 years (mai nianxian 
shiba nian 賣年限十八年) at the price of 250 taels. Since 150 taels had already been 
paid, Ma paid Akenmu 100 more taels.  
Just as ―yin dao hui shu 銀到回贖‖ indicates a pledge sale, the phrase ―nian 
man jia xiao 年滿價銷‖, which means the payment would not be returned when the 
period is due, stood for zumai transactions. After the Muslim Rebellion, most zumai 
contracts used the latter phrase to assert that the rent paid by the lessee was not 
refundable.
449
 In the above case, Ma Huakui first purchased the land and water 
through a pledge sale, but after two years this transaction was changed into a zumai 
tenancy. Theoretically, since Akenmu was not able to redeem the property, Ma had 
the right to go on managing it. But in practice Ma paid 100 more taels to obtain the 
usage rights for a fixed period, which was 18 years.  
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In this pledge sale, the pledgee, Ma Huakui‘s right to manage the land and to 
have it irrigated by karyz for 4 or 6 days was actually the interest he acquired by 
lending the loan. When the pledgor, Akenmu asked him to ―return part of the usage 
rights of the irrigation water‖, he was actually asked for a reduction of interest. 
Akenmu was not able to redeem the property. He actually had no ground to make 
such a request. The only reason is that he was too impoverished and badly in need of 
more irrigation water. Although Ma Huakui said that he ―had no choice but to agree 
to return the irrigation rights‖, in fact he did not accept the reduction of the interest of 
the loan. In the end, the pledge sale was actually abolished and the two parties signed 
a new zumai contract. After paying 100 more taels, Ma Huakui gained a fixed time 
period to manage the land.  
The above three cases give us an impression that in Turfan a pledge sale without 
a time limit on redemption was less reliable to guarantee long-term tenure than zumai. 
Some Uyghur pledgors tried to redeem the land very soon. Meanwhile, In Turfan 
Chinese immigrants were usually living among a large number of Uyghur neighbors 
and they might feel a lot of pressure from the neighborhood, especially from local 
Uyghur elites. For example, in this case, Akenmu asked several Uyghur ―middlemen‖ 
to persuade Wang to ―return‖ some water to him. 
Some Chinese who purchased land from Uyghurs through zumai or dang did 
not cultivate the land themselves. The land (or vineyard) was cultivated by tenants (or 
sub-tenants), who were very likely to be local Uyghur peasants. This type of tenancy 





practiced in the neidi. The tenant was required to pay rent annually to the landowner, 
which was dramatically different from in the zumai transactions. It is common in 
Turfan for Chinese to acquire land through zumai or pledge sale and then lease the 
land to Uyghur peasants to actually farm. This annual rent could be paid either in cash 
or in kind.  
Actually to rent out the property one purchased by zumai could be quite 
lucrative. For instance, Wu Decai purchased through zumai a vineyard from a Uyghur 
at a price of 100 taels of silver for a period of 18 years. Meanwhile, the original 
Uyghur owner continued to manage this vineyard as his tenant. The annual rent Wu 
charged him was 30 taels, which means Wu could earn back his full investment 
within 4 years given no rent arrears. And the purchase price he paid in advance was 
still refundable.
450
 However, a Chinese ―newcomer‖ had to take risks to rent out his 
land to local Uyghurs, especially the original owner of the property, since a 
below-average harvest would easily cause a poor Uyghur peasant to fall into arrears, 
and leasing land to Uyghur tenants made the Chinese land renter subject to pressure 
from the Uyghur community.  
Turfan archives show that the original landowner had priority to cultivate the 
land he had pledged or leased out. For instance, in 1879 Hasenmu pledged his land to 
the Wan brothers. The property was said to be redeemable upon the return of money. 
For the first 6 to 7 years, the Wan brothers sub-leased the land to some unknown 
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tenants. Then in the eighth year, they leased it to a Uyghur tenant called Shawuti. The 
annual rent was 110 jin of cotton. Half a year later, the original owner, Hasenmu 
began to make trouble physically on the land and finally forced Shawuti to cease the 
tenancy with the Wans. Wanting to rent the land himself, Hasenmu promised to pay 
the same rent as Shawuti did. Finally the Wan brothers ―had no choice but to lease the 
land to him since he is the landowner‖. However, Hasenmu failed to pay the rent by 
the end of the first year and even brought a false claim against Wu brothers for seizing 
his land illegally (according to the archives). The magistrate later judged that the 
pledge sale was valid and Hasenmu should pay the rent.
451
 
This case shows that in Turfan the original landowner enjoyed a priority to be a 
tenant of the land he rented or pledged, although it is not a written rule. The priority 
does not seem to be absolute, since Hasenmu had to promise to pay an equal rent, but 
he did successfully forced the current owners into a new tenancy relationship with 
him, when they already had another tenant. Again, we saw a community pressure felt 
by Chinese immigrant here, local Uyghurs had their own way to make resistance and 
fight for their interests. By making trouble physically, Uyghur tenants (original 
landowners) were able to obstruct the arrangements of Chinese (conditional) 
landowners. 
The Wans paid Hasenmu a lump sum to zumai his land. Then they let Hasenmu 
farm it and pay them rent. This was not the only case in which the land‘s original 
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owner cultivated it as tenants.
452
 In these cases, Chinese immigrants did not cultivate 
the land themselves. They simply invested their capital in the land and received 
interest every year (Uyghur tenants‘ annual rent).  
In all, both zumai and dang transactions between Uyghurs and Chinese involved 
a large amount of money, which shows that Chinese immigrants often came with 
capital. In Turfan, they played a role similar to moneylenders. Through both kinds of 
transactions they acquired arable land from Uyghur peasants. By managing the land 
themselves or by leasing the land out (often to the original owner), they were able to 
gain annual income. 
To Chinese investors, dang was both more lucrative and unstable than zumai. 
Zumai could better guarantee Chinese purchasers‘ use right of land for a longer time. 
On the other side, to Uyghur ―land providers‖, dang seems to imply a worse financial 
situation than zumai, since they might lose their land if they were not able to buy back 
it. This could explain why in Akenmu‘s case, when he was not able to redeem his 
land, he managed to replace the original pledge sale by a new rental sale.  
To Uyghurs, both zumai and dang were means by which they could acquire a 
large source of cash immediately. But why were they so badly in need of money? 
Turfan ting documents show no clues indicating that Uyghurs invested the money 
they made from zumai or dang in any type of business. They either put the money into 
some nonliquid forms of wealth, or were really impoverished.  
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After the establishment of Xinjiang province, the state tried to ease Uyghur 
peasants‘ tax burden by reforming the tax system. It was said that from then on tax 
was calculated in Xinjiang based on the acreage of the land and no meltage fee (hao
耗 or huohao 火耗 or haoxian 耗羨) was levied.453 However, due to the corruption 
of local level officials (both Chinese and Uyghur) as well as the deteriorating fiscal 
situation of the government (both central and local), Xinjiang Uyghurs actually still 
suffered from various kinds of regional taxes, corvees, and other illegal charges 
besides the ―regular taxes‖ (zhengxiang 正項) levied by the state.454 Many Uyghur 
smallholders were vulnerable. In the spring they were already in need of money to 
pay the land tax and by the autumn they were again left without resources after 
repaying their debts.
455
 As we have noticed in some Turfan cases, entangled in a web 
of debts, some Uyghur peasants had to renew their zumai contract with the Chinese 
tenant repeatedly through the help of middlemen. Moreover, as I have already 
mentioned, the reason some Uyghurs sold their land to a Chinese through zumai or 
dang was because they were in debt to him. Therefore, in Turfan zumai and dang 
displays a relationship of dependency based on economic inequality.  
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Economic Conflicts between Uyghurs and Chinese 
Lawsuits about zumai after the establishment of province 
Several Western observers noticed that in late Qing Xinjiang the ethno-religious 
boundaries between Chinese (both Han and Hui) and Uyghurs were carefully 
maintained and, in bazaars and other public places, the two groups of people had only 
very limited superficial contact and deep distrust toward each other at the bottom of 
their hearts.
456
 Local Chinese archives also show that except for necessary economic 
transactions, Chinese immigrants and Xinjiang Uyghurs had their separate social 
spheres. Very few examples of intermarriage between Han and Uyghur (or Hui and 
Uyghur) have been found. Among criminal cases, I did find one or two concerning 
sexual relations between a Uyghur and a Chinese, but even those entailed economic 
transactions — the purchase of sex.  
Despite the clearly maintained ethno-religious boundaries and an underlying 
feeling of ―distrust,‖ Chinese and Uyghurs were engaged in various economic 
transactions with each other, such as the trade of land and real estate, as well as 
money lending.  
Although both Chinese and Uyghurs tried their best to avoid disputes when 
trading with each other, a dramatic historical break – during the Muslim Rebellion 
and the Emirate established by Yaqub Beg from 1864 to 1877 – caused many land 
disputes once the Qing reconquered this area. Among the Turfan ting archives, a large 
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number of civil disputes from the early Guangxu reign were about the seizure of Han 
or Hui lands by Uyghur inhabitants during the Rebellion and Yaqub‘s reign. During 
the Rebellion and Eastern Turkestan‘s decade of independence from the Qing, most 
Chinese living in Turfan were ousted or killed. Their lands, which were usually 
acquired through zumai, were repossessed by the original Uyghur landlords, but it 
was also possible they were occupied by Uyghur sub-tenants
457
. After the turmoil and 
the reconquest, Chinese survivors came back and the first thing they did was to 
reclaim their land rights. Aggrieved parties had to bring their case to the magistrate‘s 
court. That is why we see in Turfan ting archives that the court handled large numbers 
of civil disputes of this type around the 1880s.  
Due to the regulation of Xinjiang Archives，I was only able to read and copy 
forty seven cases of type (which were randomly chosen). Unfortunately, among them 
many were only petitions or did not mention the result of the dispute. Cases in Table 2 
were those with the result recorded.  









n to be paid 
by Uyghur 
landlord 
Land went to Dispute 
resolved 
by 
15-4-14 42 7 60 taels of 
silver 
Uyghur landlord Court 
mediation 
15-4-14 48 10 70 taels of 
silver 
Uyghur landlord Court 
mediation 
15-4-40 30 4 10 taels of 
silver 
Uyghur landlord Court 
mediation 
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15-4-69 Unknown 6 None Confiscated by the 
government (because 




15-4-88 32 4 None Chinese lessee (for him 
to cultivate until the 





40 8 150 taels of 
silver 




107 2 250 taels of 
silver 




Unknown Unknown None Chinese lessee (for him 
to cultivate until the 





Unknown Unknown None Chinese lessee (for him 
to cultivate until the 





Unknown Unknown None Chinese lessee (for him 
to cultivate until the 




Of the above 9 cases for which we have a clear magistrate‘s decision or result, it 
seems that the usually ruling was that the land be returned to the original landlords, as 
long as they paid monetary compensation to the lessees. The only exceptional case 
was recorded in Archive 15-4-88 but this case is somewhat complicated and unique.  
In 1862 a Chinese tenant, He Quan, rented a vineyard from a Uyghur, Shawuti, 
through zumai. After one year He sublet the garden to two other Chinese, Zhang and 
Wu, and then left for another place to make further investments. In the course of this 
time, the Rebellion took place and He was killed in the chaos. After the Rebellion, 
before He Quan‘s younger brother He Yuan went to the magistrate to seek justice on 
behalf of his widowed sister-in-law, one of the subtenants, the late Mr. Wu‘s widow, 





cultivate the garden. When He Yuan brought this case to the court, the magistrate 
decided that He Quan‘s wife could cultivate the land for a certain period after Wu 
Shi‘s tenure of cultivation was over (document is in very bad shape and the characters 
are hard to see). Interestingly, the magistrate stated that he had originally meant to 
award the garden to its original owner (Shawuti) and let him pay compensation to the 
lessee. However, since Shawuti had already made an arrangement with Wu Shi, 
which indicates that ―Shawuti may have purposes (other than keeping the vineyard 
under his own management) (huo lingyou ta tu 或另有他圖),‖ he made this very 
decision to let Mrs. He manage the garden.   
Therefore, all these cases, including the above one indicate that to uphold the 
landlord‘s ownership of the property was an underlying principle for Chinese 
magistrates to resolve this type of land disputes. If Chinese tenants who had lost their 
tenure during the Rebellion went to the magistrate‘s court, they could most likely only 
get part of the rent price back. They stood a better chance to regain their cultivation 
rights through private negotiation with the Uyghur landowners.  
Why did the magistrates not follow the contracts and order that the land be 
managed by Chinese zumai tenants until the original agreed-upon zumai period was 
over? It seems to me the fundamental reason lies in the state‘s overriding policy 
decision to make sure that indigenous landowners still got land to cultivate during the 
process of gaitu guiliu so that the frontier society could continue to be stable. In 
addition, since Han/Hui—Uyghur relations had been badly jeopardized during the 





at the court might cause more troubles. Moreover, it was probably easier to enforce 
the judgment of monetary compensation than to force the unwilling Uyghur landlords 
to leave the land. 
At the same time, a bias inherent in the Chinese land tenure system can also 
explain the decisions of Xinjiang magistrates. As Madeleine Zelin noted in her study 
of Baxian land tenure disputes, a tenancy contract in itself did not offer security of 
tenure.
458
 As long as the property owners paid taxes to the state, their claim to 
ownership was always recognized and protected. That is probably because ownership 
right represented a relationship between an individual and the state, while tenure 
rights existed between two private parties. As we know in other parts of China, a 
landlord could relet his land to another party whenever the current tenant was in 
arrears.
459
 A landlord could easily evict the current tenant as long as he returned the 
rent deposit.
460
 In Baxian, it is infrequent that tenants attempted to have evictions 
overturned and it is even more infrequent that such a claim was upheld by the 
magistrate. The Xinjiang magistrate‘s judgment on disputed land of zumai tenancy 
also followed the principle of giving priority to ownership rights. As the tenancy 
contracts promised the tenant the refund of his deposit but did not guarantee security 
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of tenure in inland China,
461
 Xinjiang magistrates simply ordered a proper amount of 
rent price be returned to the Chinese zumai tenants.  
Legal cases show that Chinese magistrates followed the same rule when dealing 
with cases of pledge sale. In Turfan, a Uyghur, Shawuer pledged his land to Wu 
Decai at a price of 100 taels of silver. After two years, Shawuer sued Wu at the 
magistrate‘s court saying that he only paid him 38 taels. Wu explained that this was 
because Shawuer‘s younger brother owed him a debt. Finally the magistrate ruled that 
Wu should return the land to Shawuer, Shawuer should return the price he had already 
received and his brother had to pay his debt immediately.
462
 Again, in this case the 
magistrate was eager to protect the original owner‘s land rights first.  
In general, Chinese magistrates‘ decisions on economic disputes between 
Han/Hui and Uyghurs seem to be practical and impartial. Their attitudes were not 
influenced by the two parties‘ ethnicities. To restore the normal social order and 
resume economic production in Xinjiang were their ultimate goals. The late Qing 
central government, standing behind these magistrates, does not appear to have had 
any intention to take ―revenge‖ against indigenous Uyghurs who were once subject to 
another regime. Moreover, although following the Manchu restoration in the wake of 
the Yaqub episode, Han officials replaced Mongol and Manchu officials in most of 
the administrative positions of Xinjiang, local official materials do not give us the 
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impression that Chinese magistrates showed partiality toward Han immigrants when 
handling their economic disputes with native groups. The attitudes of these new Han 
ambans toward disputes between Han and non-Han commoners were not very 
different from their Manchu or Mongol predecessors.  
After the Qing restoration, the region continued to retain a relatively large 
degree of autonomy. A more extreme case shows that even some of those who had 
served the Yaqub regime as lower-ranking officials were not punished and by and 
large kept their privileges and positions.  
In 1875 a Han Chinese widow, Qizhang Shi, filed a petition in order to get back 
a karyz her late husband had built. She told the magistrate that in 1847 her husband 
and Sun Zhong together built the karyz and had been paying land tax on it ever since. 
During the Rebellion, both her family and Sun‘s were persecuted by two ―evil 
Uyghurs,‖ Luozibahai, a yuziboshi 魚子伯什463 at that time, and Adier, who was 
known by Uyghurs as ―asibangban 阿斯幫辦‖464. The two were alleged to have 
killed more than ten persons of Qi‘s and Sun‘s households, seized all their wealth as 
well as the karyz, and shared them between themselves. ―This was known by every 
Han and Uyghur living in Turfan, and the record that many people sued them could 
be found in government archives.‖ However, since Adier was now the xiangyue of the 
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county and Luozibahai the yuzbasi, ―their money can get round all obstacles (qian 
tong ge lu 錢通各路)‖, she had no alternative but to seek help from the magistrate.465  
At the end of Qizhang Shi‘s petition, the magistrate wrote his decision in red ink: 
―It has been found out that the karyz had been sold by the Shanhouju as property left 
without an inheritor (juechan 絕產).‖ If this is true, meaning that the karyz had been 
confiscated by the Shanhouju, then why did the old woman have no idea of this?  
Why did she not go to the Shanhouju to claim her property before it was sold to others? 
No more materials exist to answer this question. The only thing we know is that she 
lost the karyz during the Yaqub period and was unable to take it back after the Qing 
restoration. Moreover, in his comments the magistrate did not say a word about 
Luozibahai and Adier‘s criminal offences accused by Qizhang Shi. He did not 
promised to punish them, neither did he declared this was false accusasion. 
If what Qizhang Shi said was true, the two lower-ranking indigenous Uyghur 
were hardly influenced by the alteration of regimes. Through theYaqub reign to the 
Qing reconquest, despite slight changes to their official titles, the actual power and 
privileges they held in local society largely remained the same. Although they killed 
many Chinese during the Yaqub period and were sued after the restoration by many 
people (zhong kong yi deng 眾控伊等), the Qing rulers chose to let bygones be 
bygones and they had no intention to thoroughly investigated what happened during 
the chaos. It seems that these new Chinese magistrates only did the minimum they 
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had to do to restore local order and the economy. They had to start the agricultural 
production in this area as soon as possible, so they carefully handled civil cases 
related to the local economy, especially those relevant to land rights. More so, the 
indigenous administrative hierarchy was still useful for Qing governance in Xinjiang 
since the principle of non-interference of local practices still by and large persisted. 
Therefore, Luozibahai and Adier did not need to pay the price for what they had done 
during the period of turmoil.  
 
Cases about moneylending  
When discussing the land transactions between Uyghur indigenes and Chinese 
immigrants, I have mentioned that both zumai and dang indicate that the Chinese 
immigrants often came to Turfan with capital. The role they played in these 
transactions was very much like moneylender. In addition to their participation in land 
transactions Chinese also lent money to Uyghurs directly and extracted very high 
interest. Since the lending of money for interests (riba) was prohibited by Qur‘an, 
Chinese were able to fill a large gap in the economic landscape that was barred to 
indigenous Muslims. 
James Millward suggests that during the first century of Qing rule in Xinjiang, 
Chinese merchants had been active in the business of moneylending and this could be 
a source of ethnic conflict.
466
 Chinese materials dating after the 1880s indicate that 
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this situation continued after the re-conquest, although the Chinese held no monopoly 
over this trade.
467
 It was very common for Xinjiang Uyghurs to use the services of 
Chinese moneylenders. I found several civil disputes submitted to Chinese 
magistrates concerning Chinese who loaned money to Uyghurs at high interest 
rates.
468
 Two cases record specifically that the Chinese moneylenders charged 
Uyghurs an interest rate of 6 percent per year, rates which according to the magistrate, 
even violated Chinese law. As he noted ―there is a rule that the interest on private 
loans cannot surpass 3 percent and the total interest can never surpass the principal.‖ 
Here he was citing Article 149 in the ―Laws relating to the Board of Revenue‖ (hulu 
戶律) of the Great Qing Code.469  
However, in practice few usurious moneylenders were reported and punished. 
According to a memorial submitted to the Guangxu Emperor in 1892 by Xinjiang 
governor, Tao Mo, there existed a lot of Chinese usurious moneylenders in Southern 
Xinjiang and this caused serious inter-ethnic conflicts. 
Please allow us to punish those Chinese who exploit Uyghurs by 
lending money to them at heavy interest according to the regulation of 
inland civilian offenses of transacting with and lending money to 
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ethnic people…Uyghurs are too stupid (yu 愚 ) to calculate 
(interest)…Those moneylenders are all outrageous ruffians. They are 
retired soldiers or former yamen scribes (ding shu 丁書), who bully 
the poor and the fool deliberately. In the meanwhile, the runners 
(dingyi 丁役) and translators (tongshi 通事) of each yamen also 
make profits out of this and cover for one another. In 1890 a group of 
Turfan Uyghurs led by Abudu Reyimu attacked Chinese exclusively 
and burned their houses and caused 36 deaths. This incident was also 
caused by the long accumulated rancor between moneylenders and 
borrowers…According to the legal code, inland civilian were 
prohibited to communicate with or lend money to ethinic people (neidi 
minren gai buxu yu tusi deng jiaowang jiezhai 內地民人概不許與土
司等交往借債), The offenders should be punished as those who 
secretly cross the national border (touyue fanjing 偷越番境), and the 
native Miao people who borrowed money (from Chinese) should be 
punished in the same way.
470
  
The emperor replied to this memorial: ―the situation of Southern Xinjiang 
Uyghurs is similar to that of the native Miao (tumiao 土苗). It is reasonable to handle 
(them) in a similar way.‖ 471 
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The incident mentioned by Governor Tao Mo was also called the Yanghai 
Incident (named after the village where it took place) in Chinese archives. In the 
Turfan area it was the most elaborate and tragic inter-ethnic conflict that happened 
after the Qing reconquest. The story was told in several other documents, according to 
which the two leaders of the armed attack, Abudu Reyimu and Maimaiti Reyimu, 
were both ―notorious bandits‖ (zhuming guan zei 著名慣賊). In 1889 a Chinese 
xiangyue named Xu and a merchant named Zhao had asked the Turfan ting to oust 
them, after which Abudu and Maimaitiled rioted and killed many Chinese including 
the Xu family out of revenge.
472
 The 26 Uyghur ―bandits‖ were finally caught by 
Qing troops and Uyghur Jasak Mamute. They were sentenced to death by slow slicing 
in public, charged with the crime of treason (panni 叛逆).473  
Tao Mo‘s memorial to the emperor, however, seems to be the only material that 
associates this inter-group violence with Chinese moneylenders. Apparently Tao did 
not want to conceal the sharp inter-ethnic hostility from the emperor. He especially 
condemned the retired soldiers, yamen runners, scribes as well as translators 
(including both Chinese and Uyghurs), who were notorious for abusing their power 
and bullying the poor locals for profit. It is widely known that many Chinese 
merchants who were doing retail commerce also engaged in money lending, but Tao 
did not explain how these minor officials and retired soldiers who did not hold high 
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positions with good salaries were able to loan out large amounts of money to the poor 
Uyghurs. James Millward‘s finding might help us to understand this situation. 
According to him, local bureaucrats in Xinjiang became involved in usury by loaning 
money from the public money bureaus at a relatively low interest to rich merchants, 
who re-loaned this money to pawnbrokers or to the poor directly at very high interest 
rates.
474
 The people who were involved in usury and ―bullied the poor and the foolish‖ 
might have been a far larger group of bureaucrats or semi-bureaucrats than those 
condemned by Tao Mo before the emperor.  
Contracts and the role played by the state  
The Yanghai Incident indicates the severity of inter-ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang 
that could be the result of economic disputes in activities such as money lending. 
However, the hostility and distrust between Chinese and Uyghurs did not prevent the 
two groups from entering into various forms of contractual relations. 
In Kinship, Contract, Community, and State, Myron Cohen introduces the 
―overwhelming‖ use of ―white contracts‖ (contracts not registered with the county 
government) in contrast to a small minority of ―red contracts‖ (contracts registered 
with the county government) in Minong, Taiwan, whose residents also rarely turned 
to the court of law to resolve their economic disputes. These facts indicate that 
―recourse to the state in the protection of contractual agreements was powerfully 
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subordinate to reliance on social ties‖ and the contractual documents of Minong were 
―far more social than legal‖.475  
At variance with Cohen‘s observation in Minong, I found that red contracts 
played an important role in Xinjiang dwellers‘ economic transactions. In Xinjiang, the 
red contracts kept in the Turfan ting archives or mentioned in other legal documents 
seem to be more than ―a small minority‖ compared to the number of white contracts. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed Uyghurs who were willing to have their contracts 
registered by the Chinese county government. As for the contracts signed between a 
Uyghur party and a Chinese party, red contracts also existed widely.   
Among my findings at the Turfan ting archives was a list of all contracts of 
land-related transactions which were taxed and registered by the Turfan ting 
government office in the first ten months of Guangxu 15 (1889). As in the neidi, after 
collecting the tax, the government would affix a tag, called a ―contract tail‖ (qiwei 契
尾), to each contract in order to show official recognition and protection of the 
property transaction.. There were a total of 139 entries in this list, among which about 
60 contracts were signed between two Uyghur parties; about 47 between a Uyghur 
party and a Chinese party; and the rest were mostly signed by two Chinese parties.
476
 
All contracts recorded in this list were on their face red contracts. Another archive 
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entry recorded that the outgoing Turfan ting magistrate, Master Zhang, passed on 299 
contract tags to his successor, Master Fu. It was said that when Zhang assumed his 
new position, he accepted 439 tags from his predecessor, and issued 140 tags during 
his whole tenure.
477
 The Master Zhang mentioned in this archive refers to Zhang 
Qiyu, who had been a Turfan ting magistrate for about 14 months, from the tenth 
month of Guangxu 14 (1888) to the first month of Guangxu 16 (1890).
478
 
When Xinjiang first became a province, the Qing central government required 
the registration of all irrevocable sales of land or other real estate with the local 
government office and the payment of tax within one year. Conditional sales longer 
than 10 years were also to be registered and taxed. In 1735, this policy was adjusted 
such that conditional sales no longer needed to be registered.
479
 As discussed above, 
when Chinese immigrants arrived in Xinjiang to make a living, a large percentage of 
them would choose to rent (zumai) land from Uyghurs for a specified period. 
Although we do not have precise data quantifying the annual influx of Chinese 
immigrants in Turfan, the area of land they purchased from local Uyghurs, or the 
number of Uyghurs who bought land from Chinese owners, the above two archives 
about contract tags do give us a sense that when Chinese and Uyghurs made 
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unconditional land sales with each other, many of them were willing to pay the 
transaction tax and officially register their contracts in order to receive state protection 
over their property rights.  
In the aforementioned ―taxed contracts list‖ (qishui hao bu 契稅號簿) which 
was apparently drawn up annually by the local government, a brief note was taken for 
every single registered transaction, including the name of the transacting parties, the 
place and type of land or real estate in question, the agreed rent/ price, as well as the 
name of the guarantor, which was usually the xiangyue. This record, though very brief, 
contained the most important information about the sale and thus was a powerful 
proof of one‘s property rights. It could be useful for replacing lost contracts, 
clarifying ambiguities, or identifying a forged contract. This might partly explain the 
low frequency of disputed irrevocable land sales found in the Turfan ting court 
archives.  
Besides irrevocable sales, many more land-related transactions between a 
Uyghur party and a Chinese party were pledge sales or zumai tenancy. Also, disputes 
about the latter two types constituted the majority of the Turfan ting magistrate‘s civil 
caseload. As we have seen, in order to protect their property rights when making these 
kinds of transactions, Chinese and Uyghurs often wrote and signed a bilingual 
contract with each other. Among these contracts signed by parties of different 
ethnicities, more than half are bilingual, typically with the agreement (between 
Uigher-Chinese parties) rendered in Chagatai on the left side of the document and in 





and Chagatai on separate slips of paper by local legal professionals, then pasted 
side-by-side onto a single bilingual contract.
480
 In some cases when the two parts 
would be written on one piece of paper and there was no space for the signatories to 
sign their names in Chinese on the Chinese side, they often signed on the left side 
beneath the Uyghur contract.
481
 Signatories usually wrote and signed two copies of a 
bilingual contract and each would be kept by one party to the transaction. This rule of 
―each carries one copy of the contract‖ (ge zhi hetong yizhang 各執合同一張) would 
even be written clearly in the middle of the bilingual contract.
482
 As with regular 
Chinese contracts, the middlemen and amanuensis all needed to sign the contract and 
the executors had to put their fingerprints on it. The Uyghur part of a bilingual 
contract would sometimes be affixed with akhunds‘ maor seals,483 but for the most 
part these were not included.  
Certainly when describing the same transaction, the content of the two parts 
written in different languages in a bilingual contract should be the same. But on 
occasions one or two details were recorded differently, which could lead to serious 
disputes. When there was such a mistake, the executors would have to go to the 
magistrate‘s court to seek for arbitration.  
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Before the Muslim Rebellion, four Uyghur brothers – Maimaitieling, 
Maimaiyasi, Shawuti, and Ailibahai – sold (zumai) a garden containing 430 
grapevines to a Chinese man, Yang Shuji, for an unmentioned period. When the 
Rebellion broke out, Yang escaped to the South. In 1878 Yang returned to reclaim his 
property. The four Uyghurs restored Yang‘s cultivation rights on the garden for a 
period of 30 years. Subsequently, Yang and his son, Shouren, bought additional 
cultivation rights in three contracts totaling 25 years from Maimaitieling, Shawuti and 
Aiyibahai. In this way Yang and his son were allowed to manage the garden from 
1878 to 1933 (a total of 55 years). In 1903, Maimaiyasi brought a lawsuit to the 
Turfan ting magistrate, Master Liu, because he thought the 30-year contract had some 
problems and it was unfair for him to be excluded from the additional 25-year 
transaction. When Master Liu investigated the old contracts, he found that in the first 
30-year zumai transaction, the Chinese contract differed from the Uyghur one. The 
former contract stipulated that the buyers and the sellers agreed to collectively 
cultivate (huozhong 夥種) the vineyard in the first year but responsibility for the 
remaining 29 years fell solely on the buyers, while the latter contract provided that 
both parties should collectively cultivate the grapes for the entire 30 years. The 
magistrate then ordered that the 30-year zumai contract be reduced to 15 years and 
cultivation rights given to the Yangs. As a consequence, the total period that the 
Yangs could manage the garden shrank to 40 years.  
However, Maimaiyasi was not satisfied with the judgment. The following year 





court. The new magistrate, Master Fang, checked the brothers‘ family division 
document and found that Maimaiyasi acquired 87 grapevines from the garden 
concerned. He then ordered Yang Shouren to set aside 87 grapevines from the 
vineyard for Mamaiyasi to cultivate and, as compensation for Yang, the three Uyghur 
brothers were to extend 5 more years of cultivation rights to Yang for free.  
Again, Maimaiyasi did not accept the judgment. He sued Yang Shouren for 
occupying one of his houses built in the vineyard in question. Master Fang then asked 
Yang to return the house to Maimaiyasi. But Yang refused because ―(if we) live 
together in one garden, there will surely be conflicts‖. So the magistrate ordered that 
Yang should pay Maimaiyasi 60 taels of silver as rent for the house for 20 years. 
Additionally, the three Uyghur brothers should give Yang one more year to manage 
the vineyard as compensation.  
For the third time, Maimaiyasi rejected the magistrate‘s judgment and sued 
again because he thought the 87 grapevines Yang returned to him were not good 
enough. This time, the magistrate scolded Maimaiyasi for being ―a vexatious litigant 
and extremely greedy‖ (diao jiao chan song, tan de wu yan 刁狡纏訟，貪得無厭). 
But after the mediation and persuasion of two Chinese neighbors and two akhunds, 
Yang agreed to return 4 more grapevines to Maimaiyasi, who finally accepted this 
arrangement. New Chinese and Uyghur maor contracts were signed under the 
supervision of these neighbors and akhunds.  Each party would keep one copy of the 
final (bilingual) contract, and one more copy was to be saved by the court as a 





It is worth noting that the complex story recounted above was all based on the 
content of the aforementioned final contract. It was common practice in Qing China 
for the whole process of a prolonged civil case and the magistrates‘ decisions to be 
memorialized in a contract. 
At first sight, it seems to be quite understandable for Maimaiyasi to bring the 
case to court because the difference in the terms of the bilingual contracts did exist. 
However, after a close reading of the documents, we discover that Maimaiyasi filed 
his petition quite late — after the contract had been in effect for 22 years. Why did he 
not raise an objection at the beginning of the second year of the zumai tenancy, when 
the Yang family began to cultivate the garden by themselves? Moreover, why did the 
other three Uyghur brothers not try to correct the possibly ―false‖ arrangement in 
order to manage the garden together with the Yangs?  
Unfortunately from the data now available it is impossible to figure out which 
contract recorded the ―true‖ agreement made by the two parties in 1878. All previous 
outdated contracts were destroyed as was customary upon the conclusion of the case 
and the new, final contract was signed in 1904. Since all four Uyghurs did not object 
to the actual arrangement until 22 years later, it seems to be more possible that the 
two sides did agree to cultivate together for only the first year when they made the 
deal. Few zumai contracts stipulated co-cultivation by buyers and sellers, and the 
Uyghur contract might be wrong but had gone unnoticed by the executors. Certainly 
there could be more complex possibilities and explanations. Nonetheless, what we do 





bilingual contracts, resulting in executors turning to the court of law in an attempt to 
overthrow the current arrangement even if it was in accordance with what they had 
agreed upon at the very beginning. As long as incosistencies existed in authentic 
signed and witnessed contracts, the magistrate had to take action. In this case, the 
Chinese magistrate certified the authenticity of the original contracts and made sure 
the differences did exist, after which he simply altered the zumai arrangement, from 
what the Chinese contract suggested into that of the Uyghur one. It seems that for 
both Chinese magistrates Liu and Fang, a contract drawn up properly naturally 
became a valid proof of property rights, regardless of whether it expressed the original 
agreement made by every party before it was written on paper.  
Maimaiyasi was obviously good at using every kind of written understanding to 
protect his interests. Besides the Uyghur contract of zumai arrangement signed with 
Yang Shuji, the family division contract signed by the four Uyghur brothers was also 
used by Maimaiyasi twice to claim his property rights over the vineyard. By using the 
fendan 分單 the first time he successfully acquired his cultivation rights of 87 
grapevines from the magistrate; the second time he confirmed his ownership of that 
old house and managed to receive rent from Yang. All the three times, the Chinese 
magistrates tried to enforce the authentic Uyghur contracts unreservedly.  
The court did not reject Maimaiyasi‘s lawsuit until the fourth time, when his 
appeal had no support from any written agreement and Master Fang finally berated 
him for being a “vexatious litigant”. This time, the local authorities, such as Uyghur 





finalize the dispute with a new bilingual contract. The akhunds affixed more than five 
maor marks on the contract. Again, this case shows not only the close cooperation 
between Chinese yamen and Uyghur religious courts but also the important role the 
latter played in mediating inter-ethnic civil disputes during the last several years of 
the Qing dynasty.  
Also, in this case as in many others, Xinjiang commoners, such as Maimaiyasi, 
showed a dramatic proficiency in making use of official legal services to fight for 
their own interests. Every time Maimaiyasi felt he was wronged, he went directly to 
court, first to the prefecture court, then the Qing provincial government.  
In sum, besides revealing a lot of other meaningful information, this case 
eloquently shows how useful a valid contract could be to protect one‘s property rights. 
It confirms Madeleine Zelin‘s argument that in prewar China the written contract was 
the main source of property rights.
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I have discussed the important roles played by contracts in both Uyghur and 
Chinese legal contexts in previous parts of this dissertation. Now we noticed that 
besides drawing contracts in their mother language, many Xinjiang dwellers also 
managed to draw contracts in foreign languages when dealing with people from 
different ethnicities.  
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Ever since the 1759 conquest, the Qing‘s imperial control in Eastern Turkestan 
was hardly steady. Lots of uprisings, crises, and invasions happened in this place. The 
1860 Muslim Rebellion finally led to the establishment of an Islamic regime and the 
Qing had to reconquer this area in the 1880s. Due to this political instability, for 
Xinjiang dwellers the safer way to play the game was to make their written 
documents of transactions acceptable by both Qing and Islamic authorities, so that no 
matter which side ruled the area, their transactions could always be protected. This 
can explain why many Chinese immigrants were willing to have their economic 
transactions endorsed by Uyghur religious authority by signing and keeping Chagatai 
contracts, though they did not pay any attention to the Uyghur legal system or social 
customs in other aspects of their social life. In extreme cases, they even signed only 
Chagatai contracts. For instance, during the Muslim Rebellion, a Hui Chinese, Jin 
Nongguan, sold his land to a Uyghur and signed only a Uyghur contract (chanyue 纏
約) with him before escaping.485    
When talking about the use of written contractual documents in Minong, 
Taiwan, Myron Cohen suggests that contracts in Minong were more social than legal 
in nature, as their legitimacy was established first and foremost through the 
participation of social intimates, and protected by social connections.
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Ocko discusses further that there could be two types of contracts practiced in two 
                                                 
485 XJA 15-7-2499 





types of societies — those contracts guaranteed by state adjudication and enforcement 
as well as those signed in a self-regulating community. The examples of the latter 
include a guild or a native place association that generated mutually beneficial trust 
over time. Moreover, the transaction cost of this society could also be high, because 
people had to make investments to maintain the trusted relationship through the 
exchange of gifts, information, meals, and perhaps marriages.
487
  
These two historians‘ findings provide us a meaningful perspective to observe 
the economic exchanges carried out by Chinese and Uyghurs in late Qing Xinjiang. 
My previous discussions show that there were some dramatic differences between the 
practice of land-related transactions in Xinjiang and that of many other places in 
China. These differences include very frequent usage of red contracts, widely 
practiced bilingual contracts, and the Xinjiang dweller‘s proficiency in protecting 
their property rights by seeking justice from official (legal) institutions. These give us 
an impression that the contracts found in Xinjiang were more legal-oriented. In my 
opinion, it is precisely because people of different ethnic communities could not rely 
on the social mechanism to enforce their agreements  
In most places in Qing China, lineages and guilds existed widely and they had a 
long history of providing the ―matrix and infrastructure‖ for economic exchange and 
generating mutually beneficial trust. Therefore it was usually enough for people 
within such a community to simply sign a contract to protect their interest, as long as 
                                                 





it was according to the customs of the area and witnessed by proper individuals, such 
as lineage heads or guild leaders. However, in the young multi-ethnic Xinjiang 
society, most Chinese immigrants (including merchants and peasants) came and made 
a living by themselves; there were no such things as guilds, or lineage or other 
native-place associations. Furthermore, distrust and even hostility between Uyghurs 
and Chinese was prominent in this area. As an aforementioned case in this chapter 
shows, Han and Hui Chinese immigrants did not believe that they would be treated 
fairly by the Uyghur xiangyue.
488
 
In such circumstances, being under the protection of the state became crucial for 
contractual agreements between people of different ethnicities. Xinjiang residents 
were aware that their disputes over contracts were highly likely to be brought to trial 
and resolved in court. They had to make all kinds of preparations in advance, 
especially to have their contracts officially registered and endorsed. Certainly they 
could go for local mediation first, but since Chinese and Uyghur communities operate 
in separate spheres, it was hard to find a neutral authority to handle their cases. So it is 
understandable that there were so many commoners bringing their disputes directly to 
court. Things would become much easier if the magistrate sent the case back for local 
mediation, because in that case, both Chinese and Uyghur village authorities would 
have to sit together to resolve the dispute on behalf of the magistrate. In this situation, 
a bilingual contract that could be understood and accepted by local legal elites as valid 
                                                 





proof was necessary. Moreover, the fact that red contracts and bilingual contracts 
were widely signed in Turfan indicates that people living there had strong 
expectations for enforcement of the contract by the state.  
In all, in the frontier society of Xinjiang, where the social links between 
different ethnicities were extremely weak, the state played a very important role in 
making and enforcing the economic rules of property rights. Lack of mutual trust 
among people made the state adjudication and enforcement of contracts more 







Many scholars have drawn attention to the inheritance by the modern Chinese 
state of its vast frontier territories from the Manchu Qing empire. The role of the Qing 
in the history of China‘s northern and western frontiers is of unique significance and 
importance not only because the CCP has built on the imperial acquisitions of the 
Manchus, but also because it was the Qing who initiated civil administration in these 
frontiers. With these initiatives, the Qing endeavored to transform the traditional 
Chinese system of tributary relations and ―loose rein‖ policies into a new system of 
administrative governance. It is these major changes that occurred in the second half 
of the Qing dynasty that are the subject of this study, covering the period when 
Xinjiang was lost and recovered. It is a period that includes both the end of a 
―glorious‖ imperial history and the start of a ―nationalist‖ era, and that also saw the 
start of the central regime‘s formal governance of the vast northwestern frontier. Ever 
since the 1830s, the scholars of statecraft in China had been promoting the idea of 
turning Xinjiang into a province. The province was indeed established in 1884; 
however, by the end of the dynasty it was still quite different from a regular neidi 
province.  
In terms of administrative institutions, it has been the Communist party which 
has largely accomplished this ―unifying‖ mission. Intriguingly, today‘s Xinjiang is 
still not called a ―province‖ and the government shows no intention of doing so. As 





autonomous regions and indeed of all administrative divisions of China. It has been 
granted autonomy, presumably an acknowledgement to its relatively recent 
incorporation into the Chinese administrative system as well as to the ethnicity of its 
population – but this autonomy remains more nominal than actual. Besides having an 
ethnic regional governor who is ―shadowed‖ by the Party secretary, Xinjiang Uyghurs 
enjoy few extra legislative rights compared to people living in other Chinese 
provinces.  
What does this study tell us about the history of administration in such cases? 
By documenting the role the law played in the Qing empire's state building project on 
its north-western frontier, it shows how law is used in conquered territories as an 
important tool of administration, but not as of forced acculturation. My observation 
thus differs from what is attested to in the history of European expansion.
489
  
If we make an overall evaluation of Qing governance in Xinjiang, it is fair to 
say that by the end of the dynasty Xinjiang was integrated, but it was far from 
acculturated into the empire. Why was that? My dissertation provides some 
explanations from a legal perspective. First of all, the early Manchu rulers, especially 
the Qianlong emperor, had an ambivalent attitude about fully applying state law to the 
ethnic frontier and his early mode of legal administration in Xinjiang was largely 
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inherited by most of the policy makers who succeeded him. Secondly, the nature of 
the Chinese law, which tolerated native customs to a great extent, created a technical 
obstacle for state law to intervene in civil cases among Uyghurs even when the late 
Qing governors in Xinjiang had the intention to do so. Thirdly, the deteriorating 
political and economic situation from the second half of the nineteenth century 
onward did not allow the new policy makers to carry out more institutional reforms.  
It is likely that Qianlong determined his legal policy in Xinjiang on the basis of 
both ideological and practical considerations. Ideologically, as the ruler of a 
multi-ethnic empire, Qianlong did not want to see the assimilation of non-Manchu 
peoples into Chinese culture. So he was reluctant to fully impose the Great Qing Code, 
which was compiled based on the Ming state law and thus served as an agent of 
Chinese culture, on Xinjiang Uyghurs. Practically, by adopting a flexible legal policy 
(or not drawing clear distinctions between Chinese law and Islamic law), the emperor 
was able to deprive the local level of the bureaucracy of decision-making power and 
so was able to maintain tighter control over the frontier areas. Therefore, Qianlong 
embraced a group of policies that were culturally tolerant and economically 
non-exploitive. In the legal domain, local dwellers were allowed to resolve most of 
their civil disputes and the majority of criminal ones within the sphere of the Islamic 
legal system.  
But Qianlong failed to foresee that having two laws operating side by side was a 
double-edged sword. Whenever the central authority loosened its control, frontier 





Xinjiang influenced the Qing‘s frontier rule in the opposite direction. As local 
rebellions and conflicts broke out frequently on this frontier, the Qing elites began to 
display an implicit distrust of East Turkestanis and as a result they began to modify 
their frontier policies. Consequently, the Manchu rulers‘ concern about the 
assimilation into Chinese culture eased and they tended to apply Qing law, especially 
the criminal law, to the frontier in a stricter way.  
Nonetheless, the actual policies in Xinjiang did not always shift in one direction 
only. As nationalism became more and more important as a theme in Chinese history 
and history-writing from the time of the late Qing onwards, as a glorification of the 
imperial past, so the high Qing frontier strategies never completely faded away. For 
instance, late Qing Xinjiang Governor Liu Jintang‘s statement about ―educating 
without changing their customs‖ actually reiterated Qianlong‘s idea of 
non-intervention. The practice of ―jiu di zheng fa‖ which prevailed in post-Rebellion 
Xinjiang also originated in the Qianlong period, when the laws were adjusted 
―flexibly‖ to intimidate local criminals and to consolidate the emperor‘s control over 
the frontier. On the other hand, from the second half of the nineteenth century onward, 
facing various crises from inside and outside, the Qing rulers were not able to carry 
out more ―formalizing‖ institutional reforms to make the frontier legal system more 
unified with that of the neidi. At the central level, the emperor was too preoccupied to 
involve himself with frontier administrative affairs; in the localities, toward the end of 
the dynasty Chinese magistrates explicitly left Uyghurs‘ civil disputes to be dealt with 





Besides the change and development of the Qing‘s frontier ruling strategies, my 
dissertation also discusses from a legal perspective the effect of the annexation and 
the establishment of provincial rule on the everyday lives of frontier dwellers, by 
showing the effectiveness in practice of Qing rule. In the early period of Qing rule 
over Xinjiang, the daily life of Uyghurs was seldom touched by Qing law or Chinese 
culture. Once provincial rule was established Xinjiang in 1884, bringing it into the 
regular administrative system in China, the magistrate‘s court in each county provided 
local Uyghurs with one more choice of a method to resolve their disputes. However, 
my study suggests that few Uyghurs actually litigated against Uyghurs in the Qing 
courts – instead most of them continued to deal with their civil affairs within the 
framework of their religion and their customs. Actually even if a Uyghur did go to the 
yamen, with only a few exceptions, he was not likely to receive from the magistrate a 
judgment different from the one he would have obtained at the religious court. 
Moreover, religious courts and local institutions applying customary law tended to 
resolve a case with more ease and efficiency than state courts. Thanks to the sustained 
policy of non-intervention, the Islamic legal system and the Uyghurs‘ 
community-based system of self-regulation continued to operate as usual in Xinjiang.  
Even when some Chinese provincial officials tried to impose greater 
supervision over the native social and gender order after the re-conquest, the flexible 
and customary features of Qing civil law did not make it easy for them to do so. In 
Xinjiang, as in the neidi, it was a time-honored tradition for Chinese magistrates to 





source of criminal law, Shari‘a contains a large group of regulations on economic and 
personal matters such as marriage and divorce. Archives show that Chinese 
magistrates were aware of native regulations and norms and usually set out to enforce 
them since this was the most efficient and familiar way to deal with local cases. 
Moreover, although their position theoretically endowed them with higher status than 
the local religious elites, the magistrates appointed by Beijing did not really want (or 
dare) to challenge Uyghur religious authority and preferred to remain aloof from 
conflicts between local Uyghurs and their native leaders. In most cases the two courts 
therefore remained in a relationship of cooperation. This was particularly manifested 
in the acknowledgement by Chinese courts of contracts signed according to Uyghur 
tradition.  
Though few disputes among Uyghurs were brought to the magistrate‘s court, 
my study of transactions between local dwellers and Chinese immigrants suggests that 
the state did play a crucial and active role in the enforcement of rights and 
transactions in the multi-ethnic world of Xinjiang. Actually, the state appears to have 
been surprisingly powerful in this field. My study shows that, people of different 
ethnicities were extremely cautious in their dealings with each other and so often 
made unique arrangements for their land transactions (such as zumai) to protect their 
respective interests. Moreover, unlike in the neidi or Taiwan, where the majority of 
people signed white contracts instead of red ones, in Xinjiang red contracts were 
widely used and both Chinese and Uyghurs were eager to have their land transactions 





people had strong expectations for the enforcement of contracts by the state and 
Xinjiang magistrates did show great respect for authentic contracts. All these 
situations indicate that in a multi-ethnic area where there was no established social 
mechanism to mediate between people of different ethnicities, formal state institutions 
were particularly important in upholding economic rights. While the contracts seem to 
be ―more social than legal‖ in the neidi, the northwestern frontier stories suggest that 
with the backing of the state, contracts turned property rights into a fundamental 
social institution. 
In general, the study of Qing policies of criminal jurisdiction indicates that legal 
pluralism in Xinjiang became more hierarchical and that its territory was gradually 
integrated within the state. But if we observe this development from the perspective 
of civilian life, the impression is clear that to a large extent ordinary Uyghur people 
still lived their familiar lives and followed their traditional religious and customary 
regulations. There seems to be a paradox that, while the Qing rulers carried out a 
series of culturally tolerant policies in order to better rule the ethnic frontier, their 
policies of this type constituted a barrier to acculturation and, more importantly, did 
not prevent riots and rebellions from frequently breaking out.  
How do the legal policies of the PRC compare with that of the Qing in Xinjiang. 
Such a comparison would be an interesting project. Was ―modernized‖ Chinese law a 
prerequisite for the Communist Party to fully impose state law on ethnic peoples? Did 





For the moment, we can concluded from this current study that Qing frontier 
legal policy led the area to became more ―unified‖ and better ―integrated‖ within the 
neidi toward the end of the dynasty, but that this trend was interrupted by the collapse 
of the Qing and so was never completed at that time. We may ask whether the 
transformation of the frontier policy of the central regime from an ―imperial mode‖ to 
a ―nationalist mode‖ was actually finalized in the PRC era. This will be the subject of 
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